concerned than as he Wills his imagining, or think ing about them, it going before any Decree of his Will that they should abfolutely be. I have therefore enough to conclude that all things, whatsoever Acts of God, or Acts of the Creature, Neceffary, Free, Contingent, Future, Good, Evil, that are, after the Decree of God, certainly known by the Knowledge of Vifion, were, before that Decree, when they were fulpended under the pleasure of God, whether they should abfolutely be or no, known as certainly by the Knowledge of fimple Understanding: * for any object whatsoever being fuppofed to be, it neceffarily followeth that the Divine Understanding hath Knowledge of it, because of the infinity of his Effence; Suppofing alfo any object as poffible to be, God neceffarily understands what would arife from it.

I will determine both thefe doubts in the words of † Bellarmine; God, by his Knowledge of fimple Underftanding, knew Man would fall if he were made, not only before his Creation, but before he had Decreed to make him. Therefore according to our mean Capacity, that Knowledge of this conditional propofition, viz. if Man be Created, he will Sin, doth precede God's abfolute Decree of making Man: for those things are first in God which are neceffary, then those which are voluntary; Seeing those things may not be in God, these cannot but be; but it is necessary for God to know all things, which may poffibly be known, whether they be abfolutely Future, or conditionally; otherwife he should not be of an infinite Knowledge, and therefore not God. But it was not neceffary, but voluntary, that God should decree to make Man. For more ample proof of this Foreknowledge of God concerning future contingencies, &c. I refer you to ** Suarez and tt Vafquez.

* Armin, Thef. de nat. Dei. Sect. 43. † De Amiss. Grat. L. 2. C. 17. **Opus. Lib. 2. †† De fcientia Dei 64.

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It being confeffed then, that there is in God fuch a manner of Knowledge which we call fimple or pure Understanding; the next confideration is, where we fhall find him ufing it. Queftionefs, no place is fo fit to feek it in, as in the Divine act of Predeftinating for as to Predeftinate is the first and highest act of the Will, fo to know by pure Understanding, is the firft and highest act of Knowledge, and the moft wife Agent. willeth nothing, but that which he hath first moft perfectly underftood, as before was faid.

In the first Opinion of the five fet down before, there was no place at all given to God's foreknowledge, whence the defenders thereof have a hard task to clear themselves from making God the Author of Sin, Sin being a futurum in the World, and to be ordered and governed by God.

In the fecond Opinion it was confeffed, that God did ufe this his Foreknowledge of fimple Understanding, in apprehending that Man would fall, if he were Created, before he Decreed to Create him; which is right well done. But what reason is there to ftop this Knowledge at this Object, or at one free act of the firft Man, and not to extend it to all the free acts of all Men in all times? God did understand by the fame Knowledge that if Chrift were fent to the Jews, they would not receive him, that if Peter were tempted, he would deny his Master, before he Decreed either to fend Christ, or to create Peter.

If this Question then be, how far the Knowledge of God extended it felf, before he Decreed any thing concerning Men, whether unto the Creation of the Mafs of Mankind in one, or to the fall of Mankind in the firft Man, or to Chrift to be fent into the World, or to the Faith of Men beginning, or to their end and perfeverance, to the beginning of the World,

or

or to the end thereof; it is most agreeable to the Infinite and Glorious Wifdom and Knowledge of God, to have extended it felf unto all and over all, the Whole, the Parts, the Kinds, Sorts and Individuals themselves; their Beginnings, Progrefs, Succeffions; his own and their Actions, Sayings, Thoughts; and even to the laft Ends and Events of things, which will be manifefted at the laft Judgment.

5.

This they mean, that extend God's Foreknowledge beyond the Fall, and would have Chrift and Faith in him, foreknown by this fcience of fimple Underftanding, before the act of God Electing or Predeftinating; not that they would make the Faith of the Believers, or Chrift himself, the caufes of God's Predeftination, but the Objects in God's Knowledge 1, Pet. 1: when he predeftinated both Christ and us, out of no 20. caufe, but the Good pleasure of his own Will. Now Eph. 1. 4. after the view of the whole World, God finding this frame both poffible to his Power, and good in his Wisdom, to declare thereby his Juftice and Mercy, and all other his excellent Attributes of Perfection, decreed to put it into being, and execution: which was the firft A&t of his practical Knowledge, calling up his Will to allow, approve and decree, this Goodly and Glorious Syftem, the mirrour of his Eternal Power and Godhead, and this Order of all things, efpecially of Human Kind, that great Mafs, out of which his Mercy, Justice and Sovereign Power, draws forth Veffels to Honour, and Veffels to Difhonour.

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CHAP.

Pag. 232.

CHA P. II.

Of the Will of God and the Distinctions thereof.

T is the proper Work of the Will to Predefti

infinite prefented by the Understanding, fhall be and come into light; for unless the Will and Power of God cause their production, their being known makes them not to be.

Predeftination, according to P. Ferrius, is a purpose; now a purpose is the last act of the Will determining for the doing of any thing: Predeftination therefore rather imports the willing fomething than the knowing it. He faith, the laft, because there is an act of the Will even in Knowing; for we first will the knowing any thing, that is, refolve to give fome attention to the Ideas we can form of it, before we know, or underftand it; afterwards we understand it, and give it, being understood, the fanction of our Wills: as was obferved by the fame Author a little before.

Here then is the firft act of God's Will, chufing and refufing; chufing that those things which now are, fhould be, refufing all the reft, even that infinite variety of things which he apprehended by his Knowledge of fimple Understanding, which he caft into perpetual Pfal. 135. darknefs and filence; doing, according to the Pfalm ift, whatsoever pleafed him.

6.

The Will of God being in it felf one, and fimple, may be confidered with diverfity, only as converfant about things that are diverfe, his Will allowing them to be diverfe.

First, then, there are fome things which God willeth to be done by himself, by his own Power:

as the World to be created of nothing: his Son to be fent into the World, made of a Woman, and fuch like. This Will of God never faileth, because he works it himself alone by his Almighty Power. Secondly, there are fome things which God willeth to be done by the Creature, either as a natural agent, as Flowers to be drawn out of the Earth by the Sun in the Spring; or by a voluntary Agent, as righteous and Good works to be done by Man; where notwithstanding, God himself concurreth and coope rateth with the Creature in a manner fuitable to the nature of a voluntary Agent. This fecond Will oftentimes faileth by the Creatures default, by whom God would have the Work wrought; God permitting, and not hindering that default, tho' he could have done it. Thirdly, fome things God willeth, and doth himself, or with others, antecedently to any thing in them, out of his own Goodness and Mercy; as all the Good we have in Nature, or in Grace; our Creation, our Calling, our Glory; God beginning, following, perfecting all our Good, out of his Abundant, and never-failing Bounty. Some things he willeth and doth, led or urged thereunto, upon fome occafion of the evil of the Creature ; as to forfake, to punish, or to deftroy it; and this is the Will of his Juftice, the Caufe of all the Punishment inflicted on Mankind. This distinction Damafcen took out of Chryfoftom on the firft to the Ephefians; and Anfelme calls it the Will of Mercy, and the Will of Justice; wherewith why fome Divines fhould find fuch fault I know not. do I conceive, why God's defire of the Welfare

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* Κατὰ τὰ εὐδοκίαν, φησί, ξ' θελήματος αὐξε Τετές, γιὰ τὸ σφοδρῶς θελήσουν· ἡ ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι, αυτη ἐξ, πανταχοῦ εὐδοκία, τὸ θέλημά ἐτι τὸ προηγούμθρον. ἔσι γάρ και άλλο θέλημα· εἷον, θέλημα πρῶτον, το μή απολέσαι ἡμαρτηκότας θέλημα δεύτερον, το shops xaxes &. Chryf. Hom. 1. in Ep. ad Eph. Cap. 1. Pag. 869. Fol.

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