them, would lay afide all prejudice, ana fuffer their judgments to be ravished to the embracing of Truth by the argumentative allurements of Scripture and Reafon. Thou wilt find the fingular use of this enfuing Piece in affording thee light to, and carrying thee thro' thofe obfcure intricacies controverted betwixt the Remonftrants and Contra-Remonftrants. And that it may be of this fingular use and benefit, is the hearty prayer of

Thy Friend and

Servant in Chrift,

J. G.

A DIS

Α

DISPUTATION,

Concerning the

NECESSITY and CONTINGENCY of EVENTS, &c.

I.THE Sum of the Controverfy is this; Whether or no all things that ever have or shall come to pass in the World, have been, or shall be effected neceffarily, in respect of an irrefiftible Decree, by which God hath everlastingly determined, that they should inevitably come to pass.

2. Whether or no many things have not been done contingently, or after fuch a middle Manner between impoffibility of being, and neceffity of being; that fome things which have been might as well not have been, and many things which have not been might as well have been, for ought God hath Decreed to the contrary.

An happy compofing of this intricate Controverfy will be of excellent ufe not only in guiding us fafe thro' the Briers of these prickly Disputations of Predeftination, Free-will, the Caufe of Sin, &c. which at this Day have fet Proteftants, Papifts, Lutherans, Arminians, and Puritans, together by the ears, but over and above in eafing us of many Scruples and perplexing Cafes, which daily arife in our minds, concerning God's Special Decrees, and particular. Providence, in refpect of the paffages of our Life.

But the fingular Ufes of this Difputation will beft appear when it is finifhed; and therefore without any further Preface, I betake my felf unto it, pur paling to carry fuch an equal eye to Brevity and

Perfpicuity, that the Reader fhall have no just cause to fay, that I am either obfcure or tedious.

I have already divided the main Question into two particular Queries. Many Divines completely Reverend, both for their Knowlege and Practice of Religion, and therefore defervedly of precious esteem in the Reformed Churches, have fubfcribed affirmatively to the first Query; maintaining, that whatfoever any Creature doth, Man or Beast, Plants or Inanimate Elements and Meteors, God from all Eternity hath Decreed, that they fhould neceffarily do it; fo that a Man doth not fo much as fpit without a Decree yea, they fay, that there falleth not fo much as a drop of rain, or arifeth a blast of wind, fine fpeciali Dei juffu.

Contrariwife, fome others of as good, tho' perhaps not of fo great a name as they, both for their Learning and Love of Orthodox Religion, have fubfcribed affirmatively to the fecond; teaching, that as God in his Wisdom hath ordered, that fome things are impoffible and cannot be; fome things neceffary, and cannot but be; fo alfa hath he poised fome things in fuch an equal poffibility of being or not being, and left it to his Creatures choice to turn the fcale, that in refpect of him they fall out contingently; it being as poffible for his Creatures to haveomitted them, as to have done them.

I have a good while hatted between these two Opinions; I have Sceptically hovered over them, to fee where I were beft to light. Sometimes I have fent out my Affent like Noah's Dove, but fhe mifliking her footing, fpeedily withdrew her felf back again, till at length the finding better entertainment amongst this fecond company, she hath returned now at laft with an Olive branch in her Mouth, with that Emblem of peace, Uniting my diftractions.

The

The Arguments by which Truth first courted, and at last ravished my Affent, are thofe which both confirm the fecond, and confute the first O. pinion.

The first manifeftly discovers an Heathenifh Error, lurking implicitly in the oppofite Opinion: Our Adverfaries indeed do difallow it explicitly, and I know they heartily miflike it; but it will too evidently appear, that if that Error be Paganifm, their Opinion is little better, which I prove thus; It was the conceit of the antient Stoics, that all things were governed and brought to pafs by an inevitable Deftiny, all things falling out by fatal Neceffity, in fpight of Men, and according to the addition of Poets, of Gods alfo. Now do not our Oppofites in this Controverfy impofe a fatal Neceffity on all things? Yea, they go further in this point than fome Stoics; for, as it may be collected out of fome of their Writings, tho' they fubjected the main Events and Ends to irrefiftible Destiny, yet they fuppofed the Means by which a Man might, tho' vainly, endevor to cross thofe Ends, arbitrary in Man's Choice. But our Oppofites impofe a Neceffity on all things whatsoever, not only upon Ends and Events, but also upon the Means. For example; according to their Doctrin, God hath not only Decreed that I fhall, or that I shall not escape this Infection, but he hath alfo Decreed that I fhall, or I fhall not use the Means to escape it. So that all the Abfurdities that dog the Stoical dream of fatal neceffity at the heels, are infeparable attendants of this Opinion. For I may not only fay, if I fhall die of the Infection, I fhall; if I fhall not die, I fhall not; and therefore I need not ufe Means to avoid it: But alfo, if I muft ufe Means, I must; if I must not, I must not: Seeing God's Decree neceffitateth as much to use or omit the Means, as to obtain or lose the End. For if their Opinion be true, all things whatfoever, End or Means of little

or great moment, come to pass neceffarily or unavoidably, by reafon of God's eternal Decree.

Here they have two Evafions. The first is this; Albeit, fay they, God hath most certainly determined what fhall, or what fhall not be done concerning us; yet his Decree is hid from us, and we must use lawful and ordinary Means for the obtaining of fuch and fuch good Ends, keeping on the ordinary courfe which he hath revealed to us.

See the Vanity of this Shift; our Opposites teach, that whatever God hath Decreed fhall be done, and whatsoever is omitted fhall be undone. If therefore God hath determined that we should not use such and fuch Means, it is impoffible for us to use them; if he hath Decreed that we fhould, it is impoffible that we fhould omit them. And therefore it is more than ridiculous to fay, that altho' God in his Secret Will hath determined that we should not do fuch a thing, yet we are to do it, feeing his Decree, tho' it be fecret, yet it will have its Effect; and it is abfolutely impoffible we should do that, which God hath determined we fhall not do.

However, fay our Oppofites, our Opinion is Far from Stoicifm; for the Stoics thought that all things came inevitably to pass, by reason of an indiffoluble Chain and Connexion of natural Caufes: but we teach, that all Events are irresistibly neceffary, by reafon of God's everlafting Decrees, and his Omnipotency daily executing them.

This reafon is fo poor a one, and yet so much made on by fome worthy Men, that I am more troubled to wonder at it, than to confute it; yet that I may fatisfy it diftinctly, I will divide the Opinion of the Stoics into two particular Tenets.

1. They hold, that all things come to pass inevitably.

2. They