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as yet weak and emaciated, I all by and by do very well. My to friends, Puzy in particular, are rse than I am, but will, I hope, on recruit themselves. Of our vants, one only is in a dangerous y; the others have suffered much, t will soon regain their health. y daughters are pretty well; my fe has for more than fifteen months en in a most deplorable state of alth. Fresh air and a little exere out of the prison might have enred her life; but these indulgencies re constantly denied. She is emated and weak. Her arms have en a prey to the ravages of disse, the effects of which are now iefly fixed in her leg, where she s a swelling and painful wound. rtunately the internal parts have t been affected, except for a short ne, and the disease has caused itIf to attack the extremities. The ctors have unanimously said, that would be madness in us to cross e Atlantic until she has a little revered. We are therefore going to rm an hospital in a retired place, d there employ ourselves wholto refit our constitutions. You e, my dear friend, that I set you e example to be very minute, and hope you will mention every partiilar relating to my hero and beloved

benefactor. I need not tell you, that on my emerging from captivity, my joy has been much embittered by the unexpected and affecting accounts of the difference between the United States and the French republic. The particulars are as yet unknown to me. This I certainly do know, that nothing can be more impolitic for both, and that my warmest wishes are to see these disputes amicably settled, which ought never to have taken place. I hope it will be the case; would to God I might be able to contribute to it!

"Adieu, my dear Huger. Present my compliments to all friends in your part of the United States. When can I hope for the delightful pleasure to meet with you again, to talk over the circumstances so honourable to you, so precious to me, of your noble, kind, and admirable conduct, in the most generous attempt that I ever heard of; to express to you at least a part of the veneration and gratitude which your personal character, your magnanimous friendship, your heroic exertions in my behalf, have so highly deserved, and by which I am happy to be for ever bound to you by all the sentiments that can attach the heart of your grateful and affectionate

"LA FAYETTE."

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them has been fortunately dissipated by repeated practical experiment. No one for a moment is now tempted to doubt, that, man to man, and regiment to regiment, the French soldiers are, both in a moral and phy. sical point of view, so decidedly inferior to the British, that the ancient romantic proportion of two to one has in some instances scarcely put them upon an equality. Still, how. ever, another part of the charm hovers around us. The general is invested with a double portion of that merit which he formerly divided with his armies, and we now hear of nothing but the commanding genius of Buonaparte, which, supplying all deficiencies, making up for all disasters, conquering all obstacles, gathers victorious laurels on the very fields from which every other general, ancient or modern, must have retired with defeat and dishonour. With this is combined a fearful and inaccurate apprehension, or rather a superstitious terror, of some new-discovered and irresistible system of tactics, devised and acted upon by this irresistible leader. Such opinions, were they generally entertained, would form a bad omen for a nation forced into collision, for all that they hold dear, with the very person of whose irresistible skill in arms such an ineffable idea is held forth. We are not however very apprehensive of this dispiriting creed becoming general among those whose opinion in such subjects is of most consequence, among the victors of Alexandria, Maida, Vimiera, Talavera, Busaco and Barrosa. The doctrine of French invincibility requires no confutation among those who retreated with Moore, or are now advancing with Wellington; nor is it to them that, like the ancient pedant in presence of Alexander, we

presume to read our lecture on the art of war. But we humbly dedicate our few and desultory observations on the French tactics in the field of battle, to every desponding statesman out of place, who seeks the character of wisdom by the presaging notes of a screech-owl, and to all those worthy common-council men and burgesses, throughout the united kingdoms, whose digestion is impaired by reflecting upon the military skill of Buonaparte. When we shall have stripped that skill of all exaggeration, enough will remain for reasonable apprehension, enough to recommend caution, and to discourage presumption on the part of his opponents; but, if our researches have been correct, his system will be found a simple one, neither implying any transcendant genius in the discoverer, nor necessarily conferring upon the general employing it, that decided superiority which has been falsely apprehended.

It is scarcely necessary to say, that our observations only respect the French principle of distributing their forces upon the day of battle. Other advantages, of a great and important nature, arise from the combination of the various corps of their invading armies, maintaining their liaison, or correspondence, by means of the etats-majors, or staff-establishments attached to every division, whose communication with each other, and with the head-quarters of the emperor, is preserved at all risks, and with a consummate degree of accuracy and address. Thus orders are circulated, and combined movements achieved in consequence of these orders, with the same ease and facility through various corps-d'-armée, occupying positions or moving upon lines of march an hundred

leagues asunder, as in other services through a single brigade. It is unnecessary to notice the unity, firmness, and consistency which this regularity and facility of intelligence communicates to the whole plan of invasion. Another cause of success, which may be shortly noticed, is their attention to the commissariat and its dependencies. Every French general is qualified to provide for the subsistence of his army; every French soldier is accustomed to lighten the general's labour, by look ing out for himself and his messmates; and it must be owned, that if the united efforts of the general and soldier prove unsuccessful, the latter can sustain hunger and privation with great patience and firmness. None of these considerations are embraced in our present inquiry; neither do we mean to investigate the still more powerful causes of success, which the French well name les grands moyens, which embrace espionage, bribery, political intrigue, and so forth. Our present subject is limited to the consideration of Buonaparte and his troops arrived on the field of battle, and preparing for conAlict. To estimate the extent of his genius, it is necessary to see what discoveries he has made in his profession, what improvements upon those of his predecessors. This requires a momentary glance at the history of the art of war.

In ancient times, when missile weapons were neither frequent nor formidable, the natural arrangement of armies was into masses, which might best support the shock of closing with pikes or swords. Such was the Macedonian phalanx ; and such, though more pliant and extended, and capable of subdivision, was the close array of the legions. Against

those nations among whom archery was cultivated to a degree which enabled them to maintain a distant bet constant and effectual discharge of arrows upon these solid bodies, this was the worst order of battle that could be imagined. Hence the suc cess of the Parthians against the Romans. In the feudal armies, the archery of England maintained the same superiority over the solid array of the French and Scottish, which presented a fair and slow-moving mark to their arrows, and which its own weight prevented from avenging the injuries it sustained. The gene ral introduction of fire-arms (a stil more unerring and destructive species of missile) necessarily changed the or der of battle from depth to extension, or from the mass to the line. See No. 1. of the annexed diagram.

This

It was obvious, that, without some improvement upon the art, the longextended line could not be easy moved without confusion; and be fore such improvement was discover ed, armies acting on the defensive usually took up some position, which they neither did nor could attempt to alter, during a general engagement, without hazard of utter ruin. ancient order may therefore be repre sented by a line without intervals, as that in No. 1.; not that there were not actually intervals in the ancient or der, but because it was not subdivi ded for the purpose of facilitating motion, In like manner, we mat be understood as speaking abstract edly and generally when we talk of the line being stationary. The wings and centre were moved in retreat or advance according to the vicissitudes of battle; but it was without princi ple or combination, which are neces sarily implied in a modern military movement. They advanced, if vic

torious, or retired, if discomfited; but they did not attempt such manoeuvres for the purpose of achieving conquest or avoiding defeat.

The genius of Frederick of Prussia brought into practical use an improvement upon this order of battle, the effect of which, whether applied to attack or defence, was to give the general the power of changing his array, and executing such movements, even during the heat of action, as must be decisive of the event, unless the same activity, pliability of disposition, and military talent, were displayed to counteract his purpose, as he brought to its execution. This grand step in the art military consisted in subdividing the long line (No. 1.) into a number of brigades, (No. 2.) each of which could be easily moved and manœuvred without the risk of confusion or interference. By this simple principle of subdivision, to which his troops and his officers were heedfully and regularly trained, the King of Prussia, instead of making his dispositions before the action, and then trusting the event to fortune and the valour of his troops, was enabled totally to change his arrangement in the very moment of advance, nay, even in the battle itself, and to gain such positions as must ensure the defeat of the enemy, who found themselves pressed probably on the very point, which, at the commencement of the action, was least menaced, and which was proportionally ill provided for defence. This is the guiding principle of the Prussian tactics, to facilitate which all their discipline tended, and which repeatedly gave Frederick conquest when employed against the most formidable armies; which, how ever brave, numerous, and skilful, did not possess the principle of activity thus maintained by the Prussi

VOL. II. PART II.

ans. In a word, the method of subdividing extensive lines with a view to facilitate their movements, the principles and machinery by which these subdivisions, and consequently the whole order of battle, can be accurately moved and reunited upon new ground, either in the former, or in any new relation, were brought to perfection, if not in a great measure invented, by Frederick the Second.

The Prussian tactics were transferred to France by the writings of Guibert; and although modified, as we shall presently see, to the circumstances of their own armies, do at present form the leading principle of all their movements. So little do those know of the modern art of war, who are daily exclaiming against the sluggish and heavy tactics of Frederick, as incompatible with, and supplanted by, the vivacious movements and new discoveries of the modern French school of war. The Austrians also adopted the new principle of movement; but unfortunately they had not genius enough to discover, that, like a mechanical power, it was capable of being applied in an endless variety of modes. They seem to have considered it as only applicable to the ancient order of an extended line, (as in No. 2.,) and to have overlooked the obvious consideration, that, having once divided the line of battle into moveable brigades, it became as easy to reduce it into a column of those brigades, as it is to form a regiment into a column of companies or half companies. About the year 1793, the Austrians might have been able to engage Frederick upon somewhat resembling his usual application of the principle which he had invented; but they were unfortunately unprepared for the tactics of a new enemy, who applied the same principle in a

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