tion. I content myself with calling attention to the elements which enter into it. Besides the blockade, there was the prolongation of the war. The rebellion was suppressed at a cost of more than four thousand million dollars, a considerable portion of which has been already paid, leaving twenty-five hundred millions as a national debt to burden the people. If, through British intervention, the war was doubled in duration, or in any way extended, as can not be doubted, then is England justly responsible for the additional expenditure to which our country was doomed; and whatever may be the final settlement of these great accounts, such must be the judgment in any chancery which consults the simple equity of the case."

After thus presenting the particulars of the national claims, Mr. Sumner, in anticipation of an objection "that these national losses, whether from the destruction of our commerce, the prolongation of the war, or the expense of the blockade,” were “indirect and remote, so as not to be a just ground of claim," argued that "by an analogy of the common law in the case of a public nuisance, also by the strict rule of the Roman law, which enters so largely into international law, and even by the rule of the common law relating to damages, all losses, whether individual or national," were "the just subject of claim." "Three times," he said, "is this liability fixed: First, by the concession of ocean belligerency, opening to the rebels shipyards, foundries, and manufactories, and giving to them a flag on the ocean; secondly, by the organization of hostile expedi tions, which, by admissions in Parliament, were nothing less than piratical war on the United States with England as the naval base; and, thirdly, by welcome, hospitality, and supplies extended to these pirate ships in ports of the British empire. Show either of these, and the liability of England is complete; show the three, and this power is bound by a triple cord.”1 On the 13th of April 1869, the day on which Mr. Summer's speech was made, Mr. J. Lothrop Motley, the eminent historian and a personal friend of Mr. Sumner, was commissioned as minister to England. Mr. Motley's instructions, however, were not completed till more than a month afterward. Mr. Sumner was consulted in regard to them, but as to the effect to be ascribed to the concession by Great Britain of belligerent rights to the Confederate States his view and that of Mr. Fish were radically variant. As has been seen, Mr. Sumner's view was that the

Instructions to
Motley.

Sumner's Works, XIII, 53-93.

2 Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, by J. C. Bancroft Davis, 30-37.

liability of Great Britain for the losses he described was "fixed: first, by the concession of ocean belligerency," and that on this ground alone the "liability of England" would be "complete." The view of Mr. Fish was expressed in his instructions to Mr. Motley, of the 15th of May 1869, as follows:

"The President recognizes the right of every power, when a civil conflict has arisen within another state, and has attained a sufficient complexity, magnitude, and completeness, to define its own relations and those of its citizens and subjects toward the parties to the conflict, so far as their rights and interests are necessarily affected by the conflict.

"The necessity and the propriety of the original concession of belligerency by Great Britain at the time it was made have been contested and are not admitted. They certainly are questionable, but the President regards that concession as a part of the case only so far as it shows the beginning and the animus of that course of conduct which resulted so disastrously to the United States. It is important, in that it foreshadows subsequent events.

"There were other powers that were contemporaneous with England in similar concession, but it was in England only that the concession was supplemented by acts causing direct damage to the United States. The President is careful to make this discrimination, because he is anxious as much as possible to simplify the case, and to bring into view these subsequent acts, which are so important in determining the question between the two countries."

Mr. Motley was instructed, in his private as well as his official intercourse, to adopt this view, "and to place the cause of grievance against Great Britain, not so much upon the issu ance of her recognition of the insurgents' state of war, but upon her conduct under, and subsequent to, such recognition." In regard to the future course of the negotiations touching the Alabama claims, he was instructed as follows:

"Your predecessor has already been directed to notify Lord Clarendon that the Senate has refused its advice and consent to the ratification of the convention signed at London on the 14th of January last for the settlement of all outstanding claims.

"Under some circumstances the announcement made to your predecessor of the rejection of this convention might be sufficient. But the magnitude of the claims involved and the gravity of the questions depending between the two governments require more than the mere announcement, to which the

delicacy of his own relation to the negotiation limited the direction to him.

"This government, in rejecting the recent convention, abandons neither its own claims nor those of its citizens, nor the hope of an early, satisfactory, and friendly settlement of the questions depending between the two governments. You will so say to Lord Clarendon, and, in your discretion, you may further proceed to communicate the views given below.

"The terms of the convention, having by accident become known to the public in this country before the action upon it by the Senate, were disproved by the people with an approach to unanimity that foreshadowed possibly even a less favorable vote on the question of its ratification than was actually given.

"This adverse judgment, while unanimous, or nearly so, in its conclusion, was not reached by any single train of argument, nor from any one standpoint of policy, nor with any single standard of estimate of the claims either of the nation or of its citizens, nor with the same degree of importance attached to various points that have been discussed in the correspondence referred to in the convention. Various sources furnished currents running through differing and widely separated channels, but meeting to form one common stream of thought.

"Both with the people and in the Senate, different minds, viewing it from different standpoints, each measuring by its own standard and judging in its own way, arrived at the one conclusion.

"The time and the circumstances under which the convention was negotiated were very unfavorable to its acceptance either by the people or the Senate.

"The nation had just emerged from its periodical choice of a Chief Magistrate, and having changed the depositary of its confidence and its power looked with no favor on an attempt at the settlement of the great and grave questions depending by those on the eve of retiring from power without consulting or considering the views of the ruler recently intrusted with their confidence and without communication with the Senate, to whose approval the treaty would be constitutionally submitted, or with any of its members.

"It is wholly unnecessary to say to statesmen of the intelligence which always marks those of the British Empire that the rejection of a treaty by the Senate of the United States implies no act of discourtesy to the government with which the treaty may have been negotiated. The United States can enter into no treaty without the advice and consent of the Senate, and that advice and consent to be intelligent must be discriminating, and their refusal can be no subject of complaint, and can give no occasion for dissatisfaction or criticism.

"On the 12th of May 1803 a convention between the United States and Great Britain for settling the boundaries of our

northeastern and northwestern frontiers was signed at London by Mr. Rufus King and Lord Hawkesbury, on the part of their respective governments, and submitted to the Senate by President Jefferson, with a message of the 24th of October in that year. The Senate approved of the convention, but upon the condition that the fifth article should be expunged, a condition which was never complied with.

"On the 31st of December 1806 Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney, on our part, signed at London a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with Great Britain. This instrument was not acceptable to President Jefferson, as it contained no article providing for the security of United States seamen from impressment. Consequently the treaty was never even laid before the Senate for its consideration.

"A convention for the suppression of the African slave trade was signed at London on the 13th of March, and submitted to the Senate by President Monroe, with a message of the 21st of May 1824. The convention, also, was approved by the Senate with conditions which were not accepted by Great Britain,

"Upon one point the President and the Senate and the overwhelming mass of the people are convinced, namely, that the convention, from its character and terms, or from the time of its negotiation, or from the circumstances attending its negotiation, would not have removed the sense of existing grievance; would not have afforded real substantial satisfaction to the people; would not have proved a hearty, cordial settlement of pending questions, but would have left a feeling of dissatisfaction inconsistent with the relations which the President desires to have firmly established between two great nations of common origin, common language, common literature, common interests and objects in the advancement of the civilization of the age. "The President believes the rejection of the convention to have been in the interest of peace, and in the direction of a more perfect and cordial friendship between the two countries, and in this belief he fully approves the action of the Senate. That action is quite recent and has been the cause of some excitement and popular discussion on both sides of the Atlantic, and possibly of some little disappointment, if not of irritation, in England. The tone of the press and the proclaimed opinions of some public men in each country suggest that the present is not the most hopeful moment to enter upon a renewed discussion, either of the objections to the lately proposed convention, or of the basis of a renewed negotiation. A suspension of the discussion on these questions for a short time (but in communicating with Lord Clarendon you will be particular to assure him that the desire on our part is that this suspension be limited to the shortest possible time consistent with its object) will allow the subsidence of any excitement or irritation growing out of the negotiation or of the rejection of the treatywill enable the two governments to approach the more readily to a solution of their differences.

"The President hopes that Her Majesty's Government will view the propriety of the suspension in the same light in which he proposes it, as wholly in the interest and solely with a view to an early and friendly settlement of the questions between the two governments.

"He hopes that when the question shall again be considered it may comport with the views of Her Majesty's Government to embrace within the scope of the negotiation some agreement by the two governments, defining their respective rights and duties as neutrals in case the other government becomes unfortunately involved in war with a third power.

"The absence of some agreement or definition on this subject was among the causes leading to the rejection of the recent convention, under which, had it been adopted by the two countries, none of the grave questions which have arisen would have been passed upon by a tribunal whose decision either party (much less other nations) would regard as authority, so as to prevent repetition or retaliation. It might, indeed, well have occurred in the event of the selection by lot of the arbitrator or umpire in different cases, involving, however, precisely the same principles, that different awards, resting upon antagonistic principles, might have been made.

"If, however, the two leading maritime commercial nations of the world establish a rule to govern themselves, each with respect to the other, they may reasonably hope that their conclusion will be accepted by the other powers, and will become for the future recognized as a part of the public law of the civilized world."

While rejecting the claims convention, the Senate adopted. a resolution advising and consenting to the conclusion of a treaty of naturalization on the basis of the protocol signed by Mr. Johnson and Lord Stanley. Mr. Motley was furnished with full powers to conclude such a treaty. On the convention for the arbitration of the San Juan water boundary, the Senate did not come to a vote. Mr. Motley was instructed to communicate this fact to the British Government.

Motley's Interview with Lord Clarendon.

Mr. Motley had his first interview with Lord Clarendon on the 10th of June, and, although it did not affect the international result of the negotiations, it illustrates the complications to which they were exposed and forms an integral part of their history. Mr. Motley, after communicating the purport of his instructions in regard to the naturalization question and the San Juan boundary, proceeded to the subject of the rejected claims convention. In so doing he declared that he was fully sensible of the "gravity of the occasion" and of the "contingencies" that