men from the windows of the houses, shooting down the wounded in cold blood, when they stopped to rest, throwing boiling water upon them, and indulging in such atrocities, that the rebel General Jackson rebuked them, afterwards, most severely.

To attempt to retreat quietly and without fighting, through this town and toward Martinsburg, would have been equivalent to a surrender, for the enemy would have soon overtaken him, and completely overwhelmed his feeble forces. Fully satisfied of this, Gen. Banks determined to send his train, of which only about fifty wagons were yet lost, forward at once, and placing his troops in as good a position as possible, give battle to the enemy, and thus delay his advance, till the train could reach a place of safety.

At four o'clock A. M., of the 25th, having been re-enforced by about twelve hundred men, the 10th Maine and five companies of Maryland cavalry, stationed at Winchester, he opened fire on the advancing force of the rebels, and fought them for five hours, inflicting heavy loss upon them, and then fell back in good order, and continued his retreat to Martinsburg unmolested. After a halt of two and a half hours, at that place, they resumed their march, and reached the Potomac at sun-down. One little incident occurring on this retreat is worthy of notice, as it furnished the basis for an attack on General Banks, by the enemies of the war in Congress. It was reported and charged in the House of Representatives, by Mr. Voorhees of Indiana, that Gen. Banks had given the negroes, of whom large numbers joined in the retreat, seats in the wagons of the train, while the sick and wounded soldiers had been compelled to march on foot. The charge being forwarded to the General, he replied, that the only incident which gave the slightest foundation for such a charge was, that in passing along the lines, to encourage his men, he observed a little negro girl of nine years, who, without friends

620

THE ARMY AT WILLIAMSPORT.

or helpers, had kept up with the army for twenty-seven miles of the retreat on foot. Her tottering limbs showed but too plainly, that the liberty she was seeking, by a journey so toilsome, would come too late, unless she had an opportunity of rest. Stopping the driver of one of the guns, he stooped from his -horse, and raising her, seated her on the caisson, under the charge of the driver, and then rode along to attend to his other duties.

The ford was too deep for the greater part of the teams to attempt it before morning, but by noon of the 26th, the army and train of nearly five hundred wagons,-only fifty-five in all having been lost, and these were mostly burned-had crossed the Potomac. The losses, exclusive of those of Col. Kenly's command at Front Royal, were only about seven hundred, of whom thirty-eight were killed, one hundred and fiftyfive wounded, and a little more than five hundred missing, mostly prisoners. Including the loss at Front Royal, the entire loss was about one thousand six hundred. The retreating column had marched fifty-three miles, thirty-five of it in one day. Gen. Banks' body guard, the Zouaves D'Afrique, reached the Potomac, near the mouth of the Great Cacapon river, on Monday, and thence joined the army at Williamsport, having marched one hundred and twelve miles in about forty-eight hours. A more successfully conducted retreat, taking all the circumstances into account, is not to be found in the records of history.

The intelligence of this retreat, and of Jackson's advance upon the Potomac, created an extraordinary and unaccountable panic in Washington, Baltimore, and elsewhere at the North. The Secretary of War telegraphed at once to the Governors of the northern States, to send forward instantly, the militia regiments which they had at command, for the defence of the Capital, and within a week, twenty thousand soldiers were on their way to Washington, and its vicinity. Or

JACKSON'S RETREAT.

621

ders were also sent, with all speed, to Gen. McDowell, to send Gen. Shields' Division to the relief of Gen. Banks, and to Gen. Fremont, to cross the mountains, and attack Jackson.

Meantime, Jackson had turned aside at Winchester, and advanced, somewhat leisurely, toward Harper's Ferry. This important post had been assigned to Brigadier General Rufus Saxton, and he had assumed command on the 26th, and the same evening and the next day, had received considerable reenforcements, including three batteries, one of them a fine naval battery, under command of Lieutenant Daniels, U. S. N.; this was planted on Maryland Heights, and the others on Camp Hill. After two or three days' skirmishing, the rebel General resolved, on the evening of the 30th, to storm Maryland Heights, but after two fierce attacks, in both of which he was repulsed with heavy loss, he abandoned his purpose, and fell back to Winchester, and thence to Strasburg.

This rapid movement of retreat had become a necessity to the Rebel General, for, with his manifold sources of information, he had become aware that large forces had been detached from different directions to cut off his army from its connection with its base, and that only by the greatest activity and tact, could he avoid the capture of his entire force. He was fully equal to the occasion. His bold dash had accomplished the purposes intended, preventing the junction of McDowell's forces with those of McClellan for the attack of Richmond, encouraging the Rebel army, alarming the Government at Washington, and delaying McClellan's progress, until there should be time to bring in the new troops from the conscription, and thus make Johnston's force more nearly equal to that of the Union commander. It now remained for him to escape, by as rapid movement and as little fighting as possible, from the foes that were advancing upon him, and rejoin the rebel army at Richmond, or protect it from an attack on the north-west.

622

ATTEMPTS TO INTERCEPTION.

His retreat was timed with most consummate skill. He reached Strasburg in advance of both the Union commanders, and, with his rear guard, skirmished with Fremont, who first arrived, for one or two hours, while his main army was pressing on to Woodstock, eluding, meanwhile, a collision with the advance guard of Gen. Shields' force, which was at the same time approaching him from Front Royal.

It is due, however, to the two Union commanders, who have been, unjustly as it seems to us, censured for letting him slip through their hands, that we should give a more detailed account of their attempts to intercept his retreat.

Immediately on receiving intelligence of the retreat of Gen. Banks, and the disaster at Front Royal, the Secretary of War sent a dispatch to Gen. Fremont, directing him to fall back, by way of Harrisonburg, to the support of Gen. Banks. Gen. Fremont was at Franklin with his entire force, except that belonging to the rail-road district, and two regiments and some batteries under the command of Col. Crook, which were at Greenbrier bridge, thirty-five miles west of McDowell. The dispatch of the Secretary of War, reached him on the afternoon of Saturday, May 24th. The day previous, a Confederate force, three thousand strong, under Gen. Heath, had attacked Col. Crook, at Greenbrier bridge, but had been repulsed with the loss of their artillery, three hundred stand of arms, and one hundred and fifty killed and wounded, and a considerable number of prisoners. This repulse was so thorough that Gen. Fremont did not deem it necessary to reserve any of his troops to strengthen Crook's position, but gave orders on the same evening on which he received his dispatch, for a movement of his entire force toward Strasburg, early the next morning. In one particular, however, he did not obey to the letter, the order of the Secretary of War. That order required him to go by way of Harrisonburg. The route from Franklin to Harrisonburg lay across the Shenandoah Mountain, and was, at that

season of the year, nearly impassable from the mud, and the steepness of the mountain passes; neither forage nor supplies in any quantity could be procured upon it, and to reach Strasburg by that route, would require about eighteen or twenty miles more travel, than by the way of Moorefield and Wardensville. On this latter route, too, though the roads were bad, there was abundant forage and supplies.

Believing that he could more promptly and effectively accomplish his purpose, and the purpose of the Government, of stopping and defeating Jackson, by the adoption of this route, than the one indicated by the Secretary of War, and his division and brigade commanders concurring in his opinion, he pushed on northward from Franklin, on Sunday morning, the 25th of May, and though the roads were intolerably bad, owing to the recent rains, the army bivouacked fourteen miles from Franklin, that night.

On Monday, they reached Petersburg, sixteen miles further, in the afternoon, and thence,-knapsacks, tents, and baggage, being left behind, -the troops, with five days' rations of hard bread, were hurried forward, as fast as possible, over the mountains; but such was the condition of the roads, aggravated as it was by constant rains, that but twenty-two miles could be made in two days, and on Thursday the exhausted troops were obliged to rest.

On Friday, still encountering a heavy rain, they marched twenty miles, and bivouacked at Wardensville; on Saturday, they crossed the last range of mountains, still in the rain, and reached the point where the Winchester and Strasburg roads divide, six or seven miles from Strasburg; the men thoroughly drenched, and too weary to erect shelters, sleeping by the side of the road, or under the trees, where the earth was saturated with the rain.

At six o'clock the next morning, the advance was in motion, and before 9.30 A M., was engaged with the rear of Jackson's