" and by the exception, and it is alleged by said exception, that the writ of summons and declaration do aver that the "female plaintiff was authorized by her husband to bring "the present action;" and "Considering that the defendants are without interest to disavow the attorneys ad litem of "plaintiffs, and have no power to question the power or authority of the said attorneys ad litem." McKercher & Simpson, 6 L. C. R., 311, 5 R. J. R. Q., p. 115, 14 R. J. R. Q., p. 371. Exception dismissed. (17 J., p. 75)

DUHAMEL & RAINVILLE, for plaintiffs.

J. G. D'AMOUR, for defendants.

REAL ACTION-JURISDICTION.

SUPERIOR COURT, Montreal, 31st October, 1870.

Coram TORRANCE, J.

WHYTE, ès-qualité, ve LYNCH et al.

Held:-That though a real action is only to be brought in the district where the immoveable in dispute is situated, C. C. P. 38, yet, an appearance, by a defendant, without pleading, or pleading to the merits of the action, is a waiver of an exception to the jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM: This is an action by John Whyte, in his quality of assignee to the insolvent estate of William Cairns, of Ormstown, in the district of Beauharnois. The conclusion of the declaration prays that certain deeds of sale, set forth in the declaration, be annulled and set aside, as simulated and fraudulent, and the immoveable described therein be declared to be vested in plaintiff, in his capacity, to be by him dealt with according to law. The first question submitted to the Court is a question of jurisdiction. There are four defendants in the writ of summons: Robert V. Lynch and William Emberson, both of New York, John Cunningham, of the village of Huntingdon, in the district of Beauharnois, and Thomas Phillips, of the village of Durham, in the same district. John Cunningham was served with the writ of summons, in the district of Montreal. The defendants, Robert V. Lynch, William Emberson and Thomas Phillips were not served, but were called in by advertisements. The defendants, Robert V. Lynch and John Cunningham, appeared by their several attorneys. The land in question is in the district of Beauharnois. Robert V. Lynch pleaded to the merits of the action that he was ignorant of the facts stated in the declaration, and that William Emberson had no property in the Province

of Quebec, and also an additional plea that plaintiff was not the assignee of the residence of William Cairns, and that the assignment to him was null. John Cunningham did not plead to the action. It was argued, for defendants, on the merits, that this Court had no jurisdiction by C. C. P. 37, 38. Art. 37 says: "In every real or mixed action, the defendant may be summoned before the Court of his domicile, or before that of the place where the object in dispute is situated." Art. 38 says: " In real actions, they should all be summoned before the Court of the place where the object in dispute is situated." "In mixed actions, before the Court of the place where the object in dispute is situated, or before the Court of the domicile of one of the defendants." The service in Montreal would only be good in a personal action. The action I should have been instituted in the district of Beauharnois where the land was. The plaintiff denied that this was a real action. As to Lynch, the question was waived by his pleading to the merits. The Court could not pronounce upon this question of jurisdiction. It had been waived. The rule of the code was not à peine de nullité. Is the present action real? The Ancient Denisart, Vo Action, says: "Les actions réelles sont celles par le moyen desquelles on poursuit immédiatement des droits sur les choses." Ortolan, Comm. on the Institute of Justinian, vol. 2, p. 457, says: "L'action réelle, en général, est celle par laquelle le demandeur soutient qu'il a, abstraction faite de toute autre personne, la faculté de disposer d'une chose, corporelle ou incorporelle, ou d'en tirer plus ou moins largement profit. Si nous avons besoin d'intenter l'action, c'est parce que notre droit est méconnu, que quelqu'un y met obstacle, et qu'il faut recourir à la justice pour faire lever cet obstacle." It is impossible for the Court to come to any conclusion but that the present action is a real action. Has the objection been waived by the appearance of the two defendants, Robert V. Lynch and,John Cunningham, without their fyling a declinatory exception? The rule may be stated as follows: The consent of parties cannot give jurisdiction, when wanting ratione materia. It can only confer it when mere personal rights are involved, or where a defendant is sued before another judge than the one of his domicile, and he nevertheless appears and pleads to the merits, or does not plead at all. When jurisdiction is wanting ratione materiæ, the court is bound ex officio to notice it. Now, is the Superior Court, at Montreal, incompetent ratione materia to take cognizance of an action claiming real estate in the district of Beauharnois? The Court here is competent to take cognizance of real actions generally, and is, therefore, competent, ratione materice, to take cognizance of the present

action claiming an immoveable in the District of Beauharnois. The authors would appear to be of opinion that the solution of the difficulty is in the solution of the question, whether the tribunal is either relatively or absolutely incompetent. If this Court be only relatively incompetent, the objection has been waived; if it be absolutely incompetent, then no acquiescence or waiver of parties could give jurisdiction. Thomine Des Mazures, in his commentary on art. 170 of the C. C. P. of France says: "Mais comment déterminer si un tribunal est incompétent à raison de la matière, ou si l'incompétence n'est que relative? Ce n'est pas toujours une question facile à résoudre. Nous estimons que la solution dépend du point de savoir si l'attribution de l'affaire a été faite principalement dans l'intérêt des parties, auquel cas l'incompétence n'est que relative, ou si elle tient principalement à des intérêts généraux, ou à l'ordre hiérarchique des pouvoirs, auxquels cas l'incompétence est à raison de la matière et absolue." Tom. 1, p. 322. Rogron, in his commentary on the Code of Procedure, in France, art. 170, tom. 1, p. 182, says: "Il y a incompétence à raison de la personne, ratione persona, lorsque le défendeur est cité devant un autre tribunal que celui qui doit connaître de la cause, bien que les causes de la même nature soient placées dans les attributions de ce tribunal; ainsi, un tribunal de première instance peut connaître de toutes les affaires civiles; mais, si l'affaire est personnelle, elle doit être portée devant le tribunal du domicile du défendeur; si elle est réelle, elle doit être portée devant le tribunal du lieu où l'objet litigieux est situé; si elle est mixte, devant le tribunal du domicile du défendeur ou de la situation des lieux. Si donc, dans ces trois cas, le défendeur est cité devant un autre tribunal que celui indiqué par la loi, il pourra proposer le déclinatoire; mais comme cette indication est toute dans son intérêt, il devra le faire in limine litis, c'est-à-dire avant toutes exceptions et défenses." Rogron is plainly of opinion that, in a case like the present, the defendant should have fyled a declinatory exception, within the delays, if he wished to avoid a contestation, at Montreal, and not having done so, it is a waiver of the objection. Judgment for plaintiff. (17 J., p. 76) J. J. C. ABBOTT, for plaintiff.

W. H. KERR, for defendant Lynch.

J. A. PERKINS, for defendant Cunningham.

TRANSFER.-SIGNIFICATION.

.CIRCUIT COURT, Montreal, 28th February, 1871.

Coram TORRANCE, J.

MCLENNAN 28 MARTIN, & MARTIN, Plff. en faux, vs McLENNAN, Deft. en faux.

Held :—That it is necessary to serve upon a debtor a copy of the act of signification of transfer by his creditor to a third party.

The defendant was sued upon a deed of lease made by him in favor of André Herault dit Dominique, and, by the latter transferred to plaintiff, by deed of transfer of date 27th October, 1869 (P. E. Normandeau, N. P.). The plaintiff, by his declaration, alleged that a copy of the deed of transfer was duly signified upon defendant, on the 3rd November, 1869. In proof of this allegation, plaintiff produced a copy of the transfer, and acte of signification. The defendant inscribed en faux against this document, alleging, by his moyens de faux, "that portion of the said pretended signification of transfer, in which it is stated, by the said notary, that he served Joseph Martin with a copy of the signification of said transfer is false, namely, the words in the original and authentic copy of said signification, and also a copy of these presents,' are false, the notary not having served Martin with a copy of the said signification of said transfer, as he falsely states in said pretended signification that he did, and that the deed of signification of transfer is untrue, and false in that respect." The defendant en faux demurred to the moyens de faux," because, by law, supposing said moyens de faux to be true, it was not necessary to serve upon said plaintiff en faux a copy of the deed of signification of the said transfer. Because the word impugned as false constitutes a mere surplusage."

DUGAS, in support of demurrer, cited C. C. 1571; Troplong, Vente, no 109; A. Denisart, vo. faux principal, p. 452.

MCCORD, for plaintiff en faux, cited 2 Gr. Cout., art. 108, n° 29, p. 132.

The Court dismissed the answer in law. (17 J., p. 78; 3 R. L., p. 31; 1 R. C., p. 245)

D. MCCORD, for plaintiff en faux.

GIROUARD & DUGAS, for defendant en faux.

INSCRIPTION IN REVIEW.

SUPERIOR COURT, IN REVIEW,

Montreal, 21st December, 1872.

Coram MACKAY, J., BEAUDRY, J.

LENOIR DIT ROLLAND vs DESMARAIS et vir.

Held-That an inscription under C. C. P. 497 (art. 1196 C. P. C. de 1897), may be made on the ninth day after judgment when the eighth day falls on a Sunday.

DUGAS, for plaintiff, moved, inasmuch as the judgment of which a review was sought had been rendered on the 30th November last, and the inscription in review was only fyled on the 9th December instant, that the inscription in review be declared null and void, as not having been produced within the eight days after the judgment. Vide C.C.P.

497.

TAILLON, for defendants, è contra cited C. C. P. 3, 24; and Scatcherd vs Allan, 10 L. C. Jur., 201. (1)

PER CURIAM: The case of Scatcherd vs Allan furnishes the rule, and the motion is dismissed, with costs. (17 J., p. 81) GIROUARD & DUGAS, for plaintiff.

TRUDEL & DEMONTIGNY, for defendants.

(1) La section 21 du chap. 39 des Statuts du Canada de 1864, 27-28 Victo ria, intitulé: "Acte pour diminuer les frais des ventes en justice et des "ratifications de titres, et pour faciliter la tenue des enquêtes, l'assignation “des absents, la distribution judiciaire des deniers, la saisie des rentes "constituées représentant les droits seigneuriaux, et pourvoir à la revision "des jugements en certains cas, dans le Bas-Canada," décrétait que dans le but d'obtenir la revision devant trois juges, d'un jugement définitif rendu à la cour supérieure ou dans toute cause susceptible d'appel à la cour de circuit : "la partie lésée devra, dans les huit jours de la date du jugement dont on se plaint, déposer entre les mains du protonotaire ou du greffier ayant la garde du dossier, vingt piastres dans les causes au-dessous de quatre cents piastres, et quarante piastres dans toutes les causes au-dessus de cette somme, ou dans toute action réelle.... et elle pourra ensuite inscrire la "cause pour revision à Québec ou Montréal (selon le cas), signifiant l'avis de l'inscription à la partie adverse ou à son procureur. Jugé que si le délai de huit jours, exigé par cette disposition pour l'inscription des causes en revision et pour le dépôt susdit, expire un dimanche ou un jour férié, le dépôt et l'inscription peuvent être faits le jour juridique suivant. Jugé aussi qu'il n'est pas nécessaire que la signification de cette inscription soit personnellement faite à la partie adverse ou à son procureur. (Scatcherd vs Allan, C. S. R., Montréal, 31 octobre 1865, BADGLEY, J., BERTHELOT, J., et MONK, J. A., 16 J., p. 201; 1 L. C. L. J., p. 96, et 15 R. J. R. Q., p. 486.)

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