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Of the Objection to the Syftem of Materialism derived from the Confideration of the DIVINE ESSENCE.

IT

T will be faid, that if the principle of thought in man may be a property of a material fubftance, the divine Being himself may be material alfo; whereas, it is now almost univerfally believed to be the doctrine of revelation, that the Deity is, in the strictest fenfe of the word, an immaterial fubftance, incapable of local prefence; though it will be fhewn in its proper place, that the facred writers fay nothing about fuch a fubftance.

Confidering how much this subject is above all human comprehenfion, it is no wonder that the most oppofite opinions should have been maintained with respect to it. But this confideration, at the fame time that it ought to check our boldness, ought, likewise, to have taught us mutual candour and indulgence.

I am fully aware how difficult it is to exprefs myfelf with clearness on a fubject fo extremely obfcure, and how hazardous it is to advance the very little that any man can fay concerning it. But I fhall not, on this account, decline fpeaking freely and fully to every difficulty that either has been urged against

against the fyftem of the materiality of man, or that has occured to myfelf with refpect to it; and the objections which arife from the confideration of the divine effence, are of fuch particular confequence, that I shall treat of them in this separate section. I only beg those who are friends to freedom of thought, and inquiry, to attend to the few confiderations that I fhall offer on this very difficult fubject.

In the first place, it must be confeffed, with awful reverence, that we know but little of ourselves, and therefore much less of our Maker, even with refpect to his attributes. We know but little of the works of God, and therefore certainly much less of his ellence.

In fact, we have no proper idea of any effence whatever. Our afcribing impenetrability to matter might make us imagine, that we had fome kind of idea of its fubftance, though this was fallacious; but now that, by a rigid attention to the phenomena, and a ftrict adherence to the laws of philofophizing, we have been obliged to deny that matter has any fuch property, but befides extenfion, merely powers of attraction and repulfion, it will hardly be pretended, that we have any proper idea of the fubftance even of matter, confidered as divested of all its properties. The term subftance, or effence, therefore, is, in fact, nothing more than a help to expreffion, as we may fay, but not at all to conception.

We

We cannot speak of attraction or repulfion, for example, but as powers belonging to, and refiding in fome thing, fubftance, or effence, but our ideas do not go beyond these powers; and when we attempt to form any thing of an idea of the fubftance of matter, exclufive of the powers which it has, and exclufive of the impenetrability which it has not, all ideas vanifh from the mind, and nothing, absolutely nothing, is left for an object of contemplation. If it be ftill called a fubftance, it is, however, as immaterial a one as any perfon can wish for. In reality, the term immateriality never did, or could fuggeft any idea whatever. That the term fubftance and effence are of no use but as modes of expreffion, is evident from our speaking of the fubftance or effence of things, as if they themfelves were only properties.

If then our ideas concerning matter do not go beyond the powers of which it is poffeffed, much lefs can our ideas go beyond powers, properties, or attributes, with refpect to the divine Being; and if we confine our defini-. tion of God to thefe, it is not poffible that we can make any mistake, or suffer by our misconceptions. Now the powers and properties of the Divine mind, as clearly deduced from the works of God, are not only fo infinitely fuperior to those of the human mind, when there is fome analogy between them, but fo effentially different from them in other refpects, that whatever term we make use of to

denote

denote the one, it must be improperly applied to the other.

In two circumstances that we do know, and probably in many others of which we have no knowledge at all, the human and divine nature, finite and infinite intelligence, most effentially differ. The first is, that our attention is neceffarily confined to one thing, whereas he who made, and continually fupports all things, muft equally attend to all things at the fame time; which is a moft aftonishing, but neceffary attribute of the one fupreme God, of which we can form no conception; and, confequently, in this respect, no finite mind, or nature, can be compared with the Divine.

Again, the Deity not only attends to every thing, but must be capable of either producing, or annihilating any thing. For fince all that we know of bodies, are their powers, and the divine Being changes thofe powers at pleafure, it is evident, that he can take them all away, and confequently annihilate the very fubftance; for without powers, fubftance is nothing. And fince he can communicate powers, it is evident, that he can produce fubftance. So that, in this refpect alfo, as the Divine powers, fo the Divine nature must be effentially different from ours; and, confequently, no common term, except fuch comprehenfive terms as being, nature, &c. can be properly used to exprefs them both.

Again, as the Divine nature has properties incompatible with all created and finite natures, fo, though there must be fome common property in all beings that have any action or influence upon one another, there is no evidence of the Divine nature being poffeffed of the properties of other fubftances, in fuch a manner as to be intitled to the fame appellation. For example, the Divine effence cannot be the object of any of our senfes, as every thing that we call matter is. For though the divine Being, in order to his acting every where, must be every where, we are not fenfible of his prefence by our fight, hearing, or feeling, &c.

There is, therefore, upon the whole, manifold reason to conclude, that the Divine nature, or effence, befides being fimply unknown to us, as every nature or effence is, has properties moft effentially different from every thing else; and, therefore, we shall certainly deceive ourselves, if we call things fo different from one another by any common

name.

Upon the whole, it is plain, that no proof of the materiality of man can be extended, by any juft analogy, to a proof or evidence of a fimilar materiality of the Divine nature; for the properties or powers being different, the fubftance or effence (if it be any convenience to us to use fuch terms at all) muft be different alfo.

If

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