Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy
Cambridge University Press, 01.12.2005
Corruption is a threat to democracy and economic development in many societies. It arises in the ways people pursue, use and exchange wealth and power, and in the strength or weakness of the state, political and social institutions that sustain and restrain those processes. Differences in these factors, Michael Johnston argues, give rise to four major syndromes of corruption: Influence Markets, Elite Cartels, Oligarchs and Clans, and Official Moguls. In this 2005 book, Johnston uses statistical measures to identify societies in each group, and case studies to show that the expected syndromes do arise. Countries studied include the United States, Japan and Germany (Influence Markets); Italy, Korea and Botswana (Elite Cartels); Russia, the Philippines and Mexico (Oligarchs and Clans); and China, Kenya, and Indonesia (Offical Moguls). A concluding chapter explores reform, emphasising the ways familiar measures should be applied - or withheld, lest they do harm - with an emphasis upon the value of 'deep democratisation'.
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power consensus and policy
Participation institutions and syndromes of corruption
influence for rent decisions for sale
how to buy friends and govern people
we are family and youre not
reach out and squeeze someone
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
abuses accountability affluent market democracies agendas anti-corruption Botswana bribery bribes bureaucratic campaigns chaebols chapter China citizens civil society contrasts contributions corrupt deals Corruption Perceptions Index corruption syndromes countries created credibility democratic dominated economic liberalization effective elections electoral Elite Cartel corruption enforcement factions favors Federal Election Commission figures funds groups growth helped Human Rights Watch impunity incumbents Indonesia Influence Market Influence Market societies insecurity interests involved Japan Johnston Kenya Korea leaders legitimate less levels major Marcos Mexico million money politics Official Moguls Oleg Deripaska Oligarch and Clan opportunities organized crime participation and institutions patronage percent Philippines political and economic political competition Political Corruption politicians Porta President presidential processes property rights reform regime role Russia scandals scores significant social strong Suharto sustained syndromes of corruption tangentopoli thru tion Transparency International violence weak institutions wealth and power
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