The Federalist: A Collection of Essays by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, Interpreting the Constitution of the United States as Agreed Upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787 |
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Inhalt
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Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
able admit advantage America answer appear appointment army attention authority body branch causes character circumstances citizens common confederacy confederation Congress consequence consideration considered Constitution continue Convention councils course courts danger depend duties effect elections equal established evident executive exercise existence experience extent favor federal federal government force foreign former give greater hands happen House immediate important independent individuals influence instance interests judges jurisdiction jury kind latter laws least legislative legislature less liberty limits majority means measures ment nature necessary necessity never objects observations officers operation particular parties peace period persons political possess practice present President principle probable proper proportion proposed provision question reason regard regulation relation render representatives require respect rule Senate side single situation society spirit sufficient supposed thing tion treaties trial Union United whole
Beliebte Passagen
Seite 46 - A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.
Seite 135 - That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law.
Seite 268 - In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them : the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them : to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
Seite 247 - No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
Seite 435 - NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support.
Seite 47 - When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.
Seite 48 - The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
Seite 286 - In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Seite 246 - Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.
Seite 372 - to nominate, and " by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to appoint " ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the " supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose " appointments are not in the constitution otherwise provided for, " and which shall be established by law.
Bibliografische Informationen
| Titel | The Federalist: A Collection of Essays by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, Interpreting the Constitution of the United States as Agreed Upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787 Band 59 von The worlds̓ great classics |
| Mitwirkende | Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay |
| Ausgabe | überarbeitet |
| Verlag | Colonial Press, 1901 |
| Original von | New York Public Library |
| Digitalisiert | 18. Dez. 2007 |
| Länge | 488 Seiten |
| Zitat exportieren | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |