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the guest of the nation. He was formally received with honors by both Houses of Congress; but there was some discussion in both as to whether the course pursued by the government was not a departure from its traditional policy of non-intervention in European affairs. The weight of opinion, however, was that it involved no material departure; because, in the first place, there had been no violation of any rule of international law or comity; and, in the second place, the action of the United States government was not guided or influenced by any obligation to, or any understanding with, any European or other foreign power.2

Again, it has been said that the Monroe Doctrine has never received legislative sanction; that the President alone has no right to declare principles obligatory upon foreign nations; consequently, that it can have no real validity. Such an argument merits little consideration. In the first place, Congress has never dissented from any part of the Monroe declaration. On the contrary,

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The Resolution which passed in the House of Representatives on the subject of the proposed Panama Conference of 1826, cannot be held an exception; for it merely expressed the opinion that the United States ought not to be represented in that particular Conference" except in a diplomatic character; that the United States "ought not to form any alliance with all or any of the South American Republics; " but that "the people of the United States should be left free to act, in any crisis, in such manner as their feelings of friendship towards their sister Republics, and as their own honor and policy, may at the time dictate."

In looking back upon the Panama Conference from this length of time, it is easy to understand why it failed. Unfortunately it struck against the rock of American slavery. One of the questions proposed for discussion in the Conference was "the consideration of the means to be adopted for the entire abolition of the African slave-trade." There was a possibility that the condition of the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, then possessions of Spain, and still slave-holding, might be made the subject of discussion and of contemplated action by the Panama Congress. Moreover, Haiti, already a negro Republic, would claim the

that body is constructively committed to the doctrine as a whole. All resolutions introduced on the subject have been in support of it. That of January, 1824, by Mr. Clay, was never called up; that of June, 1879, by Mr. Burnside, was merely referred; that of December, 1880, by Mr. Crapo, was unanimously sustained by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, but the session closed before the report could be taken up; and with the exception of the Anglo-Venezuelan Resolution of 1896, which passed both Houses without a dissenting vote, there have been no others. In the second place, every lawyer knows that most of the rules of international law derive their authority from usage alone; and that the Monroe declaration is a precedent universally acknowledged and accepted by the peoples of both the Americas. It has been confirmed by the declarations of every President of the United States, from Monroe to McKinley, who has ever had occasion to refer to it. It has always been regarded as a matter above and beyond mere party, and has been persistently asserted by leaders of both the great political parties in the United States. Moreover, to say that it has no validity for want of formal legislative sanction, is tantamount to saying that Washington's Farewell Address has none; for neither did that ever receive any formal legislative sanction. And yet every American citizen who knows anything about the po

right to be represented; and this would have been an awkward dilemma, for there were then some 4,000,000 negro slaves in the United States. The example, it was thought, would have been dangerous to an institution then sanctioned by our Constitution, to say nothing of the prejudices it would have excited. Thus the necessity of preserving the great interests of the Southern States, and of preventing a change in the character of labor in the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, lost to us the opportunity of giving permanent direction to the political and commercial connections of the newly enfranchised Spanish-American States, and their trade passed into other hands.

litical history of his country, or of the annals of our foreign relations, knows that the recommendations in that Address (which embodies the essential principles of the Monroe Doctrine) have shaped the foreign policy of the government for more than a century.

It might be amusing, were the fact less deplorable, to point out some of the crude and exaggerated notions of the nature and scope of the Monroe Doctrine that are entertained in certain of the South American states. There seems to be an impression that it may be successfully invoked to prevent a European nation from enforcing an international obligation against a South American Republic, or for preventing the execution of demands for satisfaction in cases of tort, or for the prevention of interferences in general that are otherwise sanctioned by international usage. The absurdity of such a construction is its own sufficient refutation. And yet, strange to say, on more than one occasion the United States government has been mildly censured, even by some of our own citizens, for not interposing in such cases.

CHAPTER XXII

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE MOSQUITO COAST CONTROVERSY

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HE seizure of the port of San Juan, and the establishment of a British Protectorate on the

Mosquito coast, as related in the preceding chapter, was something more than a contemptuous disregard of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, something more than an unprovoked outrage upon the sovereignty of a free American state. It was, besides being both these, a deliberate violation of a solemn treaty obligation. This may seem a rather blunt way of putting it, but it will be found that the facts in the case fully justify the statement.

By the treaty of 1783, between England and Spain, Great Britain agreed to withdraw entirely from Central America, and to "forever abandon" any and all claims she might have had to territory there. British subjects were granted an extension of their former permission to cut and export mahogany and dyewoods from a narrow strip of territory "between the rivers Balíze and Honda," near the Mosquito coast; but this concession conveyed no political rights or privileges, and in no way interfered with Spain's right of eminent domain. It in no way impaired Spain's acknowledged sovereignty and jurisdiction over any part of Central America, or of the adjacent islands.

This was sufficiently manifest from the very terms of the concession itself. But in order to prevent any pos

sible misunderstanding on this point, the treaty contained a clause which expressly stipulated that this "permission" or concession to cut and export timber, was never to be construed as " in anywise derogatory to" Spain's "absolute sovereignty," not only over that particular territory, but over all other territory in Central America. And, as if to give this still greater emphasis, there was an additional clause whereby England obligated herself "to demolish any fortifications" which had been erected there by her "subjects," and "to prevent the erection of any new ones."

It would have been difficult to make language more explicit. The manifest purpose was to at once and forever do away with any claim or semblance of claim. which Great Britain then had, or that she might at any time in the future set up, to any territory, not only on the Mosquito coast, but to any portion of Central America, or to any of the adjacent islands. Or, to quote the words of the treaty itself, the inhibition embraced "the whole of the Spanish-American continent."

Very soon, however, despite these express limitations, the British cabinet began a system of quibbling; and by ingenious and strained constructions sought to render them nugatory. It was claimed that the words "SpanishAmerican Continent," as employed in the English text of the treaty, were of "such general import as warranted the British government in placing its own construction upon them;" and that consequently, Great Britain had the right "to determine upon prudential reasons" whether the Mosquito coast and the contiguous outlying islands came within the general inhibition.

This led to the explanatory Agreement or supplemental treaty of 1786, which declared, as the sense of

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