Special Formerly when it was necessary to restrain a transfer of stock, the court required the plaintiff to make the company, in whose books the stock was standing, a party, in order to restrain it from permitting a transfer (a). In order to save this unnecessary expense, an act of parliament was passed (b), by which it was provided, that any court of equity might order the Bank of England, the East India Company, and South Sea Company, to suffer a transfer of stock to be made, or to pay dividends belonging to or standing in the names of any party to a servant, or issue an injunction to restrain such transfer, although those companies were not made parties. It was also provided that in suits then depending, where the company had put in an answer, not claiming any interest in the stock required to be transferred, proceedings should be stopped, and the bill dismissed; but by a singular mistake in the penning of the act, the latter words of the section are not prospective, only extending to causes then depending; the consequence is, that those public bodies may still, if the plaintiff thinks proper, be made parties (c). Some check, however, is provided for an abuse of this power, by a declaration of Sir J. Leach, that (a) Lord Kenyon is stated to have been of opinion, that notice to the Bank, without more, would operate as an injunction, 6 Ves. 772. But Lord Eldon has denied that, observing that the Bank never would admit that, even upon a subpoena and bill filed, ib. 773. n. (b) 39 and 40 Geo. 3. c. 36. (c) Temple v. Bank of England, 6 Ves. 770. Attorney General v. Gale, ib. n. where the Bank has been unnecessarily made a Special party, the bill will be dismissed as against it with Injunctions. costs (a). An application under this act to restrain the Bank, or the other public companies mentioned in it, from making a transfer, must be upon notice to the defendants; or where, from the necessity or urgency of the case, notice cannot be given, the application must be upon affidavit, verifying, that such urgency and necessity exist (b). property. It seems to be settled that courts of equity will Husband assigning not interpose in prejudice of the legal right of a husband over the wife's property, if such property equitable can be made available without resorting to a court of equity (c). But injunctions have been granted to restrain the husband from assigning or transferring her equitable property, until a proper settlement has been made under the superintendance of the court (d). (a) Edridge v. Edridge, 3 Mad. Rep. 386. Skrymsher v. cote, cit. ib. North (b) Hammond v. Maundrell, 6 Ves. 773. n. So before the act an injunction could not be granted till after appearance, or where the defendants were in contempt, and upon notice. Doolittle v. Walton, 2 Dick. 442. (c) 1 Fonb. on Eq. 29. 5th ed. 1 Roper on Husband and Wife, 256. (d) Ellis v. Ellis, 1 Vin. Ab. Sup. 475. Roberts v. Roberts, 2 Cox, 422. There is a dictum upon this subject by Lord Ellesmere, which is very much in the style of Twisden: a man having run away with his wife against her friends' consent, sued for her portion in Chancery; his Lordship dismissed the bill, observing, "he that steals flesh, let him provide bread how he can." Bignal v. Langton, Prac. in Chancery unfolded, 50. Special Injunctions. Whether husband will be restrained of lands to be settled rate use of There is a note in Dickens of a motion before Lord Northington, in which he refused an injunction to restrain the husband from receiving the rents of certain houses, which he had covenanted to settle from receiv- to the separate use of the wife. It was sworn on ing the rents the part of the husband, that she had eloped from covenanted him and refused to return, although he had applied to the sepa- to her to do so; the motion was refused, Lord Northington thinking that if granted it would probably be the means of preventing her return (a). It is difficult, however, to support this decision, as it seems to be settled upon the authorities, as collected in a valuable treatise which has lately appeared (b), that neither the wife's elopement only, nor her elopement and adultery, deprive her of the power of enforcing any of her legal or equitable. rights, with the exception of the right to dower (c). the wife where she has eloped. Husband re strained wife's term after a divorce a mensâ et thoro. There is an Anonymous case of an earlier date, in from selling which the court was induced, by the importunity of counsel, to grant an injunction, in restraint of the legal rights of the husband, which can hardly be justified. A feme sole being possessed of a term of years, married and was divorced a mensa et thoro, and had alimony allowed for her support. The husband intending to sell this term, the court was induced to grant the injunction, for which it gave this extraordinary reason, that though the marriage (a) Lee v. Lee, Dick. 321. 806. (b) 2 Roper on Husband and Wife, 137. (c) Sydney v. Sydney, 3 P. W. 277. Blount v. Winter, ib. Field v. Serres, 1 N. R. 121. This does not apply to the cases in which the wife applies for a favour, as a maintenance out of her equitable property, &c. 2 Roper on Husband and Wife, 134. continued, notwithstanding the divorce, yet the Special Inhusband did nothing as husband nor the wife as junctions. wife (a). court re Where it appears by affidavit that an infant ward Intercourse is about to make a marriage without the consent of with ward of the court, an injunction will be granted not only to strained. restrain the marriage, but also all communication with the infant, and all intercourse, either personal or by letter: and if the guardian is suspected of countenancing the intended marriage, he will be restrained from giving his consent without the leave of the court (b). from inter his child's education. The court has also in a remarkable manner exercised Father reits jurisdiction in regard to infants, by depriving the strained father, in many cases of immorality, ill-treatment, fering with or even insolvency of his legal right to the custody of his child (c); and accordingly, in several instances fathers have been restrained from taking their children abroad, or interfering in any manner with their education (d). ship. An injunction will be granted to restrain the Sailing of sailing of a ship. This was formerly attempted to be done in the great cause of the East India Com (a) 9 Mod. 44. (6) Lord Raymond's case, Forr. 58. Beard v. Travers, 1 Ves. 313. Roach v. Garvan, 1 Dick. 88. 1 Ves. 157. Lord Noel v. Somerset, cit. ib. Lord Shipbrook v. Lord Hinchinbrook, 2 Dick. 547. Hodgson v. Watson, cit. ib. Pearce v. Crutchfield, 14 Ves. 206. Warter v. Yorke, 19 Ves. 454. Tempest v. Ord, 1817.' Wilcox v. Drake, 2 Dick. Whitfield v. Hales, 12 (c) Butler v. Freeman, Amb. 301. 631. Powell v. Cleaver, 2 Bro. C. C. 499. Ves. 492. (d) Ex parte Warner, 4 Bro. C. C. 101. Creuze v. Hunter, 2 Cox, 242. De Manneville v. De Manneville, 10 Ves. 52. Special Injunctions. Assignees dividend. pany v. Sandys (a); but the court refused to make the order. The instances of it in recent times are frequent (b). In a case which has been before alluded to, an injunction was granted on the application of a part owner of an unascertained share, to restrain the sailing of the ship till his share was ascertained, and the proper security settled (c). In a subsequent case, however, this application was refused, where the ship was intended to sail the following day, and it did not appear that there were any circumstances to account for the plaintiff's delay (d). An injunction may be granted on the application from making of a plaintiff in a bill for an account against a bankrupt, to restrain the assignees from making a dividend till the account has been taken (e). Removal of timber wrongfully cut. Injunction to restrain presentation An injunction was granted by Lord Thurlow, without any difficulty, to restrain the removal of timber wrongfully cut (ƒ). An order to this purpose is frequently inserted in the ordinary injunction to stay waste, where the defendant appears to have already committed waste. An injunction has also been granted before answer to restrain presentation or induction to an eccleor induction. siastical benefice (g). Lord Eldon has also incidentally observed, that he should not hesitate to in (a) 2 Ch. Ca. 165. (b) Marasco v. Boiton, 2 Ves. 112. (g) Potter v. Chapman, 1 Dick. 146. Amb. 98. |