makes this judgment a very useful one for the purpose of practical reference. Having thus disposed of the considerations arising on contracts made with or by infants and married women,' I will postpone the conclusion of this branch of the subject till the next lecture. PARTIES TO CONTRACTS-INSANE PERSONS-INTOXICATED PER- PETENT PERSONS CONTRACT COMPANIES. PURSUING the inquiry upon which I entered in the last lecture with regard to the competency of the parties to Contracts, and having disposed of the cases of Infancy and Coverture, the next in order is that of persons of non-sane mind, whose disability arises, not, as in the two former cases, from a positive rule of law, but from the very nature of their disorder itself. In the earliest ages of our law the rule which common sense dictates on this subject appears to have witness for the plaintiff by stat. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85, notwithstanding any ultimate interests in the assets, and that receipts of interest by him were available to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations. The interesting questions which arise as to the wife's equity to a settlement, as it is termed, and as to her power of disposition over her separate estate, are not strictly pertinent to the subject of this book. The cases as to the former of these subjects, may be found collected in the note to Murray v. Lord Elibank, 1 White's Eq. Cases, 319, and as to the latter in that to Hulme v. Tenant, Id. 355. ८ prevailed, namely, that a person deprived of the use of that reason which is the instrument, if I may so say, with which men contract, shall not be bound to his own injury by contracts made while in such a situation. Thus in Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium, 202 n. it is laid down that a person who had enfeoffed another of his land while non compos might, on recovering his intellects, avoid the feoffment. But, soon afterwards, a doctrinė was established of the most absurd description which it was possible for the ingenuity even [*227] of an ancient lawyer to have devised. It was admitted that the acts and contracts of a lunatic could not be looked upon as valid so far as they affected other persons, but it was said that they should bind the lunatic himself, after he had recovered the use of his reason; "for," said the old lawyers, "a man cannot remember what he did when he was out of his mind, and consequently cannot recollect whether he did this or that particular act, or entered into this or that particular contract." And they actually carried this so far that it became a maxim that a man should not be heard to stultify himself, and it is laid down as such in the 405th and 406th sections of Littleton, and in Stroud v. Marshall, Cro. Eliz. 398, where the opinion of Fitzherbert to the contrary, in his Natura Brevium, was overruled. However, in more modern times, the common sense of the courts began to be shocked by this doctrine, and Sir William Blackstone, in his commentaries, book ii. p. 291, argues with great force of reasoning against it. And in the later cases of Yates v. Boen, Str. 1104, and Faulder v. Silk, 3 Camp. 126, it seems to have been discarded; so that I think we are now justified in saying that it has virtually ceased to exist, and that the lunacy of one of the contracting parties may be shown by himself if sued upon a contract entered into while he was in that situation. However, it would not be for the lunatic's own benefit to prohibit him absolutely from binding himself by any [*228] contract whatever. Such a prohibition might prevent him from obtaining credit for the ordinary necessaries of life; and there are many modern cases in which contracts evidently of a fair and reasonable description entered into with a lunatic have been held binding on him, and have been enforced. In the case of Baxter v. Earl of Portsmouth, 5 B. & C. 170, 11 E. C. L. R., an action was brought against the Earl of Portsmouth for the hire of several carriages. It was proved that the carriages were suitable to his rank and fortune, and that the price charged for them was a fair and reasonable one, but on the other hand it appeared that an inquisition had issued out of Chancery under which the Earl was found to have been insane from a period long anterior to the time at which the carriages in question were supplied to him. The L. C. J. Abbott, before whom the case was tried, directed the jury that, as the articles hired were suitable to the station and fortune of the defendant, and as the plaintiffs, at the time of making the contract, had no reason to suppose him of unsound mind, and could not be charged with practising any imposition upon him, they were entitled to recover, and the jury accordingly found a verdict for the plaintiffs. Mr. (now Lord) Brougham moved in the next term to set it aside, but the Court supported the direction of the Lord Chief Justice. *In a subsequent case of Brown v. Joddrell, [229] M. & M. 105,2 the lunatic was the chairman of 'Mitchell v. Kingman, 5 Pick. 431; Rice v. Peet, 15 Johns. 503; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Connect. 203, 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 225. 2 Also reported 3 Carr & Payne, 30, 14 E. C. L. R. Lord Ten a society called the Athenaion, and he had concurred in ordering work and goods to be supplied to them; for these Lord Tenterden held that he might be sued by the person who had supplied them. (See also Dane v. Kirkwall, 8 Car. & Payne, 679, 34 E. C. L. R.') From these decisions it is plain that a lunatic's contracts are binding in many instances; and some treatises suggest that he stands on the same footing with an infant, and is liable only for necessaries. But this is, I think, not quite so; nor would it be reasonable that it should be so; for, where a lunatic is permitted to go about and appear to the world as a person of sane mind, it would be very hard indeed to prevent persons who had supplied him with goods under that impression at a fair price, from recovering because the articles were not necessaries. And in the case I have just cited, of Brown v. Joddrell, an infant could not, I think, have been held liable for goods supplied to the Athenaion. One of the latest cases in which the subject has been canvassed, is that of Tarbuck v. Bispham, 2 Mee. & Welsb. p. 2, in which one of the questions was whether a lunatic laboured under the same incapacity to bind himself by stating an account as I have already shown you that an infant does. The case went off upon a terden there seemed, however, to rely on the old common law doctrine, and on the ground that a man should not be suffered to stultify himself, refused to admit evidence of the insanity, unless it could be proved that the defendant had been imposed upon, by reason of his mental incapacity. But see the later cases, infra. 'That was an action for use and occupation of a house, and it was shown on behalf of the defendant that she was of unsound mind, that she had no occasion for the house, and that the rent was exorbitant, and it was left to the jury to say whether the plaintiff knew of the defendant's insanity, and took advantage of it. It was not suffi cient that the defendant was insane, without these additional circumstances. different point, but the Court said that, had it *become material they would have granted a [*230] rule for the purpose of considering it. There is another late case, argued some time ago in the Court of Queen's Bench, and in which the learning on this subject was very fully canvassed. I am not aware whether the decision of the Court has yet been pronounced; but I mention it, in order that, if you should have occasion to consider any point connected with this subject, you may be aware that there has been this very recent case, and may make due inquiry. (a) Upon the whole, this branch of the law is, even now, in a very unsettled state. Some parts, indeed, seem clear. It seems clear that a lunatic is liable upon an executed contract for articles suitable to his degree, furnished by a person who did not know of his lunacy, and practised no "imposition upon him.' [231] It seems equally clear that he is not liable when the other contracting party has taken advantage of (a) The case here referred to is probably that of Clark and Another v. Medcalf and others, argued in the Court of Queen's Bench in Hilary Term, 1841, and in which the judgment was given in the following Trinity Term, but is not reported. It, however, threw no new light whatever on the subject, and was decided in favour of the plaintiffs, who were London agents of the defendants, who were country attorneys; the action was for work done and money paid as such agents, and on an account stated. One of the defendants pleaded insanity. But as there had been an executed contract, and for legitimate consideration, without notice of insanity, or any pretence of fraud by the plaintiffs, the Court adjudged for the plaintiffs, without entering into the question raised by the count on the account stated. In the recent case of Moulton v. Camroux, 2 Exchequer, 501, which was an action to recover money paid by a lunatic for the purchase of an annuity, the jury found that the transaction was a fair |