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ress of natural science and with the modern critical spirit. When he left Oxford, it would have been his choice to enter the church. was in obedience to his father's desire that he chose a parliamentary and official career. In his later years he wrote thus about the character of his mind and about his early preferences:

There was a singular slowness in the development of my mind, so far as regarded its opening to the ordinary aptitudes of the man of the world. . . . In truth the dominant tendencies of my mind were those of a recluse, and I might, in most respects with ease, have accommodated myself to the education of the cloister. All the mental apparatus requisite to constitute the "public man" had to be purchased by a slow experience and inserted piecemeal into the composition of my character.

To the activities of Mr. Gladstone as the most prominent layman of the English church the author devotes some attention. Sufficient reference is made to them to show that they occupied a very important place in his career as a whole. But no attempt is made to write his biography from that standpoint. On the contrary, those interests are kept strictly in the background. The public career of Mr. Gladstone in its relation to secular affairs is made specifically the subject of the work. Even with that limitation, accompanied with reasonable condensation and with the exclusion of most unrelated topics, Mr. Morley has found that the theme of Gladstone, the statesman, demands for its treatment nearly two thousand large octavo pages. It necessitates a review of more than sixty years of English history, and that during a period of great events and changes. It raises the question - always a difficult one — to what extent should the general history of the time be utilized in explanation of the ideas and policy of one who has borne a leading part in its events? A further question of proportion relates to the use of extracts from the voluminous letters and papers at hand, either as a substitute for narrative or to enforce and clarify the author's statements. In both these particulars Mr. Morley's chief difficulties have arisen from the abundance of his materials. Notwithstanding the bulk of the work, all readers must admit that the author has drawn upon the general resources of history only to the extent that was necessary to explain Mr. Gladstone's career. While much documentary evidence is introduced, it is not excessive and it does not clog the main current of the narrative. There is no padding, and little waste material in the work. The treatment is ample and full, but it is not overweighted with detail. Not only is the reader's attention sustained throughout, but it steadily grows as the subject unfolds through the

second and third volumes, and as we approach the time when the author took his place in Parliament and in the cabinet by the side of the great Liberal chief. It reaches a climax in the chapter on the Breach with Mr. Parnell, followed as it was by the wreck of the Home Rule cause and the retirement of Mr. Gladstone from public life.

In the third volume, which deals with events subsequent to 1880, Mr. Morley was specially confronted with another difficulty. How should he impartially treat events of so recent a date, struggles in which he, as well as Mr. Gladstone, had prominently shared, and which had aroused such intense feeling? For this period the book becomes an original historical source in a sense which is not true of the other volumes. Through it all flows a dignified and sustained narrative, from which it must be said that undue partisan reflections are excluded. Gladstone and his great achievements in Parliament and outside are of course the central theme, but not to the disparagement of others or of the opinions which they held. In the third volume, as in its two predecessors, Mr. Morley has fairly maintained the attitude with which he set out, that of intelligent and sympathetic treatment of the great subject which had come to his hand, without undue bias and certainly without "importunate advocacy or tedious assentation."

In the very brief space which remains it is possible to call attention to only a few of the features in the treatment of Gladstone's political career which seem to the reviewer to be especially valuable and suggestive. The account of the relations between the young Gladstone and Sir Robert Peel are of great interest, showing the promptness with which the abilities of the new member were perceived, and how through his service in the Board of Trade he was first brought into close contact with the intricacies of budget legislation. The history of the long process by which, as a member of the group of Peelites, Gladstone held. aloof from both parties, but finally, in 1859, abandoned the Tories and joined the Liberals, is detailed at length. But it is on the whole a disappointing record - except in its result—and one which certainly does not arouse the enthusiasm of either author or reader.

During that period, however, Gladstone's interest in foreign affairs was first awakened. This came in 1850 through his study of conditions in the Kingdom of Naples. It was further extended by the Crimean War, and passed through an interesting phase when, in 1858, he went as special commissioner to the Ionian Islands. The Italian war of 1860 found him an ardent supporter of the cause of nationali

To Tw Problem By W. J. ALET. London. P. S. King &

Though a large part of this volumes devoted to the task of showing that something must be done for Briton industry, the author presents

two positive arguments, with several negative ones, in favor of a protective system as a means to that end. The positive arguments may be called the "big stick" argument and the "anti-dumping" argument. The negative arguments are only intended to show that certain alleged evils of protectionism would not exist so far as England is concerned, or would be much less serious than is generally supposed.

By the "big stick" argument is meant the contention that a protective system may be wise when used as a means of securing more favorable terms, say a reduction of tariff duties, from other countries. Professor Ashley begins by quoting the well known passage from Adam Smith, wherein the validity of this argument is admitted.

There may be good policy in retaliations of this kind when there is a probability that they will procure the repeal of the high duties or prohibitions complained of. The recovery of a great foreign market will generally more than compensate the transitory inconveniency of paying dearer during a short time for some sorts of goods.

He quotes Adam Smith further to the effect that the decision as to whether such retaliations are likely to secure the end aimed at must be left to "that insidious and crafty animal vulgarly called a statesman or politician." Unfortunately "that insidious and crafty animal" is not primarily interested in the question whether such a policy is likely to succeed or not. His main business is to carry elections, and his chief interest in such a policy is in its efficiency as a vote-getter; therefore the politician, as such, is the last person in the world to whom the economist ought to defer on such a question.

The author next quotes, somewhat unfortunately for his cause, from Professor Schmoller, as the leader of the German historical school of economists.

The new era of protection has arisen not because economists and statesmen have been unable to understand the beautiful arguments of free trade, nor because a few monopolists and manufacturers have dominated the government: it has arisen from the natural instincts of the peoples. It does not only rest in many cases it does not primarily rest on List's doctrine of educative tariffs (the "productive powers" or "infant industries" argument); it arises from a motive which is rather instinctively felt than clearly understood, viz., that tariffs are international weapons (Machtmittel) which may benefit a country, if skillfully used.

The italics in the above quotation are mine, and they serve to call attention to the vital point in Professor Schmoller's observations, viz.,

that tariffs are "international weapons" seized upon by the "natural instincts of the people." The correctness of this observation no one can doubt who has watched the course of a tariff campaign in this country and has marked how effectively the designing protectionist has appealed to the natural popular instinct of international jealousy. The author quotes further from Professor Schmoller to the effect that they who ignore the importance of "negotiation-tariffs" dwell in Cloudcuckooland; but in what sublunary region dwells the ethereal spirit of him who imagines that an international weapon seized upon by the instincts of the people will secure concession rather than further retaliation? Military threats seldom secure concessions except from nations that are weak from a military standpoint. They usually, on the other hand, provoke a blow in return. Similarly, such an economic weapon as a tariff can hardly be expected to secure concessions except from nations industrially weak. The effect of our tariff policy toward Canada, for example, has not been, as certain guileless souls imagined it would be, to bring her a suppliant to our feet. It has been, on the other hand, as anyone who understands the natural instincts of a high-spirited and self-respecting people ought to have known, the means of developing a greater degree of industrial self-sufficiency in the Canadian people, besides provoking retaliatory tariffs against ourselves. In the opinion of the reviewer, neither the commercial world at large, nor England in particular, has anything to hope from the system of retaliatory tariffs.

But aside from the probable results of such a policy as a mere weapon of offence, a tariff system is about the clumsiest and most ineffective weapon imaginable in a popular government; though in the hands of a Napoleon it might be used to some purpose. Such a weapon can not be used without affecting interests, and these interests are certain to clamor loudly and continuously for attention. It will be found that the "big stick" is not in a single strong hand controlled by a single will, but in a number of hands controlled by diverse and conflicting wills.

By the "anti-dumping" argument is meant the contention that under modern industrial conditions, where the element of fixed charges. figures largely in the cost of production, the producers of one country can and will make strenuous efforts to enlarge their output by selling in foreign markets at a price considerably below the total cost of production, provided only it is high enough to pay the running expenses, or what Marshall would call the "prime cost." This "dumping" process becomes especially prominent in times of depression, when it is better to sell at a loss than to stop producing altogether, because to