UNITED STATES BANK.

Paper read to the Cabinet, September 18, 1833.

g carefully and anxiously considered all the facts uments, which have been submitted to him relative oval of the public deposites from the Bank of the States, the Président deems it his duty to communithis manner to his Cabinet, the final conclusions of mind, and the reasons on which they are founded, to put them in a durable form, and to prevent mis

resident's convictions of the dangerous tendencies ank of the United States, since signally illustrated by acts, were so overpowering when he entered upon es of Chief Magistrate, that he felt it his duty, notwiththe objections of the friends by whom he was surto avail himself of the first occasion to call the atof Congress and the people to the question of its reThe opinions expressed in his Annual Message of er, 1829, were reiterated in those of December, 1830, 1, and in that of 1830 he threw out, for consideration, ggestions in relation to a substitute. At the session , an act was passed by a majority of both houses of s, re-chartering the present Bank, upon which the it felt it his duty to put his constitutional veto. In age, returning that act, he repeated and enlarged principles and views briefly asserted in his Annual s, declaring the Bank to be, in his opinion, both init and unconstitutional, and announcing to his counvery unequivocally, his firm determination never to , by his approval, the continuance of that institution, tablishment of any other upon similar principles. are strong reasons for believing that the motive of in asking for a re-charter at that session of conis to make it a leading question in the election of a t of the United States the ensuing November, and all med necessary were taken to procure from the peoersal of the president's decision.

gh the charter was approaching its termination, and was aware that it was the intention of the governuse the public deposite as fast as it accrued, in the of the public debt, yet did it extend its loans from 1831, to May, 1832, from $42,402,304 24 to $70,428,070 an increase of $28,025,766 48, in sixteen months. fidently believed, that the leading object of this imxtension of its loans, was to bring as large a portion ople as possible under its power and influence: and

it has been disclosed, that some of the largest sums were granted on very unusual terms to conductors of the public press. In some of these cases, the motive was made manifest by the nominal or insufficient security taken for the loans, by the large amounts discounted, by the extraordinary time allowed for payment, and especially by the subsequent conduct of those receiving the accommodations.

Having taken these preliminary steps to obtain control over public opinion, the Bank came into congress and asked a new charter. The object avowed by many of the advo cates of the Bank, was to put the president to the test, that the country might know his final determination relative to the Bank, prior to the ensuing election. Many documents and articles were printed and circulated at the expense of the Bank, to bring the people to a favourable decision upon its pretensions. Those whom the Bank appears to have made its debtors for the special occasion, were warned of the rui which awaited them, should the president be sustained ; and attempts were made to alarm the whole people by painting the depression in the price of property and produce, and the general loss, inconvenience, and distress, which it was repre sented, would immediately follow the re-election of the presi dent in opposition to the Bank.

Can it now be said that the question of a re-charter of the Bank was not decided at the election which ensued? Ha the veto been equivocal, or had it not covered the whol ground—if it had merely taken exceptions to the details o the Bill, or to the time of its passage-if it had not met th whole ground of constitutionality and expediency, then ther might have been some plausibility for the allegation that th question was not decided by the people. It was to compe the president to take his stand that the question was brough forward at that particular time. He met the challenge, wil ingly took the position into which his adversaries sought t force him, and frankly declared his unalterable opposition the Bank, as being both unconstitutional and inexpedien On that ground the case was argued to the people, and no the people have sustained the president, notwithstanding th array of influence and power which was brought to bear upo him, it is too late, he confidently thinks, to say that the ques tion has not been decided. Whatever may be the opinio ⚫ of others, the president considers his re-election as a decisio of the people against the Bank. In the concluding paragrap of his veto message, he said:

t

"I have now done my duty to my country. If sustaine by my fellow-citizens, I shall be grateful and happy; if not, shall find in the motives which impel me, ample grounds fo contentment and peace."

was sustained by a just people, and he desires to evince atitude by carrying into effect their decision, so far as ends upon him.

all the substitutes for the present Bank which have been sted, none seems to have united any considerable porf the public in its favour. Most of them are liable to me constitutional objections for which the present Bank een condemned, and, perhaps, to all there are strong ions on the score of expediency. In ridding the counan irresponsible power which has attempted to conhe government, care must be taken not to unite the power with the executive branch. To give a president ntrol over the currency and the power over individuw possessed by the Bank of the United States, even he material difference that he is responsible to the peoould be as objectionable and as dangerous as to leave it is. Neither the one nor the other is necessary, and ore ought not to be resorted to.

the whole, the president considers it as conclusively I that the charter of the Bank of the United States will e renewed, and he has no reasonable ground to believe ny substitute will be established. Being bound to reguis course by the laws as they exist, and not to anticipate terference of the legislative power for the purpose of ng new systems, it is proper for him seasonably to conthe means by which the services rendered by the Bank e United States are to be performed after its charter expire.

e existing laws declare, that "the deposites of the mof the United States, in places in which the said Bank ranches thereof may be established, shall be made in bank and branches thereof, unless the Secretary of the sury shall at any time otherwise order and direct, in à case the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately efore congress, if in session, and if not, immediately afe commencement of the next session, the reason of such or direction."

e power of the Secretary of the Treasury over the dees, is unqualified. The provision that he shall report his ns to congress, is no limitation. Had it not been ind, he would have been responsible to congress, had he e a removal for any other than good reasons, and his nsibility now ceases, upon the rendition of sufficient to congress. The only object of the provision, is to e his reasons accessible to congress, and enable that more readily to judge of their soundness and purity, thereupon to make such farther provision by law as the atiye power may think proper in relation to the deposite

of the public money. Those reasons may be very diversified. It was asserted by the Secretary of the Treasury without contradiction, as early as 1817, that he had power "to control the proceedings" of the Bank of the United States at any moment, "by changing the deposites to the State Banks," should it pursue an illiberal course towards those institutions; that "the Secretary of the Treasury will always be disposed to support the credit of the State Banks, and will invariably direct transfers from the deposites of the public money in aid of their legitimate exertions to maintain their credit ;" and he asserted a right to employ the State Banks, when the Bank of the United States should refuse to receive on deposite the notes of such State Banks as the public interest required should be received in payment of the public dues. In several instances, he did transfer the public deposites to State Banks, in the immediate vicinity of branches, for reasons connected only with the safety of those banks, the public convenience, and the interests of the Treasury.

If it was lawful for Mr. Crawford, the Secretary of the . Treasury at that time, to act on these principles, it will be difficult to discover any sound reasons against the application of similar principles in still stronger cases. And it is a matter of surprise that a power which, in the infancy of the Bank, was freely asserted as one of the ordinary and familiar duties of the Secretary of the Treasury, should now be gravely questioned, and attempts made to excite and alarm the public mind, as if some new and unheard of power was about to be usurped by the Executive branch of the Government.

It is but a little more than two and a half years to the termination of the charter of the present Bank. It is considered as the decision of the country that it shall then cease to exist, and no man, the President believes, has reasonable ground for expectation that any other Bank of the United States will be created by Congress. To the Treasury Department is intrusted the safe keeping and faithful application of the public money. A plan of collection different from the present, must therefore be introduced and put in complete operation before the dissolution of the present Bank. When shall it be commenced? Shall no step be taken in this essential concern until the charter expires, and the Treasury finds itself without an agent, its accounts in confusion, with no depository for its funds, and the whole business of the Government deranged? or shall it be delayed until six months, or a year, or two years, before the expiration of the charter? It is obvious that any new system which may be substituted in the place of the Bank of the United States, could not suddenly be carried into effect on

termination of its existence, without serious inconvece to the Government and the people. Its vast amount tes are then to be redeemed and withdrawn from circu1, and its immense debt collected. These operations be gradual, otherwise much suffering and distress will ought upon the community. It ought to be not a work nths only, but of years, and the President thinks it canvith due attention to the interests of the people, be longstponed. It is safer to begin it too soon than to delay it ng.

for the wisdom of Congress to decide upon the best tute to be adopted in the place of the Bank of the Uniates; and the President would have felt himself relievm a heavy and painful responsibility, if, in the charter Bank, Congress had reserved to itself the power of dig, at its pleasure, the public money to be elsewhere ded, and had not devolved that power exclusively on one e Executive Departments. It is useless now to inquire his high and important power was surrendered by those are peculiarly and appropriately the guardians of the money. Perhaps it was an oversight. But as the Hent presumes that the charter of the Bank is to be dered as a contract on the part of the Government, it now in the power of Congress to disregard its stipula; and by the terms of that contract the public money is deposited in the Bank, during the continuance of its er, unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall otherwise t. Unless, therefore, the Secretary of the Treasury first Congress have no power over the subject, for they candd a new clause to the charter, or strike one out of it, ut the consent of the Bank; and consequently, the puboney must remain in that institution to the last hour of istence, unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall reit at an earlier day. The responsibility is thus thrown the Executive branch of the Government, of deciding long before the expiration of the charter, the public intevill require the deposites to be placed elsewhere. And ugh, according to the frame and principle of our govent, this decision would seem more properly to belong e legislative power, yet as the law has imposed it upon Executive Department, the duty ought to be faithfully firmly met, and the decision made and executed upon est lights that can be obtained, and the best judgment can be formed. It would ill become the Executive branch e Government to shrink from any duty which the law ses on it, to fix upon others the responsibility which y belongs to itself. And while the President anxiously es to abstain from the exercise of doubtful powers, and