connection with a reluctant people, he would not press what he could not but consider his right.

The second point concerned the navigation of the Mississippi. Spain, while admitting that its navigation should be free to both nations, objected to the arrangement suggested by the United States for a commercial depot at New Orleans. Spain further insisted that the language of the article conveying the right should be of a strictly exclusive character, restricting the navigation to the subjects of Spain and to the citizens of the United States. This, of course, could not be considered, as it would violate our treaty obligations to England, if not to France.

As to the third point, that of reclamations, Spain insisted that all captures should be divided into two periods -the one preceding April 6, 1795, in which the rule of decision should be the maritime regulations of Spain then at war with France; and the other, following that date, in which the decisions should be upon the usual grounds of international law. To such a division Pinckney positively and unequivocally refused his assent. Conformably with the traditional quibbling and procrastination of Castilian diplomacy, the negotiations dragged their weary course, varying only with the fluctuation of European and Spanish politics. Wearied and indignant at the apparent lack of faith and their persistence in maintaining their position, Pinckney at length demanded his passports on the 24th day of October.

This show of spirit and determination on the part of the American envoy aroused the Spanish minister to the necessity of action. Having thrown herself into the arms of England she had been despoiled of her territories by the French armies. Now deserting her former mistress and cultivating a French amour, Britain had turned upon her and was driving her fleets off the sea. Dreading an Anglo

American alliance, or a separate declaration of war by the United States, badgered at all points and fearing greater 'humiliations, Spain consented to a compromise of the difficulties and at San Lorenzo el Real, October 27, 1795, a treaty of friendship, limits, and navigation was signed in behalf of Spain by Godoy.

This treaty was decidedly favorable to the United States. It established as boundaries East and West Florida on the south and, above latitude 31°, the middle of the Mississippi River. Illegal captures made by Spain during her late war with France were compensated for, favorable rules were prescribed for neutral commerce, and Indian aggressions on either side, together with the arming of privateers, were discountenanced. But the chief diplomatic exploit was in gaining Spanish recognition of the right, so long and so strenuously asserted by the United States, to the free navigation of the Mississippi River; to which was added a three years' privilege of deposit at the port of New Orleans, free of duty. Thus was paved the way for that magnificent internal commerce so soon to become fabulous in its value, which has made that river the most crowded highway of domestic trade in the world. The claims commission provided for in the treaty met in Philadelphia, terminating their duties December 31, 1799, after having made awards to the amount of $325,440 on account of the Spanish spoliations. It is not unlikely that the conclusion of the Jay treaty with England strongly influenced Spain to agree to a treaty at this time. For our arrangement with Great Britain destroyed all hopes of a concerted action between Spain and that nation against our Western country. Since the treaty of 1783 Spanish agents in North America had made frequent advances to the Canadian authorities for a joint English and Spanish policy against the Americans, all of which

found expression in the tortuous Indian relations they had pursued.

The treaty of 1795 marked the first step in our territorial expansion. Jefferson wrote as early as 1786, from Paris: "Our confederacy must be viewed as the nest from which all America, North and South, is to be peopled. We should take care, too, not . . . . to press too soon on the Spaniards. Those countries cannot be in better hands. My fear is that they are too feeble to hold them till our population can be sufficiently advanced to gain it from them piece by piece. The navigation of the Mississippi we must have. This is all we are as yet ready to receive." Voy? ageurs, like Brissot, had prophesied the secession of the West; Washington had dreaded it; Western leaders, Wilkinson, Sevier, Robertson, Clark, Butler, had sold their services to secure it; and Spain and England had negotiated to that end. Had the United States failed to secure free navigation it would have withdrawn, and for the want of sea power to protect its commerce passing from the mouth of the Mississippi through the Gulf, it must have allied itself with a foreign power.

Firmness rather than skill, determination rather than finesse, were required for the negotiation of the instrument. Political circumstances had compelled Spain to yield to the demands of the United States. She had made concessions which except for extraneous forces might have been postponed for years. The treaty and the ministers who negotiated it were similarly applauded in both countries. recognition of his diplomatic success, Thomas Pinckney, on his return home, was named by the Federalists as the associate of Adams on the presidential ticket. The treaty of Basle and that with the United States were hailed by the corrupt court of Spain one of the worst in her national

history-as great triumphs, and Godoy as a reward received the title of Prince of Peace. 1

The country of Charles V. was at this time under the absolute rule of Godoy who, as a young lieutenant in the army, had become the paramour of the faithless queen and through her favor had been named prime minister. Under his régime the price of office had been such as to exclude men of any nobility either of mind or character - they were the rewards of those willing to submit their wives and daughters to the embraces of this libertine. Miserable Spain, dishonored in the shame of her queen, and ruled by men the most contemptible, willing for paltry office thus to sell their own honor!

1. In his memoirs Godoy felicitates himself on the American treaty and claims that he secured "unexpected advantages" though of what nature we cannot conjecture, for he virtually yielded all the demands of his adversary.

CHAPTER III.

TH

THE PURCHASE OF LOUISIANA.

HE treaty of 1795 provided that the contracting parties. should name commissioners to run the boundary line between Florida and the United States. As the American linesman was sent one Andrew Ellicott, who immediately repaired to the post of Natchez on the Mississippi. A vain man whose pretensions and bombastic manner made him an object of ridicule, he reached the Spanish post with an idea that he was a sort of ambassador or envoy extraordinary rather than a mere astronomer or surveyor. Naturally irascible, his frequent toasts to the health of his country and himself scarcely tended to sweeten his disposition.

In his imaginary capacity of a diplomat accredited, or commanding general on the field, he sent daily and often hourly letters and remonstrances to the Spanish governor, Gayoso. He proceeded to stir up trouble among the settlers of this region, though they are represented to have been thoroughly contented under the mild rule of the Spanish. For nominal fees they had received liberal grants of land. They had paid no taxes, had been exempt from military service, had been allowed free access to the market at New Orleans, and had been paid a liberal price for their tobacco. Prior to the advent of the meddlesome Ellicott and his tempest in a teapot, no discontent seems to have existed. 1

1. Lowry's History of Mississippi, p. 148.