PARLIAMENTARY OBSTRUCTION. ARLIAMENTARY obstruction is no longer a mere inter PARLI ment. mezzo in the history of this or that parliament. It has become an international phenomenon which, in threatening manner, calls in question the whole future of parliamentary governNor indeed is it the legislative assemblies of Europe alone from which reports of parliamentary obstruction are brought. It is known in the four quarters of the globe. Long ago the Americans coined a special word for it, "filibustering," a word which, reminding us of piratical raids upon commerce, aptly characterizes a lawless arrest of the orderly conduct of business. The Parliament of Cape Colony has tried obstruction against the motherland; and, as early as 1901, the House of Representatives of the young Australian Commonwealth, shortly after its birth, had the pleasure of a twenty-seven-hour session. Almost daily, from some corner of the earth, come reports of threatened obstruction, of the struggle against it, of the victory of one side or the other. The results of obstruction, too, have already become manifest in parliamentary law. In many legislatures radical changes have been made in the rules of procedure; in others, such changes have been proposed and seriously debated. From the present, however, our gaze is turned with anxiety to the future. It cannot be ignored, although the obstructionists often fail to perceive it, that obstruction militates not only against the right of the parliamentary majority to decide but against the parliaments themselves as institutions. When, however, we consider the importance of parliament in the life of the modern state, and the fact that existing constitutions make no provision for filling the gap left by the failure of this organ to perform its functions, there appears back of obstruction, as its final issue, a condition of lawlessness which, according to the situation of the single state, may assume the form of despotism or of anarchy. Therefore the question how obstruction may be overcome is an extremely serious one; all the more serious because the answer to it is especially difficult. It is significant that this latest phenomenon in the realm of parliamentary life, like parliamentary life itself, is of AngloSaxon origin. The beginnings of obstruction can be observed in England even in the eighteenth century. In the United States, a stubborn attempt at obstruction in the House of Representatives led, in 1841, to the "one-hour rule," still in force, whereby no member taking part in a debate may speak longer than one hour. This measure was supplemented by the stricter rule of "fiveminute debates," whereby a member who moves an amendment has no more than five minutes' time in which to present it, and a single member of the opposition the same length of time in which to contest it. In the England of the nineteenth century, too, there was a good old time, which lasted till the first Irish obstruction, when even members of the cabinet looked upon obstruction as a permissible means of defeating proposals initiated by the House and not acceptable to the government; to say nothing of leaders of the opposition who sought to hinder the majority by wordy speeches. It is told of no less a personage than Sir Robert Peel that, in 1831, he made no fewer than forty-eight speeches in fourteen days. Of historical significance for England and, through the example it set, for the rest of the world as well, was the obstruction on the part of the Irish which began in 1877. Here for the first time was presented, in an epoch-making manner, the great problem as to the limits of the rights of parliamentary minorities. May the minority justifiably force its will upon the majority to the extent of compelling an abandonment of proposed measures? Further, may the minority, by means of the disadvantages associated with the obstruction of parliamentary business, compel the majority to carry out the positive wishes of the minority? In other words, is - it permissible to concede to the minority a decisive share in the government? This problem has since been presented over and over again, now in this state, now in that; here temporarily in a specific case, there repeatedly in numerous cases; in several states, however, in a way that shakes the foundations of the whole political structure. That among these latter Austria-Hungary is to be placed in the front rank goes without saying. The means which obstruction has at its disposal depend en tirely on the character of the rules which govern the transaction of parliamentary business. These means are of two kinds. Either provisions of the standing rules which expressly guarantee certain rights to the minority are employed to prevent the passage of parliamentary resolutions, or open places in the disciplinary portion of the standing rules are so utilized as to place the majority under duress. A distinction must therefore be made between obstruction by means provided in the standing rules and obstruction by means contrary to the standing rules. That form of obstruction which operates on legal ground possesses a great quantity of effective ammunition. The oldest and best known is the continuous speech. Of this there are many wonderful examples on record. How modest seems the sevenhour obstruction speech of the Social Democrat, Antrick, in the German Reichstag, and even the twelve-hour oratorical effort of Dr. Lecher in the Austrian House of Deputies, compared with a twenty-six-hour speech which was delivered in 1893 in the parliament of British Columbia, or with the thirty-seven-hour address in which a delegate in the Roumanian Chamber of Deputies, in 1897, demanded the indictment of Joan Bratiano! The annals of those American chambers which as yet have placed no limitations on debate record monstrous obstruction sessions. In April, 1896, a sitting of the Canadian House of Commons devoted to a bill dealing with the schools in Manitoba lasted a hundred and eighty hours, and in Chile a single speech is reported to have extended through ten days of a session. Other means of obstruction are repeated interpellations, the reading of which may occupy many hours or even days; cumulation of amendments; putting of urgency motions; demands that the roll be called in taking votes or in order to determine whether a quorum is present for the transaction of business; and making the assembly incompetent to act by abstaining from participation in its proceedings. Used with the necessary skill, these means, singly or combined, can completely cripple the whole activity of the chamber in which they are employed. Much more dangerous, however, is obstruction through conduct contrary to discipline. There are many parliaments which are able to exclude individual members for a time on the charge of disorderly conduct, but even such measures suffice only exceptionally to suppress tumults which are set in motion by whole parties. What a rôle tumults of this sort have played in the most recent parliamentary history is known to everybody. They have been compared frequently to revolutions, from which, however, they differ essentially in that the revolting minority can never take the place of the majority. Each victory of the minority signifies a confusion, never a clarification, of the situation, since the minority which celebrates the greatest triumphs can, according to its nature, create nothing positive: it is and remains dependent upon the concessions which the majority sees fit to make. Transitory obstructions do not seriously disturb the politician. In single cases they may mitigate the asperities of partisan conflicts; indeed, the mere prospect of obstruction may hold back a majority from a relentless exploiting of its power. But stubborn, systematic obstruction raises the anxious question: How is it to be fought and overcome? This question belongs to the greatest problems of the statecraft of the present day. Its answer appears at first sight to be extraordinarily simple: the standing rules should be changed to meet the situation. But the easiest solution is often the hardest to attain; and even where the change is easily secured, the gravest consequences may follow. The remedy is frequently no less dangerous than the disease. Before all else, account must be taken of the individual character of the state in which obstruction is to be crushed. If the state is well knit together, if no powerful parties inclined to resistance or to revolt stand back of the obstructionist delegates, then the change in the standing rules may be made without hesitation. So far as they are not based on clauses of the constitution or on statutory provisions, the standing rules may ordinarily be changed at any time by the chamber concerned. In this matter the majority has absolute power. Even if the procedure of the majority, in making such a change, be contrary to the existing rules, this fact will have no practical importance, since a breach of the standing rules in passing a resolution never carries with it the nullity of the resolution so passed. Outside of the chamber there is no one whose right and duty it is to bring under review the observance of the chamber's loi intérieure. Pure parliament ary law, i.e. the order of business developed within the field left open by the constitution and the statutes, lacks sanction to a degree unparallel in other parts of the legal order, and all safeguards which juristic ingenuity can contrive have no significance in practical politics. Therefore a majority is able brutally to misuse its power, unchecked by the existence of any means of defense against its arbitrary proceedings. The minority may protest, complain of oppression, cry out about infraction of rights and a coup d'état, but all this has no practical importance whatever, especially if the government is of one mind with the chamber. We have accordingly witnessed, in many states, the spectacle of changes in the order of business to the disadvantage of the minority and under its fiery protests. The proceedings in the German Reichstag on the occasion of the customs tariff debate are still fresh in everyone's memory. The case is wholly different, however, in states where large bodies of people, whose excitement is to be feared, stand behind the parliamentary parties, or where the majority of the day must be constantly on its guard lest it be forced down into a minority. Here amendments to the standing rules encounter great difficulties, if they do not become absolutely impossible. Although the majority has control over the order of business, it must also possess the power to force its measures through without regard to consequences. Such power is not found in numerical strength only, but also in the support given to the majority, above and below, outside the chamber. The history of the "lex Falkenhayn" is a most instructive example of the limits of the power of a parliamentary majority. A further question demands consideration: what effects the struggle against obstruction, carried on within the field of the order of business, has upon the whole structure of the state. We must not deceive ourselves by imagining that the effects are limited to the immediate object of the conflict: they extend far beyond it. If the standing rules are amended, the amendments can take no other direction than the limitation of the minority in its entire parliamentary activity; and this again can be effected only by subjecting the initiative of the individual members and their efficiency in other respects to far-reaching restrictions. The time |