union whose members it employs the American Flint Glass Workers' Union. When the combination was in process of formation, the leaders of the men came to the organizers and pointed out that, of the nineteen concerns which were to be absorbed, twelve were union and seven non-union; that the rules of the Flint Glass Workers' Union did not permit the same company to employ both union and non-union men; and that refusal to recognize the union in any of the plants owned by the combine would lead to a strike.' The labor employed in this industry is highly skilled, and the union, which was founded as far back as 1878, numbers about 10,000 members and includes about eighty-five per cent of the men in the trade. If the threatened strike had been declared, non-union men could not possibly have been secured in sufficient numbers to carry on the business successfully, independent competition would have arisen, and the trust would have collapsed. The directors decided to take the course of recognizing and treating with the union, though it is evident that some of them adopted this plan with great reluctance.3 One witness, however, suggests a further and interesting reason for the willingness of the majority to treat with the union - a willingness that is noticeable in every branch of the glass trade, save in the manufacture of plate glass. It is asserted by Mr. Hammett, formerly treasurer of the Window Glass Cutters' League, that the reason is to be found in the very high proportion which the cost of labor bears to that of the other factors of production in the glass industry. Competent witnesses say that it amounts to seventy-five per cent of the total cost in the window-glass trade, and sixty per cent in the flint-glass trade. Now an association of manufacturers is greatly helped, both in discovering a basis for prices and in maintaining the level of prices, if it is assisted by the union in maintaining a common level of wages. "Organized labor," says Mr. Hammett, "puts them all upon the same footing as to the question of wages to go into the market." In another branch of the trade, glass-bottle blowing, the same 1 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 831. Ibid., vol. 7, p. 927. 2 Ibid., vol. 15, p. 425. 3 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 898. 6 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 827. set of circumstances appears even more clearly, although at the time when the evidence was taken a trust had not been formed.1 The immediate effect of the formation of the flint-glass trust was an advance in prices. Common tumblers which had been ten cents a dozen were raised to sixteen cents; blown tumblers rose from twenty cents to twenty-five cents. The trust managers, however, asserted that the increase was no more than was necessary in order to secure a fair margin, and that there were no special complaints from those who handled the trust's goods by reason of the advance in prices. Wages were increased five per cent, according to one witness; another witness, who had operated a non-union factory prior to the combination, said that the rise was twenty-five per cent, and hours of labor were decreased. At the same time the stockholders received a dividend of ten per cent. In the window-glass trade a somewhat similar situation existed. The trade union had at one time absolute control: every workman in every window-glass factory was a union man. The union made rules concerning the admission of apprentices and enforced a very short working week-forty hours. There were some internal dissensions among different branches of the workers prior to 1900. Complete amalgamation was secured for a time, but a fresh rupture occurred subsequent to the formation of the trust. In this case also it was stated that many manufacturers were favorable to the union and to the system of yearly wage agreements, because of the consequent enforcement of a uniformity of wages which minimized competition." Since its formation the trust has maintained special agreements with the work people under which the factories are closed for five or six months every year, in order to keep up the level of prices." The trade union operates some coöperative factories, which have also an agreement with the trust to close down annually for sev 1 See an interesting dialogue, too long for quotation, on p. 108 of vol. 7 of the Industrial Commission's Report. "Ibid., vol. 7, p. 897. Ibid., vol. 7, p. 897. 8 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 46. 3 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 839. 7 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 834. Ibid., vol. 7, p. 44. eral months.1 And in this one case the trust has taken a further step in its relations with the trade union. It not merely recognizes the union and shares with it some part of its monopolistic gains; it also endeavors to make a bargain that the supply of labor shall be cut off from the independent producers, following in this respect the plan for coöperation of capital and labor so loudly advocated by Mr. E. J. Smith,3 and adopted in the Birmingham Bedstead Alliances (now dissolved). In an address by the president of the union, there occurs the following passage: Heretofore we have stipulated that manufacturers signing our scale are not permitted to employ any men who do not belong to our organization. This year we will agree not to furnish a scale to any concern that does not belong to the manufacturers' organization. The manufacturers are justified in making this request as they have acceded to our demands in this regard for years." 5 The trust also used the power of the trade union to compel the independent manufacturers to restrict production by agreeing to a long shut-down in the summer. An increase of ten per cent in wages was promised, provided the large majority of the factories, coöperative and independent, close down this month when the American factories stop, and next fire' the great majority must start and stop at the same time as the American factories. Soon after its formation, the combine also set aside in trust for the union a block of stock, and actually admitted the president to the board of directors, on condition that the union should always keep its factories manned. While never openly proclaimed, it 1 Ibid., vol. 13, p. 566. 2 Ibid., vol. 17, p. 364. See E. J. Smith, The New Trades Combination Movement (London, Rivingtons, 1899). Nor, in consequence, to permit unionists to work for that concern. I.e. the factories of the American Window Glass Company the trust. Commoner and Glass Worker (Pittsburg), May 10, 1902. 7 I.e. period of work when the fires are in constant operation. 8 Ibid., Jan. 17, 1903. was commonly understood that the union was not merely to supply all the labor needed by the trust, but to restrict the number of workmen available for the independents. The union, however, was unable, owing to strife in its own ranks, to fulfil its obligations, and the stock was forfeited. But it is easy to see how such a treaty with a union of skilled and highly organized workmen might make the trust practically impregnable as possessor of a monopoly of both instruments of production and skilled men. In the glass-bottle industry a trust has not yet been formed, and it is freely admitted that a successful combination can come about only by the coöperation of both workmen and capitalists. At a meeting of the manufacturers it was decided to ask the help of the workers in bringing about better conditions in that branch of the industry by agreeing to delay the start of the factories next fall. . . . The only way successful curtailment of production can be brought about was decided to be with the coöperation of the organized workers.1 The workers on their side are far from being averse to such cooperation. A trade unionist writes in the trade journal: As the manufacturers themselves practically admitted their inability to effect an organization by their failure to do so, I would suggest that the G. B. B. A.2 help them out. I would have the manufacturers' organization meet prior to the conference of the two wage committees next summer and adopt a minimum selling list, and at the conference have this list presented. This list, after its adoption by the conference, to be printed side by side with the blowing list and our factory committee to present the same to each firm in the business, and we then protect the selling list in precisely the same manner as we do the blowing list, namely, at the first evidence of cutting prices the members of our organization to withdraw from such factory.* It appears that these proposals have not yet been put into operation; the simple fact, however, that they have been put forth by 1 Commoner and Glass Worker, April 10, 1902. 2 Glass Bottle Blowers' Association. 3 Giving workers' wages on piece-work scale. both sides to the bargain is sufficient to show the probable trend of events. The now defunct National Wall Paper Company was formed in 1892, not through the agency of a promoter but by the efforts of the individual manufacturers, and it was not over-capitalized. It has been for many years the custom to shut down factories for several months in each year, and in 1894 the factories were closed for a longer period than usual. The lack of work caused dissatisfaction among the employees; and the two unions of skilled work people interviewed the managers, and before they would go ahead for the next year's work they made a demand that we give them eleven months' continuous employment, and to that demand we acceded. . . . And it would have embarrassed us very much not to have granted their demands, situated as we were.1 3 ... The dissatisfied employees, who were highly skilled, succeeded in obtaining a very considerable rise of wages in addition to the longer period of employment. They found that the existence of a trust was of great assistance to labor in enforcing its demands. "It is much easier," Mr. Burn testified, "to replace the amount of skilled labor required for one factory than it is for twenty factories." But it never occurred to the National Wall Paper Company to follow the plan advocated by Mr. E. J. Smith and adopted by the Birmingham Bedstead Alliances and by the window-glass trust, i.e. to make use of this scarcity of skilled labor to embarrass its competitors, by bargaining with the union that in return for the privileges granted by the trust it should not permit its members to enter the employment of independent firms.5 Turning now to the iron, steel and tin industries we find it a little difficult to distinguish the various threads of development, because the different trusts have adopted dissimilar policies. One or two interesting facts, however, may be set forth. The two par 1 Industrial Commission, vol. 13, p. 293. Lexow Trust Commission, p. 688. Industrial Commission, vol. 13, p. 293. Lexow Trust Commission, p. 699. |