persons in whose wisdom and equity both parties confided, that is to say, were settled by arbitration. Arbitration, then, as applied to the practical affairs of life between individuals, must have been coeval with the earliest dawn of civilization, if, indeed, it did not precede it. That it was the forerunner of our commonlaw courts, and the ancestor of our modern jury system, is, I think, quite obvious. Of course its exact origin is unknown and unknowable; for, like the old English common law, of which it is a part, it reaches back through mists and traditions of ages to a time quite beyond the memory of man. In its more modern and complex form, as incorporated in the judicial systems of all civilized peoples, arbitration has been described as "an adjudication by private persons, appointed to decide a matter or matters in controversy, on a formal reference made to them for that purpose." From which it appears there are three cardinal points of difference between a court of arbitration and a court of law. In the first place, the arbitrators are "private persons," as distinguished from officials. They hold no commission from the state, and represent no sovereign power. They cannot, therefore, compel attendance nor impose fines and penalties for contempts. Their authority may be revoked by the will of either party at any time before the award; and after the award is once made their functions cease altogether. They cannot revise their own decisions, nor can the case be reopened, except by a new agreement between the litigants. In the second place, the proceedings in a court of arbitration, unlike those in an ordinary court of law, are governed by rules previously agreed upon by the parties in interest, or by the arbitrators themselves if so authorized, rather than by legislative enactments or judicial precedents. There are no technical pleadings, and special forms are unnecessary. In a court of law, a mere technical error in the pleadings may indefinitely delay or even wholly defeat the ends of justice; but in a court of arbitration, the litigant may state every circumstance connected with his case without apprehension of failure through ignorance of mere form. Again, in an ordinary action at law, it is seldom possible to decide more than a single question at a time; and thus it sometimes happens that one lawsuit becomes the fruitful source of others. But a court of arbitration may decide upon all collateral issues, set one claim or injury against another, and pronounce such a sentence as will put an end to all disputes between the contending parties. It is not ordinarily essential, therefore, that an arbitrator should be a member of the legal profession; for although it is often desirable that he should be acquainted with the fundamental principles of the law, his only necessary qualification is, that he be the choice of the disputants. Finally, the award of an arbitral tribunal, unlike the sentence of a law court, is generally supposed to have no sanction other than a sense of honor or the fear of public opinion. This was so once, but it is no longer the case; for now, in most cases of private arbitration, the exceptions have become the rule. They occur where the reference was had at the suggestion or by order of some court of law, or where there is a general statute, or a series of statutes, providing for the enforcement of awards, as, for instance, in England and in some of the states of the United States. Even under the old English common law, an award properly and fairly made was held by the courts to be obliga tory; while in modern practice, there are so many indirect ways of enforcing an award by legal process, that, generally speaking, all awards, properly and fairly made, may be said to have legal sanction. Paradoxical, then, as it may seem, there is such a thing as compulsory arbitration. It was known to the English law more than three centuries ago; for there were arbitrations of important cases by "rule of court," prior to the first statute on the subject under William III.; and since that time there have been long series of statutes, whereby the cases that may or must be referred to arbitration have been so multiplied that a bare enumeration of them would be tedious. Indeed, all cases are now referable to arbitration, save only such as arise out of the administration of the criminal law, or out of agreements and transactions against public policy; and even in some of these, where there is a remedy by civil action as well as by indictment, a reference of the matter in dispute has been held to be good, and the award sustained by legal action. The same general principle permeates our whole American system of jurisprudence. The old English common law, and the principle of arbitration as part of that law, prevailed in each of the thirteen colonies; and it prevails to-day, in each of the original states of our federal Union, except where it has been modified or repealed by statute. Even by legislative enactments in some of the states, as, for instance, in Pennsylvania, as early as 1705, compulsory arbitration was extended to a class of cases hitherto unknown to the laws of England; and by the present civil codes of all the states, with, possibly, one or two exceptions, every matter of controversy, whether in suit or otherwise, may be referred to arbitration. And whether the reference be by agreement between the parties themslves, or any rule of court, the award generally has some form of legal sanction. By the Revised Statutes of the United States, all civil controversies are referable to arbitration; and in pagan and Mohammedan countries, where, by treaty, our ministers and consuls exercise judicial functions, arbitration of private disputes is often made compulsory. The application of the principle of arbitration to disputes between nations, although a logical sequence of advanced civilization, is of more recent origin. One hundred and seventeen years ago, when Robert R. Livingston, of New York, first suggested it as a rational substitute for war, and predicted that the example of it then being made by two of the New England states in the adjustment of their boundary dispute, would soon become general, the idea was ridiculed as being too visionary and impracticable to merit serious consideration. And yet, what do we see to-day? When two governments disagree, either as to the validity or amount of a claim by one against the other, the first thing usually proposed is arbitration, which is generally accepted. The natural and appropriate method of settling all such differences is now almost universally acknowledged to be by mixed commission or by an umpire. Where there are reciprocal claims and set offs, it is now a rule in the practice of nations to refer the whole to an arbitral commission. Even the higher and more vital class of international disputes, such as relate to boundaries, to the interpretation of treaties, to title by prescription, and to other issues involving intricate and delicate questions of public law, are now generally referred to a joint commission of jurists. All this is of modern origin. within the past hundred years. It has come about opening of the nineteenth century, there had hardly been a single instance of international arbitration worthy of the name. Since then, however, there have been about one hundred and twenty, or an average of one and one-tenth for every year; and to more than half of these the United States has been a party. The sixteen Latin-American states have been parties to about twenty-five. England, as the leader of the movement in Europe, has been a party to about thirtytwo. The Pan-American Conference of 1890 went a step farther, and recommended that international arbitration be adopted as "a principle of American public law," and made compulsory in all cases except only in controversies involving national independence. Only these last were to remain optional. This Since then the proposition has been advanced, by the two great English-speaking nations of the world, to establish a permanent international court of arbitration for the adjudication of all disputes between them, and that its decision be enforced by both. broad principle was soon afterwards embodied in the draft of a treaty between the United States and England, in 1897. The treaty failed of ratification by the United States Senate only because it had been hastily and unskilfully drawn, and was thought to be crude and faulty in form. The principle itself was not controverted. But how shall a permanent court of international arbitration be established; and how shall its sentences be enforced without war? The questions are recognized as presenting many difficulties; and yet they are not more difficult than those which were presented in the original project of our own federal Constitution. It will be recalled to mind by those familiar with the discussions pending the final adoption of the Constitu |