I fhall not difpute about a word. It will be fufficient to ob ferve, that our affurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our obfervation of the veracity of human teftimony, and of the ufual conformity of facts to the reports of witneffes. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their conftant and regular conjunction; 'tis evident, that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human teftimony, whofe connexion with any events feems, in itself, as little neceffary as any other. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree; had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they not fenfible to fhame, when detected in a falfehood: Were not thefe, I fay, difcovered by experience to be qualities, inherent in human nature, we should never repose the least confidence in human testimony. A man delirious, or noted for falfehood and villany, has no manner of authority with us.

And as the evidence, derived from witneffes and human teftimony, is founded on paft experience, so it varies with the experience, and is regarded either as a proof or a probability, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of objects, has been found to be conftant or variable. There are a number of circumftances to be taken into confideration in all judgments of this kind; and the ultimate standard, by which we determine all disputes, that may arife concerning them, is always derived from experience and obfervation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any fide, 'tis attended with an unavoidable contra

riety in our judgments, and with the fame oppofition and mutual deftruction of arguments as in every other kind of evidence. We frequently hefitate concerning the reports of others. We balance the oppofite circumftances, which caufe any doubt or uncertainty; and when we difcover a fuperiority on any fide, we incline to it; but fill with a diminution of affurance, in proportion to the force of its antagonist.

This contrariety of evidence, in the prefent cafe, may be, derived from feveral different caufes; from the oppofition of contrary teftimony; from the character or number of the witneffes; from the manner of their delivering their teftimony; or from the union of all these circumftances. We entertain a fufpicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witneffes contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a fufpicious character; when they have an interest in what they affirm; when they deliver their teftimony with doubt and hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent affeverations. There are many other particulars of the fame kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument, derived from human testimony.

Suppofe, for inftance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that cafe, the evidence, refulting from the teftimony, admits of a diminution, greater or lefs, in proportion as the fact is more or lefs unusual. The reafon, why we place any credit in witnesses and historians is not from any connexion, which we perceive à priori, between teftimony and reality, but because we are accuflomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attefted is fuch a one as has

feldom fallen under our obfervation, here is a conteft of two. oppofite experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the fuperior can only operate on. the mind by the force, which remains... The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assu¬ rance in the teftimony of witneffes, gives us alfo, in this cafe, another degree of affurance against the fact, which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction there necessarily arife a counterpoife, and mutual deftruction of belief and authority.

Ifhould not believe fuch a story were it told me by CATO; was a proverbial saying in ROME, even during the life-time of that philofophical patriot *. The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might invalidate fo great an authority.

The INDIAN prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of froft, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very ftrong teftimony to engage his affent to facts, that arose from a ftate of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and which bore fo little analogy to those events, of which he had had conftant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it t..

*PLUTARCH, in vita Catonis.

But..

No INDIAN, 'tis evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a fituation quite unknown to him; and 'tis impoffible for him to tell à priori what will refult from it. 'Tis making a new expe riment, the confequence of which is always uncertain. One may fometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but ftill this is but conjecture. And it must be confeft, that, in the prefent case of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy, and is fuch as a rational INDIAN Would not look for. The operations

of..

But in order to increase the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let us fuppofe that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the teftimony, confidered apart, and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that cafe there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist.

the of Argyl

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the a proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument-from experience can poffibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain fufpended in the air; that fire confumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle if it ever happen in the common course of nature. "Tis no miracle that a man in seeming good health should die on a fudden; because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently obferved to

of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it comes to the freezing point, the water paffes, in a moment, from the utmoft liqui-. dity to perfect hardnefs. Such an event, therefore, may be denominated extraordinary, and requires a pretty ftrong teftimony, to render it credible to people in a warm climate: But ftill it is not miraculous, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumftânces are the fame. The inhabitants of SuMATRA have always feen water fluid in their own climate, and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they never faw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore they cannot reasonably be pofitive what would there. be the confequence..

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happen...

happen. But 'tis a miracle, that a dead man fhould come to life; because that has never been obferved, in any age or country. There muft, therefore, be an uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can fuch a proof be deftroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an oppofite proof, which is fuperior *.

The plain confequence is (and 'tis a general maxim worthy of our attention) "that no teftimony is fufficient to establish "a miracle, unless the teftimony be of fuch a kind, that its "falfhood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which "it endeavours to establish: And even in that cafe there is a "mutual destruction of arguments, and the fuperior only gives "us an affurance fuitable to that degree of force, which re

nature.

Sometimes an event may not, in itself, feem to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reafon of fome circumftances, be denominated a miracle; because, in fact, it is contrary to these laws: Thus, if a person, claiming a divine authority, fhould command a fick perfon to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in fhort, fhould order many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command; thefe might juftly be eftecmed miracles, because they are really, in this cafe, contrary to the laws of For if any fufpicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident, there is no miracle and no tranfgreffion of the laws of nature. If this fufpicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a tranfgreffion of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man fhould have fuch an influence. A miracle may be accurately defined, a tranfgreffion of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interpofition of fome invisible agent. A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and effence. The raifing of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raifing of a feather, when the wind wants ever fo little of a force requifite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not fo fenfible with regard to us:

6

"mains,