that branch of the profession. He should be a perfect master of the doctrines of equity, which were, in fact, dicta emanating from the Lord Chancellor-not from him who immediately exercised the functions of the office, but from his predecessors, extended and enforced by himself. And, it was most important, that the Chancellor should also be acquainted with all the persons who practised the law. This was necessary, because the whole patronage of the law was in the hands of the Lord Chancellor, except the situations of the Welch judges-and these, he understood, were excluded, as being of a political nature-they were, therefore, in the appointment of the first lord of the Treasury. All other judicial offices were, however, in his nomination-the Master of the Rolls, the twelve judges, the King's counsel, and the commissioners of bankrupts, mainly depended on his recommendation for their appointment. Why, then, should such a power as this be placed in the hands of a man ignorant of the court of Chancery, incapable of judging of the individual merits of lawyers, and who would be only important as a great political engine? The person elevated to the rank of Chancellor should have a practical knowledge of the state of business in this court, that CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN THE PENIN SULA.] he might be able to expedite it, to corrected their lordships as follows: The Marquis Wellesley rose and addressany abuses which might be observable, and to bring back the practice to what it My lords; what secret cause amidst the was in former times. At an earlier period, splendid scene that has been exhibited on it was customary for the Lord Chancellor, the peninsula-what malign influence, when he first took his seat in the court, to amidst the rejoicings and acclamations of enter into a brief view of the situation in triumph, has counteracted the brilliant which he found it, and to state what course successes of our arms, and has converted he intended to adopt, for the reform of the glad feelings of a just exultation into evils, and the general dispatch of business. the bitterness of regret and disappointThe great lord Bacon, and others, the ment? With an army in discipline and glory and the pride of the profession, had spirit, superior to any that had ever been done this. The inauguration speech, (if assembled; uniting in itself, qualities so he might be allowed the term) of lord various, as never to have entered into the Bacon, was still preserved; and in it he composition of any other such assemblage pledged himself as to the line of conduct of force-with a general, pronounced by he would pursue; thus laying down cer- the whole world to be unsurpassed in antain principles, by which an accurate cient or modern times, the pride of his judgment might be formed of the manner country, the refuge and hope of Europein which he fulfilled his covenant with the with a cause, in which justice vied with public. But was this course to be expect policy, combining all that was ardent in ed from some lord Shaftsbury-some mere the one motive, with all that was sober in intriguer-some common public debater the other-with the eyes of Europe fixed -some hackneyed politician, ready at the on our movements-with the admiration nod and beck of those in power? And of the world excited by our achievements yet, such would probably be the Chancel--how is it, that our hopes have been lors hereafter to be formed under this Bill. The hon. and learned gentleman then entered into the merits of the Bill, which he raised only to be frustrated-how is it that we have been allowed to indulge in expectation of an approaching completion of success, only to behold the utter disap- | gaged, as you were, by every sentiment that can inspire the breast of a patriot, zealous for his country's glory, and for the welfare of mankind, or that can animate a nation, inspired as this has been, with the noblest motives of generosity and justice, you at length, by experience, find your exertions and the efforts of the country to be vain and hopeless,-then it will be for your lordships to say, whether you shall not tread back your steps, and correct your error, upon the ground, that England has done her utmost; but that the great strain of her force has not been able to bring you nearer to your object, than you were at the commencement of the campaign. In any view of the question, it is one, which demands the fullest inquiry, and the most serious exercise of your deliberative powers. : My lords, I say, that all these questions deserve most serious attention; they are questions most important to the country, In what I have to state to day, I do not and require the most ample explanation.-mean to impute to his Majesty's ministers Are these fatal events the result of the any intention of providing means inadeweakness of the empire? Is it that, in quate to the magnitude of the cause in the great contest in which we are engag- which the country is engaged the difed, (the grounds of which are so familiar ference between us will be this ;-have to us) the resources of the country have the resources of the country been adefailed? Is the weakness in the thunder- quately managed by them during the last bolt, or in the hands that wield it?—Are year? Have they been sufficient to reach we to understand, that the resources of the the object we all hoped to attain? And Country are deficient, or that those who with that view, let us examine, what the have the management of them do not pos- crisis was at the commencement of the sess that wisdom and energy, which should campaign; and let us compare it with direct their application? Your lordships the exertions that have been made, and will seek, in the answers to these ques- with the means of the country. tions, whence you are to trace, under all the circumstances of advantage which have opened to you, the causes of our failure, and the disappointment of our hopes you will learn whether the reSources of the empire are inferior to the great attitude that Great Britain has assumed in the peninsula and in the world; or whether the misfortunes which have attended our efforts, are to be traced to those who have had the administration of our resources. If you shall find, that the events we deplore are not attributable to any deficiency in the resources of the empire, but to the weakness and imbecility of those who direct them, then it will be for your lordships to pronounce judgment on the conduct of those who have en feebled our means, and have betrayed a mighty cause. If, on the other hand, it shall, upon inquiry, appear, as the result of all the facts before you, that the effort We have made has been complete, and that England has done her utmost; that England can go no further, and that en Where any description of persons present themselves before the country, in a crisis of war, difficulty, and of arduous contest, the nation has a right to call upon them to be equal, not only to the difficulties that may come upon them, (difficul ties long in prospect, long foreseen) but also to be able to meet unexpected diffi culties; and still more has the nation a right to expect, that persons in such a situation should be equal to meet the advantages that may occur incessantly; but, perhaps, the most moderate request the nation can make, to those who are in the capacity of having to exercise the duties of the ministry, would be to take advantage of circumstances, which are proceeding by degrees, and by steps accompanied by all those signs that denote their approach; going on, not suddenly, rapidly, or unexpectedly; but proceeding regularly as the result of the established causes, destined by Providence to designate the probable course of human events. But above all, if these effects operate. I know that with respect to the policy of our interference, there originally existed a very great difference of opinion. The object of that policy in its first commencement was this: the question was, whether by securing Portugal, and other important objects, such an example of the military means of the country would not have the effect of establishing a system, out of which might grow encouragement to the rest of Europe, by holding out hopes of support to those states about to sacrifice their independence, at the same time influenced by the spirit of resistance, but not daring to avow it. The object of our policy was to admonish those who required our assistance, that they had only to assert their independence in order to obtain it, and that there was no nation over which the influence of France had unfortunately spread its baneful wing, that if it would rouse itself, might not, with the assistance of this country, find the means of correcting what was mischievous and injurious in its own government. This seemed a natural course of things; but there were some, and one in particuJar, (lord Grenville) whose opinion, indeed, disagreed with my own, but whose person and character I have always regarded with love and veneration. To these, it seemed better to await the event of circumstances in other places, and not engage so deeply, till other causes for our interposition had more fully developed themselves. Whatever may have been the effect of their system, it is due to them to say, that they acted upon the best judgment they could form at the time. I have stated, (and I have not the least intention of retracting the opinion,) my belief to be, that great as have been the exertions of Spain, the aid of our armies was necessary to promote, and to facilitate those exertions; and that our efforts, had they been adequate to our means, would have been important towards effecting the general restoration of the affairs of Europe. My firm conviction and belief, expressed in this House, in the cabinet, out of the House, every where, have always been, that the great hope of Europe lay in the exertions of Spain and Portugal, aided by the British arms. There were, at the particular time to which I wish to advert, favourable circumstances which influenced my opinion. I am betraying no secret when I state, that as early as April 1811, and even before that time, many persons in this country, and particularly his Ma jesty's ministers, (and if they wish for any remembrance on the subject, let them look at the paper which I now hand over to them) knew perfectly well, that Russia was laying the foundation of that general effort which she has made, and is now making; that she was laying the foundation of that effort in the most plain and intelligible manner; that we had before our view, the preparations she was making in every part of her empire; that it was her object not to make war against Francenot to carry on a contest for power--not to proceed in imitation of the French government, but to establish the foundation of such a resistance as that, if the French should pursue their plans of conquest and aggression, they might not only be repelled from Russia, but that Russia might lay the foundation, on honest and fair principles, of those exertions, which would enable her to convert her system of defence, into a system of offence. It was a system which grew under our eyes; it was no matter of astonishment to any one. If you doubt what I say, see what the emperor of Russia says on entering Prussia. He says, "that he was per fectly prepared; that he had prepared the means of resistance long and regularly, and that he expected the result which had taken place, as the natural effect of what he had established." This was the state of circumstances with regard to the system adopted by Russia. It was growing, not in a way to be doubtful; it was growing, not only under your eyes, but in the eyes of the whole world; it had reached that period, at which no man could doubt what would be the result. As we were all acquainted with the ambition of the ruler of France, and as no one could expect him to diminish his efforts, it was evident, that the result would be such a resistance on the part of the Russian empire, as in all probability, would be attended with the most favourable consequences. Not only was that resistance attended with circumstances the most favourable; not only were they most favourable as to the decision of the campaign, but they produced a strong disposition in other countries, to avail themselves of the fallen influence of France, and of the blow which had been so successfully struck against her power, and the ambition of her ruler. The effect of the exertions of Russia went further: I am stating what is known to the world. It is perfectly well known, that the disposition of a large part of the army and population of Prussia, was decidedly in favour of the cause of Russia. The army of Prussia, to a certain degree, was paralyzed and neutral. With regard to Aus. tria, she was desirous of asserting her independence, but did not dare to do it. This, I think, was the great advantage produced, as to the situation of Austria, by the effect of the system pursued. What had we to desire? What was the object we had to urge during this last crisis? I speak of that, with respect to which I can speak with certainty, because I can refer to the documents on the table. Could we wish for any thing better, than that Austria should assert her independence, that circumstances should impel her to assert her independence? She had been under the necessity of reducing her military power; but this great crisis afforded her the opportunity of raising it again. It was within her own power that she should be independent, which I think she is now. What her sentiments may be, as to England and British counsels, I know not; but it is a point on which is raised the whole of this question. What have been, the counsels we have given her? Have we given her the means of recovering her independence? The first object was, to free her from the war, and to induce her to abstain from assisting in the destruction of the independence of other powers. Whether with regard to Austria we have acted wisely, and honestly, it is essential to know. There was another country favourable to the crisis which the exertions of Russia had produced. Sicily, from a variety of causes, bad detained a great British force, had neutralized, and rendered it inactive, for the general contest in which we were engaged. Owing to the conduct of a noble lord, whom I am happy to call my dear friend, with whom I have been associaled under great public difficulties, whom I found one of the most active, able, useful instruments, that could be employed in so great a cause; one of those who had watched over the first dawnings of lord Wellington;-I mean lord William Bentinck: owing to him, at last, the great disposable force in Sicily was at liberty to co-operate in the common cause. This is not all: the advantages you pos sessed in other parts of Europe, as well as in the scene of action, even surpassed your hopes. I have stated, and I think the best system to be adopted, was to concentrate your efforts. The state of circumstances was of such a nature, both here and in the peninsula itself, as rendered it proper, in the first instance, only to try the experiment on a limited scale. I thought so at the time; and I still think, that such was the proper line of conduct at the commencement of our first opera. tions.-But I am no less decidedly of opinion, that great exertions ought afterwards to have been made. It is certainly any thing but wisdom to have conducted the contest in its subsequent and more advanced stages, upon the same principles upon which it had been prosecuted at the beginning. The strength of your situation in the peninsula, during the last campaign, was totally different from what it had been at any time since the commencement of the war. I have taken the date of the opening of the campaign (and I wish the noble lord to understand, that it is because I would avoid lessening any part of the glory and advantages of that campaign) from those two splendid successes, the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos. These advantages had been accompanied with a most extraordinary, and a most fortunate, failure in the means and relaxation of the exertions of the French in the peninsula. The state of their government there was such, that I do not know to what to compare it, except, as an intelligent friend has suggested to me, to the weakness of the governments whom we have, at different times, endeavoured to combine in alliance with us. The efforts of the French army had been deprived of the advantages of unity, of counsel, and action. Distraction reigned among the generals; the exertions of the army were wholly different from those which we had seen covered with success, when the soul which inspired it was present, directing every movement, and infusing vigour into its operations. Instead of superintending the army in person, its general was com pelled to abandon it; to leave it to conflicting powers,-to authorities ridiculous and contemptible. I hardly know how to express my ideas of the wretched nature of the central government under Joseph. A miserable government, without power, with out authority, without talents to creat respect, to secure compliance, or to command obedience, with each part of it in a state of hostility, with respect to the other. Their army was hardly in a better situation. The commander in the south not able to assist, or draw assistance from, the commander in the north; and the general in the north, as little able to calculate upon the assistance and co-operation of the commander in the south. that the French force must be spread over Here, then, was a most astonishing and favourable circumstance. When the ruler of France confined himself to one object, which, however impossible the attainment of it might be, was a French object, his army seconded his views, and was ready to sacrifice itself for the principle which it considered a national one; but when his ambition led him to distant enterprises, when he embarked in projects to be carried into effect, at the same time, in different parts of the world, and when, instead of directing his plans himself, he left them to a government more weak and imbecile than any that disgraced Europe, then, as might be ex-active operations, and another, adequate pected, we found a system adopted, the reverse of that which had led to his for mer success. to keeping in check any separate corps of the French army: would not this have been an advantage operating in the most This brings me to a point, which, among powerful manner? Was not this advan-. others, I adverted to on the first day of the tage well known? Might it not have session. It was supposed, I had said, that been turned to the best account, if our it was absurd in the British government to government had understood how to seize think of making any effort in the penin- the favourable moment? Marmont's army sula, unless we had a force superior to was comparatively weak-Soult's army that of France. I never conceived such was divided-the central government was an idea: I will state the idea I always destitute of energy, and divisions and dishad above all others, under the circum-tractions existed among its officers; therestances applicable to the question before you. I have before stated to you, that the original project we had in view, at the period of our co-operation in the peninsula, was the security of Portugal: and that point obtained, it was to be consider ed, what would be the best mode in which we could render assistance to Spain. I have always conceived, that the mode should have been this, and your failure shows, that it is the mode to which you should have had recourse. Had you resorted to it, you might have attained your object, with a force not even equal to that of the enemy. You were aware fore, if ever there was a period when every circumstance demanded extraordinary efforts-if ever there was a crisis which required the greatest exertions-if ever an opportunity offered, beyond all that had ever before occurred, this was the crisis which should have produced in every man, an unison of feeling, as to the course to be pursued. It was a time-an opportunity-calculated to unite the opinions of all men, even of those who differed most from me on the preliminary parts of the contest. All must agree, that if ever there was a crisis in which the cause of Europe was at stake, this was the crisis. |
