sustained. Parton says: "If there had been but one hardheaded, painstaking, resolute man in the house who had spent ten days in reading and comparing the evidence relating to the invasion of Florida and the execution of the prisoners, and two days more in presenting to the house a complete exposition of the same, hammering home the vital points with tireless reiteration, the final votes would not have been what they were. The cause, despite the month's debate, was, after all, decided without a hearing."1

When the news of Jackson's Florida exploits reached Washington all was excitement among the officials and the public. The administration was in a quandary. It was ignorant of the fact that Jackson had been authorized to violate neutral territory. Moreover, this administration, like those which had preceded it was timid, and, without precedents, knew scarcely anything of its powers. The cabinet was certainly anxious to secure Florida, but by purchase not by conquest. Monroe was weak, to say the least, and possessed little of the "defiant patriotism" of the younger Adams. The whole matter came up in the cabinet on the question of what disposition to make of Jackson and his conquests. On the fifteenth of July Adams records in his diary that there was a cabinet meeting lasting from noon until near five. The president and all the members of the cabinet except himself were of the opinion that Jackson should be disavowed and suitable reparation made.

Calhoun, "generally of sound, judicious, comprehensive mind," was offended with Jackson's insubordination to the war department and insisted that he be roundly censured. The secretary of war, was convinced that we would certainly have a Spanish war, and that such was Jackson's object that he might be able to command an expedition against Mexico. Crawford feared that if Pensacola were not at once restored and Jackson's acts disavowed, war would 1. Parton's Andrew Jackson, Vol. II, p. 550.

follow and that our ships and commerce would become the prey of privateers from all parts of the world sailing under the Spanish flag, and that the administration would not be sustained by the people. 1 Jackson had to face the Indians but the cabinet was compelled to face Spain and England, congress, the hostile press, the people and not least, Jackson himself. The question was indeed embarrassing and complicated.

During July and August; cabinet meetings were held almost daily and the question was hotly debated. In all of these conferences Jackson's sole friend and only defender was Adams, the secretary of state, the man upon whom would fall the labor of vindicating the general diplomatically, should the administration decide to assume the responsibility. Adams declared that there was no real though an apparent violation of instructions and that his proceedings were justified by the necessity of the case and by the misconduct of the Spanish commanding officers in Florida. He insisted that if Jackson were disavowed he (Jackson) would immediately resign his commission and turn the attack upon the administration and would carry a large part of the public with him. With the overwhelming majority against Jackson, the question arose as to the degree to which his acts should be disavowed.

The entry in Adams's diary under date of July 19, is of interest as indicating something of the struggle in the cabinet. Having presented a new point in justification of Jackson, Adams commented upon the ensuing arguments:

"It appeared to make some impression upon Mr. Wirt, but the president and Mr. Calhoun were inflexible. My reasoning was that Jackson took Pensacola only because the governor threatened to drive him out of the province by force if he did not withdraw; that Jackson was only executing his orders when he received this threat; that he 1. Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, Vol. IV, pp. 107-109.

could not withdraw his troops from the province consistently with his orders and that his only alternative was to prevent the execution of the threat. I insisted that the character of Jackson's measures was decided by the intention with which they were taken, which was not hostility to Spain but self defense against the hostility of Spanish officers. I admitted that it was necessary to carry the reasoning upon my principles to the utmost extent it would bear, to come to this conclusion. But if the question was dubious, it was better to err on the side of vigor than of weakness on the side of our own officer who had rendered the most eminent services to the nation, than on the side of our bitterest enemies and against him. I glanced at the construction which would be given by Jackson's friends and by a large portion of the public to the disavowal of his acts. It would be said that he was an obnoxious man, that after having the benefit of his services he was abandoned and sacrificed to the enemies of his country; that his case would be compared with that of Sir Walter Raleigh. Mr. Calhoun principally bore the argument against me insisting that the capture of Pensacola was not necessary upon the principles of self defense and therefore was both an act of war against Spain and a violation of the constitution, that the administration by approving it, would take all the blame of it upon themselves; that by leaving it upon his responsibility, they would take away from Spain all pretext for war and for resorting to the aid of other European powers they would also be free from all reproach of having violated the constitution; that it was not the menace of the governor of Pensacola that had determined Jackson to take that place; that he had really resolved to take it before; that he had violated his orders and, upon his own arbitrary will, set all authority at defiance."

After many days of argument, when Adams continued to oppose the unanimous opinions of the president, the secre

tary of the treasury, Crawford, the secretary of war, Calhoun, and the attorney general, Wirt, a draft of a note to De Onis was prepared and a newspaper paragraph was submitted to the press for publication. With a sigh at this "weakness and confession of weakness" Adams set himself to the task of meeting the protests and threats of De Onis and the inquiries of Bagot.

CHAPTER IX.

ADAMS VERSUS DE ONIS.

WE have

E have seen that on the renewal of diplomatic relations with Spain in December, 1815, De Onis demanded the surrender of so much of West Florida as Madison had organized under the congressional act of 1811, and that this demand had been followed by an interchange of views upon the title to that province which Spain claimed never to have ceded to France, since she had received it from England and not from his Christian Majesty.

In 1816 Monroe expressed his surprise and regret that De Onis should bring up these troubles when he was without authority to settle them and declared that full power to conclude a treaty had been sent to George W. Erving, the minister of the United States at Madrid. Cevallos, the Spanish foreign minister, repeatedly complained of the number of Americans to be found officering the insurgent privateers and fighting in the ranks of the revolutionists against Spain; and of the export of arms from the United States to the insurgent forces. In answer to our complaints against the British occupation of East Florida during the late war, Cevallos denied that it had been done "with the acquiescence of the Spanish government. On the contrary it had remonstrated repeatedly and in the most energetic terms to the cabinet of St. James on this violation of its territory." But Cevallos had no intention of troubling

1. Letters from Ministers Abroad, Vol. XIII, p. 30, Erving to Secretary Monroe, Aug., 1816.