has been positively stated, on the authority of Mr. William Plummer (at the time a member of Congress from Pennsylvania), that " after the message had been read in cabinet meeting, the President inquired whether it would not be well to leave out that portion relating to the Holy Alliance." To which Mr. Adams replied as follows: "Sir, you have my views on that point already, and I see no reason to alter them.' Whereupon Mr. Monroe replied: 'Well, it is written, and I will not now change it.'" 1

These statements seem to be corroborated by the fact that, before committing his administration to the doctrine which bears his name, Mr. Monroe solicited the opinions of ex-Presidents Madison and Jefferson on the subject. Mr. Madison replied, in substance, that the circumstances of the case, and the relations of the new republics to the United States, were such as to call forth (6 our efforts to defeat the meditated crusade" by the Holy Alliance. Mr. Jefferson was more explicit. He said: "Our first fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; and our second should be never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs." 2

That the Monroe Doctrine neither contemplated intervention by the United States in the internal affairs of the Latin-American states, nor interference with any vested European rights on this continent, is manifest from the very words of the declaration itself. It was intended and understood as an authentic protest against any extension of European power and influence on this continent; and in this sense only it has always re

1 Penna. Mag. of Hist. & Biography, vi., p. 358.

2 Jefferson's Works, p. 315. It is interesting to note that Jefferson's views on this subject had undergone a healthful change after the collapse of the French Revolution. Before that time, he was insidiously advocating an alliance with France against England.

sponded to public sentiment in this country. It will have to be admitted, however, that our government has not always given to it that support which the people had a right to expect. The most lamentable instance occurred in 1850, in what is generally known as the "Clayton-Bulwer Treaty," for a proper understanding of which it will be necessary to pass in review the circumstances which led to it.

Something more than a century and a half ago, some British merchants sent out ships and began gathering dyewoods in the forests of Honduras, in Central America. Honduras was then a Spanish possession, and, as there had been no previous concession by Spain, there was a vigorous protest by the Madrid government. Subsequently, however, Spain granted permission to British subjects to gather mahogany and dyewoods; but this concession conveyed no property in the soil, nor any right of eminent domain. It was simply a permit, under certain restrictions, to cut and ship dyewoods and nothing more.

But an English settlement soon sprang up there, without having any declared purpose or fixed boundaries; and after the country became independent this settlement was gradually extended without much regard to the territorial rights and limits of adjacent free states. Very soon the British government pretended to have made a treaty with an insignificant tribe of Indians, called the Mosquitos, who inhabited a narrow strip of country on the coast of Honduras, whereby they were guaranteed "protection "; and, in order to give color to this pretension, a half-Indian boy was found who was represented to be the natural son, by a zambo woman, of a former chief of the Mosquito tribe. This motley lad was carried over to Jamaica, where he underwent the farce of a coronation as "king" of the Mosquitos.

He was then taken back to Honduras and set up as its nominal sovereign, — the real authority being vested in the resident English consul. All this took place at a time when the whole Mosquito coast country was known to be within the territory and jurisdiction of the free state of Nicaragua, and the Mosquitos themselves citizens of that Republic.1

This was the condition of affairs in Central America at the time of our war with Mexico. When that war closed, the British government exhausted all means in its power, through its accredited diplomatic agents, to defeat any treaty between Mexico and the United States whereby the latter might acquire any territory on the Pacific coast, protesting all the while that there was no British "colony" in Honduras, and that England's only solicitude in the premises was the fulfilment of her pledge of "protection" to the Mosquito "king." So great, however, was this solicitude for the safety and welfare of the Mosquito "king," that as soon as it became known that the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo had been signed, the British fleet, then stationed at Vera Cruz, hastily set sail for the mouth of the San Juan river, took forcible possession of the little town of San Juan, changed its name to " Greytown," established British authority there, and began to fortify the place.

Of course this was an unprovoked outrage upon Nicaragua; and it revealed, besides, a hostile motive toward the United States, since the San Juan river route was then supposed to be the most available channel of communication between our Atlantic and Pacific coasts. It was, therefore, something akin to a contemptu

1 Nicaragua threw off the Spanish yoke and became an autonomous free state in 1821. It subsequently became a member of the federal Union of the Central American states, but, after the dissolution in 1838, resumed its position as a separate republic.

ous disregard of the very principles of the Monroe Doctrine, of which, according to M. de Lesseps, a British statesman was the real author!

A diplomatic agent was soon sent out from Washington, who negotiated a treaty with Nicaragua, by the provisions of which the United States was invested with the exclusive right to open an inter-oceanic ship canal through the territory of that Republic, together with the right to establish towns and free ports at the termini of the canal, and to fortify the canal itself from sea to sea. In other words, it provided for a canal to be under the exclusive control of the United States. But before this treaty (generally referred to as the "Hise Treaty") could reach Washington, there was a change of administration; and the new cabinet refused to ratify the treaty, or even to refer it to the consideration of the Senate. A new minister was sent out, who negotiated another convention, which provided for a joint control of the proposed canal by the United States and Great Britain! This was unsatisfactory, owing to the ambiguity of certain provisions; and Mr. John M. Clayton, then Secretary of State, opened negotiations with Sir Henry Bulwer, the British minister at Washington, which resulted in the convention of 1850, generally referred to as the "Clayton-Bulwer Treaty." That treaty not only recognized and adopted the scheme for a "joint protectorate," but contained a clause whereby the United States and Great Britain pledged themselves, each to the other, that neither of them would ever colonize, annex, fortify, or attempt to exercise exclusive control over" any portion of Central America.

Of course this was an egregious blunder, the consequences of which have haunted us for half a century; but there is no warrant for the assertion, sometimes thoughtlessly made, that Mr. Clayton contemplated a

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deliberate abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine. marily, the object was to secure a pledge from Great Britain not to colonize the isthmus; and secondarily, to stimulate the investment of foreign capital in a great American enterprise at a time when money for such purposes was difficult to obtain. The blunder consisted in thoughtlessly committing the United States government to a constructive recognition of the British status quo ante on the isthmus; for England had already established a protectorate in Balíze, and was at that very moment exercising jurisdiction within the territory of Nicaragua. Moreover, the provision for a partnership control of the proposed canal, besides being opposed to the traditional policy of the United States, was exceedingly impolitic. For, in the very nature of the case, it would have resulted in endless misunderstandings, and thus, instead of proving a bond of friendship, would have been the source of ever-recurring discord. Fortunately, however, we have about outgrown the consequences of this indiscretion; for it is too manifest for argument that the treaty, in so far as it relates to the then projected canal, is now obsolete. And it is equally manifest that the unfortunate provision (in Article 8) for an agreement to agree “to extend joint protection to any other practicable communications" across the isthmus, cannot any longer (owing to the change of circumstances and other causes) be insisted upon or enforced.

It has been alleged that the principles of the Monroe Doctrine were violated in the case of Louis Kossuth, the Hungarian exile. Briefly stated, the facts are these: Kossuth had fled to Turkey, in 1849; his extradition was demanded by Austria and Russia; in September, 1851, he embarked on a United States war vessel, which, in accordance with a resolution of the Senate, had been despatched to carry him to this country as