acceptation of Foreknowledge, fignifying an act of the understanding, nor infer an Argument that the Perfons chofen according to fuch a Foreknowledge, were chofen for the Good that was approved in them; or that they could not but be chofen, becaufe they were Good in God's knowledge: for many Worlds of Men God might fee, in that infinite Knowledge 1 fpeak of, as eligible as these whom he hath chofen; all which notwithstanding he hath covered in the Eternal Darkness of neverbeing for to be capable of Election, and to be Eelected, I trow, are two things that do not neceffarily, always, follow one another.

For the clearing whereof, and of this whole queftion, it is fufficient to diftinguifh God's Knowledge into that of pure Understanding, and that of Vision; the first of thefe is the knowledge of all things poffible, understood in the Omnipotency of God himfelf: the fecond is of things that fhall be, upon the Decree made that they fhall be; for then they are, feen as prefent. The firft is natural in God, the fecond is free; namely following fome free act of the Will of God.

We find * Aquinas thus diftinguishing; God knows all things whatsoever, after what manner foever they are &c. fome things although they are not now in being, yet either they were, or shall be; and all thofe thingt God is faid to know, by the knowledge of Vifion, &c. But fome things there are which are in the Power of God, or the Creature, which yet neither are, nor were, nor ever shall be; and in respect of these, God is not faid to know by the Knowledge of Vi fion, but by the knowledge of pure Understanding.

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In like amnner alfo † Fra. Junius; "To Supply. the defect of our weak apprehenfions, we fancy a two-fold manner of God's knowledge; one is where †Thef. Theol. Difp. 8.

Part. 1. Q. 14. Art. 9.

Thef. 32, 33.

« &c.

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by he hath a full and adequate Notion of himself another, whereby in one act, not fucceffively; eternally, not in time; by his Effence, not by reception of intelligible fpecies; immutably, not contingently; " he knows all things that are, or that are not as yet, but shall be, by the Knowledge of Vision; that is, he fees them as if they were prefent before him: "those things alfo which are not, nor ever shall be, " he knows, fo far forth as he knows whatever he him• felf is able to do, and what by his permiffion may "be done of every Creature.

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Add to these that of Zanchius, God knows also the things that are not, no less than thofe that are; but we are to obferve that there is a difference betwixt the knowledge of those things which are not as yet, but shall be hereafter, and that of those which never shall be. For God knows things of the first kind in himself, as in one that is not only able, but also willing, to make them to be--but thofe of the latter kind, that is thofe things that might be, but never will be, God knows them only in his Powerful Effence; that is therefore termed by fome the Knowledge of fimple Underftanding for God understands those things merely as fuch which he could bring into being--but the former is called the Knowledge of Vifion; for God feeth thofe things, which are known by it, as prefent; because they certainly fhall come to pass.

This diftinction is without queftion to be allowed of; but then, two things may be doubted about it; first, whether, when we fo diftinguish, we must neceffarily fo feparate the objects of thefe two kinds of Knowledge, viz. things poffible from things future: and fo unite, or appropriate things poffible to the Knowledge of fimple Understanding, and things future to the Knowledge of Vision; that it is not poffible the fame thing fhould firft be known as poffible to be, and afterwards as future or certain to be: and ★ De hat. Dei. Lib. 3. cap. 2. Q. 8. F

first

firft, be the Objects of fimple Understanding, and then (a Decree of the Divine Will determining their futurity) be Objects of the Knowledge of Vision.

This is of fo much importance to me, that if all these things that are now in the World, have been, or fhall be, by the force of God's Decree that hath fettled them, were not before that Decree, known only as poffible, by the natural and neceffary Knowledge of God, only conditionally, if he please to give them being and way: If, (I fay) this be not true in God, after our manner of Understanding I am quite befide the mark, and this is the prime miftake that leads me into this long error. But I need not fear, fince it is undeniable, that the Knowledge of God is not the caufe of things, but his Will joined to his Knowledge and Power; whence it follows, that it is not neceffary, that things fhould actually exist, becaufe God knows them, but only, that they might be. So long as they are but in the Understanding, they are there but as things poffible; and if this were not fo, there would be no fpeculative Knowledge in God, of things which he worketh, but practical only: which is contrary to what the principal School-men conclude with great fhew of reason, viz. that God created all things, and doth create &c. therefore the Idea, Form, and Copy of all things, must needs be in God's UnderStanding and Mind: for what Artifan doth any thing, who hath not the Idea and Form of those things which he makes, preconceived in his Mind? Which reasoning of theirs was before made ufe of, and notably expreffed by + St. Auguftine. God, faith he, made nothing ignorantly, which also cannot be rightly spoken of any Artificer. whence we meet with a kind of Miracle, but yet a Truth; that this World could not

*Zanchius Lib. 3. Cap. 2. Quæft. 3. de nat. Dei. Thom. fumm. Part. 1. Q. 14. Art. 16.

† De civ. Dei Lib. 11. Cap. 10;

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be known to us, unless it had been; but unless it had been known to God before it was, it had never been. The like may be feen in Prideaux; before thefe times every Divine held for most certain those things which follow, First, that God was the cause of things; Sccondly, that he framed them not by his Knowledge only, but with his Will adjoined; Thirdly, that his Knowledge was to be diftinguished twofold, viz. into that of pure Understanding, and that of Vifion; the one refpecting things Poffible, and the other things Future; Fourthly, that the former of thefe is to be understood as preceeding the Act of God's Will, the latter as comprehending the former; (for if he knows any thing will be, he muft have known that it might be ;) Fifthly, that not the former, but the latter, afcertains the futurity of things.

It being then confeffedly apparent, that the Knowledge of fimple Understanding must be conceived to precede the Act of the Divine Will, whereby the fame things that were refpected as poffible, are now refpected as future; and that an Act of the Divine Will, added to the Knowledge of their poffibility, determines the certainty of their being: My firft Doubt is fufficiently cleared.

The fecond Doubt is, whether future, contingent, conditional things, efpecially the free Acts of a created Will, under fuppofition if fuch an one were created, or placed in this or that Order, be a subject knowable unto God by his Knowledge of fimple Understanding. The reafon of the Doubt is, becaufe they that difpute against that kind of Knowledge, which the Jefuits term fcientia media, fay, that this kind of Knowledge hath no Object, and confequently there is no fuch kind of Knowledge, for all the acts of

Ante hac ufque tempora (inquit Ripa Epifcopus Curfulenfis) Theologus quifque hac certiffima habuit &c. Prid. Lect. 2. P 54.

+ Dicunt infuper Scholaftici fcientiam Dei mediam quâ novit fi hoc fit, illud futurum. Armin. Thef de Natur. Dei. Sect. 43. Freewill

F 2

Freewill are determined by a Divine Decree. So that God knows no otherwise that they will be, than because Lect. adâ. he hath Decreed that they shall be. Thus Prideaux with his ufual perfpicuity. Again they say, that they will not strive about the name of Scientia media, but that they are difpleafed at the thing couched under it, in as much as it fuppofes fuch free actions of a created Will, as do not pre-fuppofe a Divine Decree, but in order at least precede it. This that difpleafeth might indeed with reafon difpleafe, if Scientia media did apprehend the free actions of a created Will fimply as Futare. but it seems to be a mode of the Knowledge of fimple Understanding, and evidently partaketh more of the Knowledge of fimple Understanding, than of that of Vifion; in that it fees no more than the poffibility of things, and fees the futurition of them only upon fuppofition, if God by his Decree command their coming into being. Neither can this contradicting here ftand good, with the grants and conceffions by them made, both before and after. Not with what they granted before; when they tell us that all agree, that God doth from Eternity know, not only things them. Ibid. felves, but all their fuitable Combinations, or Connexions prefent, paft or future, neceffary or contingent, by a kind of Knowledge not conjectural, but most certain and abfolute; and that the Dominicans are flandered, when it is faid, they deny abfolutely, that God doth foreknow fuch future conditionate things: Paulus Ferrius confenting that God doth know fuch things. Not with what they grant afterwards, when they fay, there be fix ways by which God is faid to know things conditionally future; and that the question is not whether they are known or not, but by which of these waies they are known. For I ftrive not for the manner how, but if they be known any way, certainly it must be by God's Simple Understanding, in which his Will is no farther

Specim. Schol. Orthodox. cap. 23.

concern