petual, and indestructible. It could not be divested by any act of his own, nor even by the act of his sovereign; nor was it in the power of any foreign state, by adopting or employing him, to dissolve the bond of his native allegiance. This slavish doctrine, one of the relics of the feudal ages, is now happily faded out of existence. But it was not abandoned by Great Britain until the year 1814, when prisoners of war, claimed as British subjects and taken in the service of the United States, were unconditionally exchanged. Indeed, it was not formally and explicitly abandoned until fifty-six years later, when, in 1870, Parliament passed an Act declaring that a British subject ceases to be such on becoming duly naturalized in some foreign state.

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Our first attempt at a constitutional definition of the term citizen" occurs in the amended Article XIV., adopted July 28, 1868, wherein it is declared that, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the state in which they reside." Up to that time, we searched in vain for some clear and authentic definition of the phrase "citizen of the United States." It could be found neither in our legislative annals nor in our judicial decisions, nor in the consentaneous action of any two of the three co-ordinate departments of the government. In its elements and its details, citizenship of the United States was as little understood, and as much open to speculative criticism, in 1861 as it was at the foundation of the government. For about eighty years we had enjoyed the practical benefits of a national citizenship without knowing precisely what it was. Experience had taught us neither the exact meaning of the term nor any very clear conception of the thing itself. In fact, we had practically denied its existence, while yet enjoying its benefits at

home and demanding the protection incident to it abroad. Thus Jefferson and his political disciples had strenuously maintained that, in a strictly legal sense, there was not and could not be any such thing as citizenship of the United States; that a person could be a citizen of the United States, only as he was such incidentally by reason of his being a citizen of some particular state of the Union; and consequently, that a person born and residing in the District of Columbia or other territory of the Union, although in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, was not a citizen of the United States! And grotesque and absurd as this proposition now seems, it had been indirectly confirmed by a decision of the federal Supreme Court.1 Even to this day, there are those who believe, or affect to believe, that Article XIV. of our Constitution was merely intended to make citizens of African freedmen; that its provisions were partisan measures, incident to and consequent upon the old slavery question; and that the true interpretation of the Constitution is still along the lines of the Jeffersonian theories of a century ago! The truth is, however, that, although African slavery was the occasion, it was not the cause either of the civil war or the amended Article XIV. which followed. The real issue of that war was the integrity of the federal Union, the supremacy of the central government, as against the assumed right of a particular state to secede from the Union, or to nullify the authority of the nation over its citizens.

The provisions of Article XIV., therefore, reach, and were intended to reach, far beyond the incidents and consequences of the slavery question. They eradicate, as they were intended to eradicate, completely and forever, a pernicious political heresy which had vexed 1 In the celebrated Dred Scott case.

us with doubts, and had periodically threatened our national existence. They establish a citizenship of the United States that is wholly independent of local or state citizenship, thus completely reversing the Jeffersonian theory. For a person may now be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of any particular state in the Union; but no one can become a citizen of any particular state without becoming a citizen of the United States. A citizen of the United States must "reside" in a particular state in order to become a citizen thereof; but in order to be a citizen of the United States, it is only necessary to have been born or naturalized anywhere within our national domain and jurisdiction.

Another test of nationality, usually adopted by commercial nations, is that by the nationality of the father. In the Latin-American states the nationality of the mother fixes the nationality of the child born abroad or on the high seas. But the principle is the same in both cases. "By the law of nations," says Vattel, "children follow the condition of their fathers, and enter into all their rights. The place of birth cannot, therefore, in itself, produce any change in this particular, nor furnish any valid reason for taking from a child what nature has given him." But, in adopting this rule our government made it a condition that the

rights of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers never resided in the United States." 1 Nor has our government ever strenuously insisted upon the allegiance of persons born of American parents in countries whose fundamental laws make the place of birth the sole test of nationality, at least so long as they remain in the country of their nativity. Thus by

1 Act of Congress, Feb. 10, 1855, which, however, is merely an affirmation of the old English common law.

the Colombian constitution all persons born in Colombia are Colombians; whereas, a person born there of American parents is by our law a citizen of the United States. But, so long as such citizen is voluntarily domiciled in Colombia, we do not claim his allegiance as against that country. If, however, he passes out into Venezuela, for example, or into some country other than Colombia, we claim his allegiance and award to him the corresponding protection.

This is right, in principle at least. For it is manifest that the adoption of the test of nationality by the nationality of the parent, even in this modified form, logically requires the abandonment in a corresponding degree of the test by place of birth. Hence, in order to avoid possible conflict, our law of April 9, 1866, generally known as "the Civil Rights Bill," in declaring to be citizens "all persons born in the United States," adds the proviso that they be "not subject to any foreign power." Substantially the same principle prevails in the laws of both England and France. The English law, like our own, lays chief stress on the place of birth; while in France, the father's nationality usually, though not always, determines the nationality of the child.

It is sometimes important to know how or under what circumstances a citizen of the United States may be deemed to have changed his allegiance; but, more particularly, how or under what circumstances a naturalized citizen of the United States may be deemed exempt from obligations resulting from his former allegiance. These questions are constantly coming up for consideration in the administration of our foreign affairs. For although most European countries have either totally abandoned or greatly modified the old feudal doctrine of indelible allegiance, there are still

conflicting theories of expatriation. Thus, while, by our law of July 27, 1868, expatriation is declared to be" a natural and inherent right of all people," by the laws of some other countries an emigrant incurs loss of civil rights in his native country, and (should he return) certain penal consequences, if the emigration took place without permission of the government.

Again, there are still as many as four general systems of naturalization, and some of these are more or less conflicting. First, that by continuous residence for a stated period, renunciation of native allegiance, and oath of allegiance to the adopted country, as in the United States. Second, that by employment in the public service, residence for a stated period, oath of allegiance, and certificate issued at the discretion of a cabinet minister, as in England. Third, that by employment in the public service or certificate from the government, as in Prussia. And, fourth, that by residence for a stated period and certificate from the government, without oath of allegiance, as in France. And, in addition to these general systems, there are exceptional methods of naturalization; as, for instance, in the United States, by military or naval service, coupled with one year's residence; or, as in England, by two years' actual service in the navy in time of war. Some of these conflicting theories have been partially reconciled by treaty; but there still remains sufficient diversity to give rise to ever-recurring disputes as to whether a naturalized citizen of the United States, on returning to the country of his native allegiance, is justly entitled to the protection of our government while there.

To become a citizen of the United States, a foreigner must reside at least five consecutive years in the country; and, two years before applying for a certificate of