with the Takutu, and thence along the midstream of the Takutu to its source, thence in a straight line to the westernmost point of the Akarai mountains, and thence along the ridge of the Akarai mountains to the source of the Corentin, called the Cutari river."

As this decision is final, and must be so regarded by both parties, it would be idle and unprofitable to offer any criticisms upon it. That it is a compromise, pure and simple, is manifest; and I am willing to believe that it was prompted by the purest of motives, and by the wisest considerations of expediency. But the question naturally arises, Where, in the treaty, is there any authority for compromises by a tribunal whose functions were expressly and purely judicial? True, the tribunal was the sole judge of the facts, and of the law applicable to the case; and it was fully authorized to "determine" the divisional line. But there is a wide difference between determining a preexistent de facto or de jure line, and the making of an arbitrary line de novo. For the new line thus set up follows neither historical facts, tradition, or legal precedent; nor is it a conventional line drawn according to the old "middle distance" rule.

Even as a compromise line, granting the power to compromise, its practical utility is open to question. It seems to have been established without much regard to topographical conformation, or to the convenience of the adjacent proprietors. It bisects the island of Barima, cuts at right angles the navigable section of one river, divides the ownership of another, partitions a section of an indivisible delta, and divides the sovereignty of a well-defined tract, the limits of which are plainly marked by natural monuments of rivers and mountains, and which is accessible only through the territory of one of the proprietors. These conditions,

instead of proving to be a bond of friendship between the two proprietors, seem more likely to give rise to endless misunderstandings and conflicting interests, and therefore to become a source of perennial discord.

However, let us hope that these apprehensions may never be justified, and that a spirit of comity and good neighborhood may henceforth prevail between the two late adverse claimants. The mouths of the Orinoco have been awarded to Venezuela, their true and rightful owner; and that, after all, was the great point of contention. And, aside from all other considerations, the decision is a peaceful adjustment of a long standing and acrimonious international controversy which, otherwise, might have involved the whole continent in a war, the cost of which would have been more than a hundredfold the value of the entire territory in dispute.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1

A

RBITRATION, arbitratio, is a word which seems to have an equivalent, more or less exact, in every written language; and the thing indicated by it is probably known, in some form or other, to all peoples, whether savage or civilized.

At any rate, it is safe to assume that the principle of arbitration, as applied in the settlement of private disputes between individuals, is as old as the oldest civilization; and the probabilities all are that it is very much older. For, in the progress of society, a considerable length of time must have elapsed, after the ideas of property and exclusive rights of individuals had arisen in the minds of men, before any compulsory system of distributive justice was established. During that unsettled period, there must have arisen many disputes involving the rights of person and property; and such of these as were not appealed to arms could have been settled only in one of three ways. Some of them may have been adjusted by mutual concession and agreement between the parties themselves; others may have been settled through the intervention of friends; but perhaps the majority of the more important disputes were referred to some indifferent person or

1 This chapter embodies the substance of an address delivered by the author at the Fifth Annual Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, in June, 1899.