Grant, pp. 168, 284, aussi p. 164. A la page 281, Grant nous donne comme règle que la corporation n'est pas responsable d'actes ayant couleur d'actes corporatifs, lorsque ces actes ne sont pas de sa compétence, auquel cas on ne doit s'adresser qu'a ceux qui ont fait l'acte. Tel n'est pas le cas ici. La Corporation de Montréal était réellement partie litigante sur l'expropriation demandée, et le Conseil-de-ville, qui la représentait, de même que la Corporation, avait droit d'adopter ou faire adopter tout acte judiciaire, pour sauvegarder les droits de la Corporation. Voir The Philadelphia, Washington & Baltimore R. R. Co., & Patrick Quigly-Howard's Rep. vol. 21, p. 202. Secus Stevens vs Middland Counties R. Co. & Lander -10 Exe. Rep. 352, Hurlston & Gordon, semble peu applicable néanmoins."

Le jugement de la cour est comme suit: "The Court, considering that the grounds of the demurrer are insufficient, and that plaintiffs' allegations in their declaration are sufficient to support the conclusions thereof, doth dismiss the said demurrer, with costs." (17 J., p. 46; 3 R. L., 451; 4 R. L., p. 7; 1 R. C., p. 475.)

BARNARD, avocat des demandeurs.

ROUER ROY & DEVLIN, avocats des défendeurs.

EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

SUPERIOR COURT, Montreal, 3rd December, 1872.

ENQUETE SITTINGS.

Coram TORRANCE, J.

COURTNEY vs BOWIE es-qual.

Held:-That a witness cannot be contradicted as to collateral matters.

The action was on a note which defendants averred had been stolen. A witness, Henry Bowie, was examined for plaintiff, and stated, in cross-examination, that a charge of perjury, which had been brought against him, fell to the ground. The defendants, in rebuttal, offered to prove against the credibility of Henry Bowie, that the statement that the charge of perjury fell to the ground was untrue. The presiding Judge held that the witness could not be contradicted as to a collateral matter. The following authorities were referred to: Best, Evidence, pp. 799, 800, 4th edn.; Queen vs Holmes,

& Furness, 1 Law Rep., Crown Cases Reserved, 334; 1 Greenleaf, on Evidence, § 449; Harris vs Tippet, 4 Camp. 637; 2 Taylor, Ev. § 1324, 5th edn. (17 J., p. 47.)

KELLER, for plaintiff.

KELLY, for defendant.

PARTNERSHIP.—ASSIGNMENT.

SUPERIOR COURT, Montreal, 19th November, 1872.

IN INSOLVENCY.

Coram TORRANCE, J.

In re LUSK et al., Insolvents, and WILLIAM FOOTE, Petitioner.

Held:-10. That an order, for the examination of witnesses in insolvency, made on the day of the voluntary assignment, under the Insolvent Act of 1869, of a partnership estate, by two out of three partners of whom the firm consisted, is irregular.

20. That the petition for such examination should set forth satisfactory reasons for the order. (32 and 33 Vic., cap. 16, ss. 110, 112.)

Semble.-Two partners of a partnership of three are without power to make a voluntary assignment of the partnership to an interim assignee. (17 J., p. 47; 19 J., p. 104.)

J. A. PERKINS, for petitioner.

REQUETE CIVILE.

SUPERIOR COURT, Montreal, 30th November, 1874.

Coram JOHNSON, J.

In the matter of LUSK et al., insolvents, petitioners for discharge, and RIDDELL, assignee, and Ross, creditor, con

testants.

Held:-That where a party has been precluded from adducing important evidence, owing to a misunderstanding between his attorneys and the attorney on the opposite side, he may be relieved from the consequences by a requête civile.

PER CURIAM:-There were two insolvents, and they made their applications to have their certificates confirmed separately, and each was contested by two separate parties: 1st, the assignee of their estate; and 2nd, by Ross and others, so that there were four contestations in all. They were heard before me at enquête and merits on the 10th of June last, and one

hearing applied to all the four cases. When they were called,
the petitioners were not ready to proceed, and an informal
application was made to put off the cases on grounds that
were then inadmissible being the same as those now
urged by requête civile, but not supported by affidavit at
that time, and the contesting parties therefore had it all their
own way. In this state of matters the Court had no alternative
but to maintain the contestations, and dismiss the petitions
for confirmation, which was done by the judgment of the
30th of June. The grounds of that judgment were the fai-
lure of the petitioners to prove the allegations of their peti-
tion for discharge, and also the sufficiency of the proof made
by the contestants under the circumstances which had taken
place at the hearing. The petitioners now present a demand
in revocation of these judgments, and the gist of their appli-
cation in each of these cases is the same. They urge that the
insolvents were precluded, by a misunderstanding between
their attorneys and the attorneys of the parties contesting
their certificate, from producing important evidence to show
that they were intitled to a confirmation of their discharge, as
well on the grounds set forth in their petition, as by reason
of the refutation they could have given of the pretentions
of the contestants, if they had not been, as they say they
were, taken by surprise and misled. It is extremely disa-
greable to a court of justice to witness misunderstandings
between professional men in the cases before it, and still
more so to have those misunderstandings made the subject of
complaint on either side for redress. I should be inclined to
say in all such cases, the misunderstanding must, in order to
be a ground of complaint, be one not arising from the neglect
of the attorney complaining, as in that case the remedy of
the party would be an action against his attorney. In the
present case the evidence shows that the party may have
been exposed to the most serious consequences, not on account
of any negligence of his attorney, but in consequence of the
reliance of the latter upon an understanding with his adver-
sary, who, in the pressure of business, forgot or disregarded
it. The party ought not to be made to suffer for this. He
has no redress if he cannot bring the matter up by requête
civile, as it is obvious that neither revision nor appeal could
be adequate to correct what does not appear by record. These
petitions will therefore be granted, each party to pay his
own costs, as well those of the first judgment, as of the re-
quête civile, each being equally wrong. Requête civile allowed.
(19 J., p. 104.)

MONK & BUTLER, for insolvents.
J. A. PERKINS, for contestants.

REGISTRES DE L'ETAT CIVIL.

COUR SUPÉRIEURE, Montréal, 30 janvier 1872.

Coram BERTHELOT, J.

Ex-Parte DévOYAU dit LAFRAMBOISE, Requérant, et Le révérend père FÉLIX VÉNARD, Intimé.

Juge:--Que sur une requête pour la rectification d'un acte de naissance dans les registres d'une paroisse, la Cour, avant faire droit, peut ordonner que la délimitation de cette paroisse soit constatée et établie par un arpenteur, suivant son érection civile. (1)

Le 24 septembre 1870, le requérant présenta une requête, devant la cour Supérieure, à Montréal, pour la rectification d'un acte de naissance, dans les registres de la paroisse de StLaurent, dans le district de Montréal, se plaignant que le répondant, le curé de la paroisse de St-Laurent, avait désigné erronément, dans l'acte de naissance qu'il avait rédigé, dans les registres de si paroisse, le requérant comme paroissien de la paroisse de Lachine, d'après un décret canonique de l'administrateur du diocèse de Montréal, en date du 12 mai 1870, malgré les protestations du requérant, et qu'il en avait fait ainsi du parrain et de la marraine, et que partant, ils ont été dans la nécessité de refuser de signer l'acte de naissance. Le 4 juin 1870, le requérant a notifié le curé, par un acte notarié, de rectifier cette erreur. Le requérant alléguait encore, dans sa requête, que ce décret canonique est nul, qu'il n'a jamais été soumis aux commissaires civils, ni ratifié et confirmé par eux. Le requérant concluait à ce que le curé fût tenu de faire l'entrée aux registres de la paroisse, du domicile véritable des parties intéressées, et concluait à la rectification de ces registres. Le répondant contesta cette requête. La cour Supérieure rendit un jugement interlocutoire, comme suit: "La "cour attendu que, par la loi, ou l'édit de 1722, fixant les "limites des paroisses de St-Laurent, de Lachine, et la cir"conscription des dites deux paroisses, est donné comme suit, "etc" Attendu qu'il est opportun de constater la continuité de territoire de la circonscription de chacune de ces paroisses avant d'adjuger. Attendu qu'il résulte des désignations et descriptions ci-dessus qu'une partie de la Côte de Notre-Dame des Vertus, est comprise dans la circonscription de la paroisse de St-Laurent, tandis que l'autre l'est dans celle de Lachine, vu que le décret canonique du 12 mai 1870, n'a pas encore été

(1) Code Civil, art. 75 à 78; Edits et Ord.; 1 vol. Ed. de 1803, p. 403, arrêt du conseil d'Etat du 3 mars 1722.

reconnu par aucune proclamation de l'autorité civile, la cour avant faire droit, ordonne que par H. Maurice Perrault, arpenteur de la cité de Montréal, il soit procédé à faire un plan des dites deux côtes de Notre-Dame des Vertus et de Liesse, et indiquant la situation de la terre ou immeuble occupée par le requérant, et de constater, s'il lui est possible, qu'était l'etendu des dites deux côtes en 1722, et des terres alors concédées en icelle, et aussi la limite dans la dite Côte de NotreDame des Vertus séparant les dites deux paroisses de StLaurent et de Lachine. Lequel arpenteur procédera, après serment prêté, à entendre les parties dûment notifiées, et à faire, sur le tout, son rapport à cette cour, le ou avant le 17 mai prochain, ou plus tôt, si faire se peut, dépens réservés. (17 J., p. 49.)

D. D. BONDY, avocat du demandeur.

R. LAFLAMME, Q. C., avocat du défendeur.

EVOCATION.

SUPERIOR COURT, Montreal, 20th November, 1872.

Coram MACKAY, J,

DE BEAUJEU & vir vs MCNAMEE.

Held :--In a non-appealable cause returnable out of term, that a defendnat may evoke at any time before plaintiff has obtained an acte of foreclosure. (Art. 1130 C. de P. de 1897.)

The plaintiffs, on the 12th September, 1872, instituted an action of damages for $90, against defendant, for alleged quarrying without their consent, on the Isle d'Assigny, also alleged to be their property. The action was returned on the 30th September. The defendant, on the 9th of October, fyled a declaration in writing, that he evoked the case, the land belonging to the Crown, and not to plaintiffs. He said he intended to quarry there in the future.

DOUTRE, Q. C., for defendant, cited C. C. P. 1058, and applied to the Court to decide summarily whether the evocation was well founded.

BONDY, for plaintiffs, said that defendant had been foreclosed from pleading, and could not evoke after foreclosure. DOUTRE, in reply. It is true that the five days for pleading had expired, but plaintiffs had taken no proceedings since.