war that deprived her of Florida and gave her Louisiana. With growing uneasiness the court of Madrid had watched the diminution of the French power in the North American continent. It feared that when once the colonial balance of France and England had been destroyed, the Spanish American dominions would become the object of English ambition and enterprise. In this opinion Spain was encouraged by the conduct of England herself. The British had adhered tenaciously to their settlements in Honduras, and had carried on a profitable contraband trade with the Spanish colonies elsewhere. A sense of community, also, in the affairs of the two great representatives of the Bourbon dynasty exercised considerable influence on Charles III. The misfortunes of his royal "brother and cousin," Louis XV, and the skill with which the latter and his ministers utilized them in appealing to the sentiment of dynastic affection, weaned the Spanish king from the prudent attitude of neutrality which he had observed during the earlier years of the war. A futile effort to mediate on behalf of France was followed by the formation of the third Family Compact, August 15, 1761.1

Whatever might have been the spirit of this agreement, it was not specifically an alliance against Great Britain. That was not concluded until February 4, 1762,2 about a month after Great Britain, aware of the eventual purpose of the new combination of the Bourbon courts, itself had declared war on Spain. In associating himself with Louis XV on this occasion, Charles III simply became the "cat's-paw" member of the Bourbon alliance, precisely as the French monarch had been enacting that rôle in his connection with Austria. Sentimental sympathy for his Bourbon kinsman, and the fear of British colonial designs blinded Charles III to the actual plight of France, and to the great strength, almost undiminished, of the English adversary. Fatuously he assumed the task of fighting for a cause already lost; the act brought in its train naught but defeat and humiliation.

1 Cantillo, Tratados, convenios y declaraciones de paz y de comercio, p. 468, et seq. 2 "Convencion particular de alianza, ofensiva y defensiva entre las coronas de España y Francia contra la Gran Bretaña." Ibid., p. 482 et seq.

3 In view of the utter overthrow of the French colonial dominion which had been attained by the time the Family Compact was signed, the language of that

No sooner had Spain embarked in the war than she assumed an active share in the negotiations, already pending, for peace. The only section of the preliminary articles under consideration in July, 1762, which concerned Spain, was that relating to the proposed boundary of Canada on the south and west. By the sixth article as then constituted, France had agreed to cede to Great Britain the left bank of the Mississippi as far as the river Iberville and Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain, thus making the Mississippi the boundary between Canada and Louisiana.1 Forthwith the Marquis of Grimaldi, the Spanish ambassador, protested to the Duke of Choiseul against this virtual cession of a part of Louisiana' under the guise of merely fixing the boundary line of Canada. Such a procedure, he argued, would give the English an easy outlet to the Gulf of Mexico. So abhorrent was the idea to the Spanish mind that he even expressed a doubt whether his royal master would ever conclude peace, should the meaning of the article be so construed. He thus intimated that

staid document in reference to compensation for gains and losses seems almost jocose. It says: "Their Catholic and Christian Majesties have agreed that, when the question of peace shall have arisen at the close of the war which they may have carried on in common, the advantages gained by one of the two powers shall compensate for the losses the other may have sustained." Ibid., p. 471, art. xviii. Nor does the humorous aspect disappear in the wording of the actual treaty of alliance between Charles and Louis, wherein it is stated that "from the day of the date of this convention the losses and gains shall be common." Ibid., p. 483, art. iii. The issue of the war certainly enabled Spain to fulfill her treaty obligations, for she shared the losses and in the minus degree the gains! Cantillo very properly remarks that for considerations of "mere family affection the blood and interests of an entire people [i.e. the Spanish] were compromised in the blunders and caprices of a foreign monarch." Ibid., p. 474.

1 "La France accorde que la fleuve de Mississippi serve aux deux nations de limites entre la Louisiane et le Canada, de manière que la rive gauche de ce fleuve appartienne à la Grande Bretagne jusqu'à la rivière Iberville et les lacs Maurepas et Pontchartrain." Projet d'articles préliminaires arrettés (sic) entre la France et l'Angleterre, Art. vi. Archivo General de Simancas. Estado, Legajo, 4551.

2 Elsewhere in the preliminary articles the river and part of Mobile were included in the French cession to Great Britain.

It must be remembered of course, that during the French occupation no definite line of territorial division between Canada and Louisiana as provinces had ever been established. Nor did the maps of the period render the task of the diplomats any easier.

France was not at liberty to dispose of Louisiana without the consent of Spain. The suggestion provoked from the Count of Choiseul, the duke's younger brother, who was present at the conference, the sharp rejoinder that it seemed rather odd for Spain to lay down the law to France regarding the latter's own property, especially since under the circumstances the English might decline altogether to entertain the proposition.1 Choiseul hastened to rebuke this youthful outburst, and answering Grimaldi's objection, said that the sense in which the article was couched ought to be clear enough to relieve the Spaniards of any such apprehension. If that were insufficient, the map that was to accompany the definitive treaty would indicate precisely the extent of the proposed cession. He declared that, since the river Iberville and the two lakes were to remain in the possession of France, the further navigation of the Mississippi by the English toward the Gulf of Mexico would be barred at that point. At least such was the present attitude of France on the subject. In the event of Great Britain's being dissatisfied with the arrangement, certainly nothing would be done, asserted Choiseul, in reference to ascertaining the boundary between Canada and Louisiana, without a previous agreement between the two Bourbon monarchs.2

Up to August, 1762, Grimaldi had received no precise instructions to govern his conduct in the negotiations, but his doubt in reference to the boundary of Canada was well substantiated in the orders that then came from Ricardo Wall, the Spanish chief minister of state. The instructions pointed out how utterly opposed the king of Spain was to any cession whereby the English might get a foothold on the Gulf of Mexico, or even hope to be able to reach that body of water. That Canada ever extended so far to the south as the French had maintained was preposterous. "The English on their part ought not to claim any port of Louisiana itself as a boundary between that province and Canada," wrote Wall, "for to do this one would have to stretch Canada southward to a point it never attained. Nor are the French free

1 Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4551. Grimaldi to Choiseul, July 20, 1762, and to Wall, July 22 and August 19, 1762.

2 Ibid. Choiseul to Grimaldi, July 21, 1762; Grimaldi to Wall, August 20,

to dispose of possessions the right to which Spain, as the legitimate owner, has never conceded." However, since his Majesty had resolved to

coöperate in every way so as to secure a lasting peace, it would be better to fix boundaries between the several possessions as they actually exist, although up to the present time some of them may not have been recognized by Spain as unquestionably parts of the royal dominions, Louisiana and Georgia, in particular, belonging to this class.

So far as Canada was concerned, he thought that the latitude of the Carolinas might well serve as an approximate line of demarcation between the French and Spanish territories.1

Armed with these instructions, Grimaldi notified Choiseul that he was ready to produce legal and historical proofs whenever it might be needful to substantiate the Spanish claim to Louisiana, at least so far as determining the extent to which the province might be alienated to a third power. The matter of capital importance to Spain at the existing stage of the negotiation, he

1 Ibid. Wall to Grimaldi, August 2, 1762.

"I do not believe it necessary to prove the king's right to Louisiana, but in order that one may provide for all possible contingencies, it might be well to have ready and at hand a memorial with the proofs of that right, such as are indicated in the enclosed sheet those of which all the European powers have availed themselves to establish the legitimacy of their conquests and possessions in America. "Memorial which proves:

"1. That the Spaniards discovered and explored all the region or coasts that surround the Gulf of Mexico.

"2. That they have taken possession of the same, and have performed those acts of jurisdiction and dominion whereby the European powers attest their right to the countries of America.

"3. That by reason of the enormous extension, Spain has not populated all the region, in which time [sic] the French made their way to the River Mississippi and to Louisiana.

"4. That their settlement is not legitimate nor recognized by Spain, in proof of which during the reigns of Philip V in Spain and of Louis XIV in France, the French were ejected from it by armed force.

"5. That the previous toleration by Spain neither lessens her own right, nor gives weight to the claims of France, etc." Ibid. Grimaldi to Wall, August 20, 1762. In his fourth "proof" Grimaldi, it would seem, refers to Juchereau de Saint Denys' exploring trip to the southwest of Louisiana in 1716. See Garrison, Texas (American Commonwealths Series), ch. v, and Winsor, The Mississippi Basin, 90-98, and the authorities therein cited.

urged, was not only that the English possessions on the continent of North America should be kept at a remote distance from the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, but also that both banks of the Mississippi for a like distance should continue to belong to France. In the opinion of the Spanish ambassador, this would be the best means of preventing English vessels from entering the river from the gulf itself. "So essential is this point regarded in Spain," concluded Grimaldi, "that until his uneasiness vanishes and his mind is made tranquil, the king cannot lend himself to peace according to the measure of his desires." In reply to this repetition of an earlier threat, Choiseul explained that England had already declined to accept any such adjustment of the matter at issue. Thereupon Grimaldi suggested that a neutral and desert zone be erected between the southern boundary of Canada even as far south as the latitude of lower Georgia on the one side, and the remainder of Louisiana and the Spanish territories on the other. Such was the state of affairs on September 17, when the Duke of Bedford, the British commissioner, became one of the participants in the discussion.

Informed of the approaching arrival of Bedford, Wall now sent Grimaldi a new set of instructions. Their main purpose was to gain, if possible, some real advantage, territorial or commercial, which would serve either as a reimbursement for the expense of the aid afforded to France, or as an offset to the losses Spain might have to undergo from British conquests. Rumors of disaster at Havana gave a tinge of foreboding and precaution, fur

...

1 Simancas, Estado, Legajo, 4551. Grimaldi to Choiseul, August 13, 1762. Ibid. Wall to Grimaldi, September 5, 1762, and Grimaldi to Choiseul, September 15, 1762. "Moyens de régler les articles de l'Espagne avec l'Angleterre." 34 'Considering that the king has performed the service of relieving the king, his cousin, from an oppressive war, if he can obtain some compensation for the injuries he has sustained . . . how can one believe that he would decline it?" Ibid. Wall to Grimaldi, September 16, 1762. "Although his Majesty has not proposed any advantages for himself, should England offer any . . . it would be foolish not to accept them, and not be the gainer by the proposals of our enemies, securing some just indemnity for the expense and losses. To this end you have ordered me to treat of these compensations in exchange for the restitutions that we shall have to make." Ibid., Grimaldi to Wall, September 13, 1762. The "restitutions" refer to the territory captured from Portugal in the region of the Rio de la Plata.