Stanchfield v. Palmer, 4 Greene, 25. De- mand in replevin. Delancey v. Hol comb, 96.
State v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 561. law. State v. Thornton, 80. State v. Berry, 12 Iowa, 58. Highway. The State v. Lane, 225.
The State ex rel. v. Bissell, 4 Greene, 328. Railroad bonds. McClure v. Owen, 251. State v. Callandine, 8 Iowa, 288. Crim- inal law. The State v. Johnson, 414. State ex rel. v. County Judge, etc., 2 Iowa, 280. Constitutional law. The State v. Squires, 346.
State ex rel. v. The County of Wapello, 13 Iowa, 389. Railroad bonds. McClure v. Owen, 250.
State ex rel. v. Johnson County, 10 Iowa, 157. Railroad bonds. McClure v. Owen, 252.
State v. Kimball, 23 Iowa, 531. Roads. Bennett v. Fisher, 499.
State ex rel. v. The Mayor, 18 Iowa, 388. Practice. Mansfield v. Wilkerson, 485. State v. Neeley, 20 Iowa, 110. Criminal law. The State v. Newberry, 467. State v. Ostrander, 18 Iowa, 435. Evi- dence. The State v. Hall, 297. State v. Pierce. 8 Iowa, 231. Forgery. The State v. Johnson, 413. State v. Tait, 22 Iowa, 140. Criminal law. The State v. Van Horton, 403. State v. Thompson, 19 Iowa, 299. For- gery. The State v. Johnson, 413. State v. Wooderd, 20 Iowa, 541. gery. The State v. Johnson, 414. Stewart v. Marshall, 4 Greene, 75. Ju. dicial sale. Cunningham v. Felker, 120. Stewart v. Ewbank, 3 Iowa, 191. New trial. Riley v. Monohan, 509. Stewart v. Brand, 23 Iowa, 478. stead. Orman v. Orman, 362. Stout v. Fortner, 7 Iowa, 183. Partner- ship. Hawk Eye Woolen Mills v. Conk- lin, 426.
Stokes v. Scott County, 10 Iowa, 166. Railroad bonds. McClure v. Owen,
Stringham, Admr., v. Brown, 7 Iowa, 33. Administrator. Shawhan v. Long, 493. Sullivan v. The M. &. R. R. Co., 11 Iowa, 421. Railroad. Hunt v. The Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 370. Taylor v. District Township of Wayne, 25 Iowa, 447. School Contracts. Tay-
lor v. District Township of Otter Creek, 282.
Taylor v. Lusk, 9 Iowa, 444. Evidence. Murray v. Cone, 279.
Ten Eyck v. The Mayor of Keokuk, 15 Iowa, 486. Railroad bonds. McClure v. Owen, 250.
Thomas v. Hillhouse, 17 Iowa, 67. Ali- mony. Harshberger v. Harshberger and Harshberger, 506.
Thorp v. Craig, 10 Iowa, 461. Notarial protest. The State v. Reidel, 437. Tyffe v. Beers, 18 Iowa, 4. Homestead. Orman v. Orman, 362.
Vannice v. Green, 16 Iowa, 574. Judg- ment lien. Chapman v. Coats, 291. Vieths v. Hagge, 8 Iowa, 192. Practice. Veile v. The Germania Ins. Co., 45. Voorhies v. Ewbank, 6 Iowa, 274. Evi- dence. Sykes v. Bates, 525.
Warren v. The Mayor of Lyons, 22 Iowa, 351. Corporation, municipal. The Iowa Land Co., 391. Webster County v. Taylor. lands. Baker v. Washington
Welton v. Tizzard, 15 Iowa, 495. Judg- ment lien. Chapman v. Coats, 291. White v. Road District, 9 Iowa, 202. County bridges. Soper v. Henry County, 271.
Whiting v. The Western Stage Co., 20 Iowa, 554. Gould v. Bowen, 79. Whitbeck v. Dubuque & Pacific R. R. Co., 21 Iowa, 103. Railroad. Davis v. Burlington & Missouri River R. R. Co.,
Wickersham v. Reeves, 1 Iowa, 413. Mortgage. Deeter v. Crossley, 183. Wilhelmi v. Leonard, 13 Iowa, 330. Mortgage. Deeter 7. Crossley, 183. Williamson v. Haycock, 11 Iowa, 40. Partnership. Hawk Eye Woolen Mills v. Conklin, 426.
Williams & Cunningham v. Housel, 2 Iowa, 154. Garnishment. Farwell & Co. v. Howard & Co., 385. Wilson & Gustin v. Jefferson County, 13
Iowa, 181. County Bridges. Soper v. Henry County, 269.
Woodward v. Laverty, 14 Iowa, 383. Practice. Viele v. The Germania Ins. Co., 45.
Woodward v. Laverty, 14 Iowa, 383. Practice. Preston v. Walker, 208.
COMMON CARRIER.
See RAILROAD, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
1. OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. The constitutional prohibition against laws impairing the obligation of contracts, is not infringed by a judicial decision declaring a contract void which the parties had no legal or constitutional power to make. McClure et al. v. Owen et al., 243.
2. COUNTY BONDS FOR RAILROADS. Our State Constitution confers no power upon the legislature to authorize counties to become stock- holders in railroad corporations, nor to borrow money upon their bonds for the purpose of payment upon such stock; and such bonds are, therefore, void. Following the The State ex rel. v. The
County of Wapello (13 Iowa, 389), and other prior decisions of this court. Id.
3. CONSTRUCTION OF STATE LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONS: FDERAL COURTS. The Supreme Court of the United States is not the final arbiter upon questions arising purely upon the construction of the statutes or Constitution of a State. Id.
4. The binding authority of a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, disregarding the construction which the highest judicial tribunal of a State has placed upon one of its statutes, or its Constitution, not admitted, but, in substance, denied. Id.
5. CONFLICT BETWEEN THIS AND UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. The history and grounds of the conflict between the Supreme Court of this State and that of the United States, growing out of the construction of our laws and Constitution, involving the validity of county railroad bonds, reviewed and stated by BECK, J. Id.
6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION BY FEDERAL COURTS: STATE LAWS. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States establishing the following principles governing the construction of State laws, cited by BECK, J.:
1. The settled construction of a State statute by the Supreme Court of that State, is a part of the statute, and will be followed by the federal courts.
2. If the highest judicial tribunal of a State adopt new views as to the construction of a statute, and reverse its former decis- ion, the federal courts will follow the latest setled adjudications. Id.
7. CONSTRUCTION OF STATE CONSTITUTION. The foregoing rules and principles apply as well to the construction of a State Constitution as to the local or statute laws of a State. Id.
8. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Gelpecke v. The City of Dubuque (1 Wallace, 206), shown to be unsupported by the prior decisions of that court. Id.
9. SPECIAL LAWS: CURATIVE ACTS. While the legislature would not, in view of article 3, section 30, of the State Constitution, which prohibits the general assembly from passing local or special laws in certain enumerated cases, and in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, have the power to pass a special law incorporating an independent school district, it would, nevertheless, have the power to pass a curative act legalizing the defective organization of a school-district already in existence under the general law authorizing the creation of independent school-dis- tricts. The State ex rel., etc., v. Squires et al., 340.
10. While such curative act is a local or special law, it is a case where a general law cannot be made applicable within the meaning of the Constitution, and is therefore not invalid. Id.
11. TITLE OF ACTS. While an act cannot, under article 3, section 29, of the Constitution, embrace but one subject, which must be expressed in the title, it may, nevertheless, embrace all matters properly connected therewith. Id.
12. SUBJECT NOT EMBRACED IN TITLE. If an act embrace a subject not expressed in the title, the act will be void only as to so much thereof as is not thus expressed. Id.
13. EX POST FACTO AND RETROSPECTIVE LAWS. A retrospective law is not necessarily ex post facto. The term ex post facto applies only
to criminal laws, such as make acts, innocent when done, crimi- nal; or, if criminal when done, aggravate the crime, increase the punishment or reduce the measure of proof. Id.
14. RETROSPECTIVE LAWS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Retrospective laws, as distinguished from ex post facto laws, are not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, nor of this State. Id. 15. LEGISLATIVE POWER TO PASS. In the absence of any constitutional inhibition, a State legislature has the power to pass retrospective or retroactive laws, and they will not be declared inoperative except when they disturb or interfere with vested rights. Id. 16. CURATIVE ACT. As a requisite to the rightful exercise of the legis lative power to cure a defective proceeding, it must have possessed the power to authorize the same result by prior legislation; though it is not necessary that it might have accomplished the result in the precise manner it has adopted to cure the defect. Id.
DISCRETION. The action of the court below in overruling a motion for continuance, will not be disturbed where no abuse of discretion is shown. Avery v. Wilson, 573.
1. RATIFICATION. Where persons claiming an interest in real estate, do not join in a contract for the sale thereof, made by another, but subsequently unite in the execution of a deed for the premises, made pursuant to and in ratification of such contract, such ratifica- tion relates back to the execution of the contract, and gives to it the same force and effect as if they had signed it when made. Sackett v. Osborn et al., 146.
2. CONSTRUCTION: RAILROAD COMPANY. The Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad company and an elevator company at the city of Dubuque, entered into an agreement, containing among others the following stipulation: That the elevator company would erect a building suitable “for receiving, storing, delivering and handling all grain that shall be received by the cars of said railroad company not otherwise consigned." Subsequently to this they made a contract supplemental to the first, in which it was stipulated that the ele- vator company should "receive and discharge for the Dubuque & Sioux City Railroad company all through grain at one cent a bushel.” etc., and that the elevator should have the handling of all through grain at that price per bushel. In an action to recover damages against the railroad company for its refusal to give the elevator the handling of grain according to the contract, it was held,
1. That the original and supplemental agreement were to be considered together as forming one contract.
2. That the words "for receiving, etc., all grain that shall be received by the cars of said railroad company," contained in the original agreement, and the words "receive and discharge for the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad company," contained in the supplemental agreement, did not limit the contract to grain received or shipped in the cars owned by said railroad com- pany, but extended to all grain shipped in cars used by it in transporting grain over its road, whether belonging to it or to other companies with whom it might have running arrange-
3. That the words "all through grain," contained in the supplemental agreement, did not mean grain shipped through merely to the end of the line of said railroad company, but all grain consigned through Dubuque to some point beyond, by the terms of shipment. Richmond et al. v. The Dubuque & Sioux City R. R. Co. and the Illinois Central R. R. Co., 191.
3. CONTRACTS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY: MONOPOLIES. The power of courts to declare a contract void as being against public policy, is a delicate and undefined one, and, like the power to declare a stat- ute unconstitutional, should be exercised only in cases free from doubt. It was accordingly held that the contract in the present case was not inoperative as being in contravention of public policy, on the ground that it gave to the elevator company a monopoly of handling all the through grain transported over the defendant's road. Id.
4. MEASURE OF DAMAGES. It was further held, that the measure of damages in the present case would be the difference between the cost of handling the grain that the plaintiffs were, under the con- tract, entitled to handle, and the price stipulated to be paid there- for; but that if it was shown that the plaintiffs, in order to handle the grain that was actually furnished them by the railroad com- pany, were required to and did have the hands and power sufficient to handle, without further expense, the grain which the defendant wrongfully refused to let them handle, then the plaintiff might recover the price per bushel stipulated for handling in the contract, since in such case the cost of the additional handling would be nothing. Id.
5. CONSTRUCTION. A contract should be so construed as to give to all of its parts, and all of the language used, force and validity where that is possible. Emerick v. Clemens, 332.
6. RULE APPLIED. E. and C. entered into an agreement of lease, wherein it was stipulated that C. should pay E. for the use of the latter's farm the following rents: fifty dollars to be paid in money and fifteen dollars in labor." By a supplemental agreement it was stipulated, "that the provision that does provide to be paid in money is to be paid in grain; the said C. is to give the said E. one-third of all the produce that is raised on his farm." Held, that the stipulation in the lease in reference to the fifteen dollar pay- ment in labor was not superseded or annulled by the supplemental contract. Id.
7. CUSTOM. Where a contract for the construction of a railroad fixes, as the price of grading, a certain rate per yard, and in terms provides that no extras shall be allowed, this express stipulation cannot be controlled by a contrary custom. Phillips v. Starr & Co., 349.
8. MORTGAGE: DAMAGES. The mortgagors of real estate, the mortgagee, and a purchaser of the mortgaged premises entered into agreement, by the terms of which the mortgagee was to release the mortgaged premises from the operation of the mortgage, upon the mortgagors rebuilding upon other land a mill received by them, as the consid. eration of the mortgaged premises, from the purchaser, putting the same in good running order and executing a mortgage thereon to the mortgagee in lieu of the other mortgage; the purchaser agree- ing with the mortgagors to set up the engine and put it in running order, and they agreeing with him to have the mortgage discharged from the premises purchased by him when this was done. The purchaser performed his part of the agreement, but the mortgagors failed and refused after the mill was put in a good running condi- VOL. XXVI.—78
tion to execute to the mortgagee a mortgage thereon in lieu of the other mortgage. Held,
1. That, as between the purchaser and the mortgagee, the rights of the latter were not affected by the failure of the mortga- gors to perform their agreement.
2. That the mortgagors were liable in damages to the pur- chaser for the breach of their agreement to discharge the mort- gaged premises. Beeson v. Hunt et al. 439.
9. PAROL AGREEMENT: PRIOR UNSTAMPED MEMORANDUM. A parol contract for the purchase of real estate, accompanied by a payment of part of the purchase money, constitutes a valid agreement, although there was a prior unstamped memorandum. Sykes v. Bates, 521.
10. VENDOR AND VENDEE DELIVERY OF PURCHASE MONEY TO THIRD PERSON. Where the purchase money of real estate is, pursuant to the direction of the vendor, sent to him in the care of a third per- son, who accordingly receives the same, this constitutes such a payment and delivery of the purchase money as will entitle the vendee to recover the same of the vendor upon his failure to exe- cute the conveyance, although such third person, after receiving the money, instead of paying it to the vendor, delivered it without the consent of the vendee to one unauthorized to receive it, and who appropriated it to his own use. Id.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1.
EQUITY.
ESTOPPEL, 2.
INSURANCE.
SCHOOLS.
CONTRIBUTION.
See PARTNERSHIP, 2, 3.
DELIVERY: PRESUMPTION ARISING FROM RECORD. Where a deed beneficial in its character to the grantee, has been properly acknowledged and recorded, the presumption of law in favor of the grantee is, that it has been delivered; and the burden is upon the party claiming the non-delivery to clearly rebut this presump- tion. Robinson v. Gould et al., 89.
1. COUNTY: LIABILITY. Incorporated towns and cities are held to a much more extended liability than counties, or school and road districts, even where the latter are declared to be invested with corporate capacity. Soper v. Henry County, 264.
2. VACATION OF STREETS. A municipal corporation under the author- ity conferred in its charter, to "locate and establish streets and alleys and vacate the same," may rightfully and constitutionally order the vacation of a street; and this power when discreetly exercised and with due regard to individual rights, will not be restrained at the instance of a citizen claiming, that, as a land owner, he is interested in keeping open the streets dedicated to the public. Gray v. The Iowa Land Co. et al., 387.
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