4. A Cafe in QUANTITY is, when we inquire into the Greatness or Smallness of a Crime; as, Tho' 'tis plain it is a Crime, yet 'tis denied to be a great Crime. Here we Amplify or Diminish; and by confidering how the Fact was circumftanced by Time, Place, Words, and Actions, inquiring Quis? Quid? Ubi? Quibus Auxiliis? Cur? Quomodo? Quando? and comparing Things with Things, we determine what may be deem'd Great or Little.

II. INARTIFICIAL RATIONAL ARGUMENTS are such as arise from without, and not from the Thing itself; such as Testimonies, Evidence, &c.

N. B. In all our Arguments great Care must be taken that we bring in Nothing, nor let any Thing drop from us, that may prejudice the Topic we are upon. For, as Cicero well observes, Turpius est Oratori nocuisse videri Caufæ, quam non profuisse. Cic. de Orat. 2.73.

ΑΝΝΟΤΑΤΙΟN S.

OBS. V. OMMON Cic. 4. A Diffimilium Con

B

SECT. II.

Of ARGUMENTS from Morals.

or Ar

Y MORAL ARGUMENTS guments from Morals is meant, that the Orator or Speaker should well consider-Of what, before whom, and for whom he speaks. 1. In regard to his own Morals, That he himself may appear Honest, Prudent, Impartial, Benevolent, &c. 2. In respect to the Morals of the Judges, Audience, or Persons he would perfuade; That the Thing perfuaded may also appear Honourable, Just, and Serviceable, &c.

OBS. VI.

M

ΑΝΝΟΤΑΤΙΟNS.

ORAL AR- ferre perutile erit. Cic. Orat. 2. GUMENTS. 43. In short, says the A. B. of CAMBRAY, an Orator cannot be fit to perfuade People unless he be inflexibly upright. For which Reason Cicero thought that Virtue is the chief and most effential Quality of an Orator; and that he should be a Person of such unspotted Probity as to be a Pattern to his Fellow-Citizens; without which he cannot even seem to be convinc'd himself of what he says; and consequently, he cannot perfuade others. Dia log. Eloquence, p. 40. Stev.

CICERO and QUINTILIAN both infift upon their Orator's appearing and being a Good Man, and the Caufes he undertakes being just, Valet enim multum ad vincendum, probari Mores, Instituta, & Falta, & Vitam eorum, qui agunt Caufas, & eorum pro quibus. TULLY adds further, Si quid profequare acrius, ut invitus, & coactus facere videare. Facilitatis, Liberalitatis, Manfuetudinis, Pietatis, grati Animi, non appetentis, non avidi, Signa pro

SECT.

SECT. III.

Of ARGUMENTS from the Affections or Paffions.

BY Y Arguments from the AFFECTIONS or PASSIONS is meant, that He who would gain his Point in Perfuafion, must endeavour thoroughly to understand the Frame of Human Nature, and thereby work upon those Affections which God has placed in Human Minds as fecret Springs to all our Actions. Plura enim multo (fays TULLY) Homines judicant Odio, aut Amore, aut Cupiditate, aut Iracundiâ, aut Spe, aut Timore, aut Errore, aut aliquâ Permotione Mentis, quam Veritate. Cic. de Orat. 2. 42.

The AFFECTIONS or PASSIONS are certain Emotions of the Soul accompanied either with Pleasure or Pain.

OBS. VII.

VII. A

ΑΝΝΟΤATIONS.

RGUMENTS

FROM THE PASSIONS. Respecting the Paffions, more will be faid under the Head of Pronunciation. ARISTOTLE calls 'em such Affections of the Mind, οἷς ἔπεται λύπη κὶ ἡδονή, which Pleasure and Pain accompany. Those he treats of are, Ira, Delinitio, Amor, O

The

dium, Metus, Fidentia, Pudor, Gratia, Mifericordia, Stomachatio, Invidia. Some of which the Orator, according to the Nature of his Subject, must shew in himself, if he hopes to work upon the Affections of others; for, as HORACE observes, in his Art of Poetry,

'Tis Nature forms, and softens us within,
And writes our Fortunes Changes in our Face.
Pleasure enchants, impetuous Rage transports,
And Grief dejects, and wrings the tortur'd Soul;
And these are all interpreted by Speech :
But he whose Words and Fortunes disagree,
Absurd, unpity'd, grows a public Jest.

In short, to be able to touch
upon and move the Paffions
properly, to set Truth in the

Roscommon. fullest Light, to represent it as amiable, and engage Men to love and pursue it, is the most glorious

The four chief Passions are; JOY, in respect to some present Good; HOPE, in respect to fome future Good; GRIEF, in respect to some present Evil; and FEAR, in respect to fome future Evil.

To these may be added, Anger, Lenity, Modesty, Impudence, Love, Hatred, Malice, Envy, Compassion, and Emulation, &c.

Vid. Ger. Jo. Vossii Elem. Rhet. de Invent. Vide etiam ejufdem Voffii Partit. Orat. lib. I. C. 2. §. 5. C. 3, 4, 5, 6, &c. lib. 2. cap. 1, 2, &c. 15, &c.

PART II.

Of DISPOSITION, or, The Right Placing of our Arguments, when Invented.

What is Difpofition? How many Parts are there in an Oration, and in what Order should they stand? §. 1. What is the Bufiness of an Exordium? What is the Narration? What doth the Propofition? What is the Confirmation? What doth the Refutation? What doth the Peroration? Give an Example of an Oration or Declamation from the Claffics. §. 2. How many and what are the Parts of a Theme? Give an Example of a Theme. Where may be had more Examples of Orations, Declamations, Themes, &c?

E.

ISPOSITION is the Ranging of our Arguments or the Parts of an Oration in the most orderly and proper Manner.

F. THE PARTS of an ORATION or DECLAMATION are usually reckoned Six, and generally allow'd to stand in this Order, Exordium, Narration, Propofition, Confirmation, Refutation, and Peroration, according to the old Verse.

Exorfus, Narro, Seco, Firmo, Refuto, Peroro. SECT,