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For the fame reafon that activity, and perceptivity cannot arife from joining together "dead and inert parts," which is the language of Mr. Baxter, no powers whatever could be affirmed of any mafs of matter, because matter being infinitely divifible, it is impoffible that the ultimate parts of it can be poffeffed of any powers. And there is no more reason in nature, why perception may not belong to a fyftem of matter, as fuch, and not to the component parts of it, than that life fhould be the property of an intire animal fyftem, and not of the feparate parts of it. It might also be faid, that no harmony could refult from a harpfichord, because the fingle notes, feparately taken, can make no harmony. Mr. Baxter, however, fays*, that "if an active and per

*

ceptive fubftance have parts, these parts "muft of neceffity be active and perceptive.'

This argument has been much hackneyed, and much confided in by metaphyficians; but, for my part, I cannot perceive the leaft force in it. Unless we had a clearer idea, than it appears to me, that any perfon can pretend to have, of the nature of perception, it must be impoffible to fay, a priori, whether a fingle particle, or a fyftem of matter, be the

proper feat of it. But judging from appear

ances, which alone ought to determine the judgment of philofophers, an organized fyftem, which requires a confiderable mass of matter, is requifite for this purpose. Alfo, judging * Effay on the Soul, p. 236.

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by obfervation, a mafs of matter, duly organized, and endued with life, which depends upon the due circulation of the fluids, and a proper tone of the folid parts, must necessarily have fenfation and perception. To judge of the perceptive power, without any regard to facts, and appearances, is merely giving scope to our imaginations, without laying them under any reftraint; and the confequence of building systems in this manner is but too obvious. It is high time to abandon these random hypothefes, and to form our conclufions with refpect to the faculties of the mind, as well as the properties and powers of matter, by an attentive obfervation of facts, and cautious inferences from them.

OBJECTION VI. From the Comparison of Ideas, &c.

It is faid, there can be no comparison of ideas, and confequently no judgment, or perception of harmony or proportion, which depends upon comparison, on the fyftem of materialism; for that, if the ideas to be compared be VIBRATIONS in the brain, they must be perceived by a different substance, infpecting, as it were, and confidering that ftate of the brain *.

But if the brain itself be the percipient power, as well as the fubject of these vibra* See Letters on Materialism, p. 63.

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tions, it must both feel the effect of every particular impreffion that is made upon it, and alfo all that can refult from the combination of ever fo many impreffions at the fame time; and as things that agree, and things that dif agree, cannot imprefs the brain in the fame manner, there is certainly as much foundation for a perception of the difference between truth and falsehood, as upon the hypothefis, of a fuperintending mind. For the mind, it is evident, has no ideas but what refult from the ftate of the brain, as the author quoted above very expreffly allows, Confequently, if there be no impreffion upon the brain, there can be no perception in the mind; fo that, upon any hypothefis that is consistent with known facts, there can be no state of mind to which there is not a correfpondent state of the brain; and, therefore, if the brain itself can be the feat of feeling, or of confcioufnefs, its feeling or confcioufnefs may be just as various and extenfive as that of the independent mind itself could be. It is impoffible there should be any difference in this case, unless the mind could have fenfations and ideas independent of the state of the brain, which every obfervation proves to be impoffible.

It is a very grofs mistake of the system of materialifm to fuppofe, with the author of the Letters on Materialifm, that the vibrations of the brain are themselves the perceptions. For it is easy to form an idea of there being vibrations, without any perceptions accompanying

panying them. But it is fuppofed that the brain, befides its vibrating power, has fuperadded to it a percipient or fentient power, likewife; there being no reafon that we know why this power may not belong to it. And this, once admitted, all that we know concerning the human mind will be found in the material nervous fyftem; and this percipient power may as well belong to one system

as to one atom.

OBJECTION VII. From the Nature of

Attention.

It has been faid, that attention is a state of mind that cannot be the effect of vibration *. But as fimple attention to any idea is nothing more than the fimple perception of it, so a continued attention to it is nothing more than a continued perception of it; which is the neceffary confequence either of the conftant prefence of the object which excites it, or of the prefence of other affociated ideas, in circumstances in which it muft neceffarily make the greatest figure, and strike the mind the most.

I fhall here introduce fome more of Mr. Wollafton's arguments to prove, that the body and the mind must be different fubftances, though I think them unworthy of him. My replies will be very fhort, and fometimes ad bominem.

*See Letters on Materialifm, p. 147.

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OBJECTION VIII. From the Difference between the Ideas and the Mind employed about them.

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"That which perufes the impreffions and "traces of things in the fantasy and memory, must be something distinct from the "brain, or that upon which those impres"fions are made. Otherwife it would contemplate itfelf, and be both reader and book *. But what is the diftinction between the reader and the book, in an unembodied spirit, which certainly must have a repofitory for its ideas, as well as be provided with a principle of intelligence to make ufe of them?

Will

not this argument affect the fimplicity and indivifibility of such a spirit, to fay nothing of fuperior intelligences, and of the divine Mind?

OBJECTION IX.
IX. From the Expreffion, MY
BODY, &c.

"As a man confiders his own body, does "it not appear to be fomething different "from the confiderer, and when he uses this

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expreffion, my body, or the body of me, may "it not properly be demanded, who is meant by me, or what my relates to?

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-Man

being fuppofed a person confisting of two

*Wollafton, p. 358.

"parts,

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