carried on by the Lord Lieutenant and a council. The Lord Lieutenant would thus occupy substantially the position of a colonial governor, and would rule Ireland through a ministry nominally appointed by himself but in reality chosen by the Irish legislative body.

66

The constitution creates of course, and this is its vital provision, an Irish parliament," consisting of the Queen, and an Irish legislative body or chamber made up itself of two orders. The powers of this Irish parliament are to be indefinite;-that is to say, it is to be able to pass any law which it is not by the Constitution forbidden to pass. Such an indefinite power tends of necessity towards constant increase. Certain subjects are, however, distinctly placed beyond its competence. These restrictions, though mainly intended to guard from Irish legislation matters of Imperial concern, do not precisely coincide with the division between Imperial and local interests. The Irish parliament might, for instance, pass an Act preventing particular classes of foreigners (or even of Englishmen) from settling in Ireland, but could not pass any law for the establishment or endowment of a church, or provide for the defence of the country.

These restrictions would be enforced either by the veto of the Lord Lieutenant, or by the authority of the judicial committee of the English Privy Council.

In return for these powers Ireland would give up all her present representation in the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and would contribute to the consolidated fund of the United Kingdom an annual sum of some four millions, to be collected by British officials and paid into the British treasury.

This constitution is to be capable of alteration only by the co-operation of the British and the Irish Parliaments, the Irish representatives being summoned back to Westminster for the purpose, and thus forming in combination with the British Parliament what we may describe as the Imperial Parliament.

43. HOW FAR DOES IT FULFIL ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS.

This paper constitution appears at first sight to combine the merits of American Federalism and of Colonial Independence. But how far does it really fulfil the three conditions already admitted to be essential?

(a) Supremacy of Parliament.

First, does this constitution preserve the supremacy of the British Parliament? In other words, would the British Parliament when sitting at Westminster, without having summoned the Irish representatives, have the power which our present Parliament undoubtedly possesses to legislate for Ireland,—to pass, for instance, a Coercion Bill, or an Act repealing the Gladstonian Constitution itself? As a matter of pure constitutional law, the existence of such authority on the part of the British Parliament under the Gladstonian constitution is more than doubtful; morally, the passing of such Acts would obviously be a breach of faith which England could not commit without dishonour. The creation of an Irish Parliament would therefore amount to a distinct abdication of power by the British Parliament.*

(b) Justice.

Secondly, does the Gladstonian Constitution secure justice both to Great Britain and to all classes of Irishmen? Roughly speaking, justice to Great Britain means the due contribution by Ireland of her share of Imperial expenditure. The Gladstonian constitution does nominally make a fair provision for the satisfaction of this claim; but the payments which it proposes to levy in Ireland, and which are already known by the hateful name of tribute, would assuredly have to be exacted in the long run by British officials supported by British bayonets, and Great Britain would have to choose between giving up the tribute and giving up all the objects for the sake of which it is proposed to grant Home Rule. It is absurd to suppose that if even just laws are hated in Ireland because they come in 66 a foreign garb," the same hatred would not be excited much more strongly by a foreign tribute. If Home Rule is to have even a bare chance of producing in Ireland the contentment of Victoria, Ireland, the poorest of all civilised countries, must be freed from a load of Imperial taxation which would not be borne by the richest of our colonies. Of all sacrifices by which Ireland might be benefited, the sacrifice which England should make with the least regret is that of revenue. But if it be true, as the Government of Ireland Bill implies, that justice requires an annual contribution from Ireland of three or four millions to the Imperial expenditure, it is clear that this claim can be satisfied only at the cost of keeping alive Irish discontent; and considering * See 'England's Case,' pp. 249–251.

the practical difficulty of levying the tribute, the result of the attempt might well be that England should be impoverished and Ireland angered.

But a far more important question is, how far it would be possible under the Gladstonian constitution to secure in Ireland justice to individuals or to unpopular minorities. An Irish Executive would at once be called upon to deal with cases which would severely test its sense of justice. Is there any security under the Gladstonian constitution that the rights of the landlords-rights, be it remembered, of British subjects, which ought to be neither more nor less sacred than the rights of a British subject in London or Calcutta, would be protected by an executive of land-leaguers? There is, I answer, none whatever. To distrust the justice of an Irish Government is not to show special distrust of Irish nature. The Irish leaders are of necessity revolutionists, and whatever other virtues may belong to the revolutionary temperament, it knows nothing of justice. With all its faults, the Government of the United Kingdom must possess more impartiality than could belong to a ministry formed out of the leaders of any Irish faction.

The Gladstonian constitution provides two methods for controlling the action of the Irish parliament. These are, the veto of the Lord Lieutenant and the action of the Privy Council. The veto of the Lord Lieutenant could not be used either frequently or upon important occasions without appearing, and that with good reason, to nullify the concession of Home Rule; and the Constitution provides no means whatever for enforcing the decisions of the Privy Council when opposed to Irish opinion, or to the decision of the Irish courts. Neither of these two methods would therefore afford a real guarantee for just government in Ireland. Home Rulers no doubt believe that no such guarantees would be needed; but restrictions which are not needed are certainly impolitic, and those which cannot be enforced are worthless. The Gladstonian constitution, however, admits that guarantees are wanted for the security of justice. In this opinion most Englishmen agree. If then the guarantees are illusory the Constitution does not secure justice.

(c) Finality.

Thirdly, does the Gladstonian constitution hold out a fair hope of finality? We may confidently assert that it would not be a final or even a lasting settlement of our constitutional relations with Ireland.

It would, while leaving alive elements of discord, cause disappointment and inconvenience to both countries, and its working would give rise to continual friction and irritation.

Englishmen would find to their great disappointment that it had not freed them from the difficulty of governing Ireland. Home Rule is not Separation; and nothing short of Irish independence would greatly lessen English responsibility. We should also soon discover that the creation of a statutory constitution for Ireland had curiously hampered the working of our own institutions. Questions would continually arise as to the limits between the provinces of the British and Irish Parliaments respectively. Many desirable reforms in our own constitution would become impossible, and disputes would arise respecting the ultimate sovereign power of the State such as have hitherto been quite alien to British politics, and must involve elements of unknown danger.

44. IT WOULD DISAPPOINT BOTH COUNTRIES.

The last disappointment of England would be to find that Home Rule had not satisfied Ireland. To say this is not to imply that its acceptance by Irish Home Rulers is dishonest. In their eyes it is a move in the right direction. They exaggerate the freedom of action which it promises to Ireland, and expect from it more than it can give. It cannot tempt capital to Ireland, but it may easily drive capital away from her shores. It cannot diminish poverty. It cannot in its direct effect assuage religious bigotry. It cannot of itself remove agrarian discontent. It is unfortunately so devised as to outrage national sentiment quite as much as it can soothe it. The tribute must affect the pride of every Irishman as much as his purse. Can it be supposed that northerners, indignant at recent treachery, and Catholics, mindful of ancient oppression, will not join, and justly join, in denouncing the demand for a tribute to be raised for Imperial purposes at the very moment when Ireland ceases to have a voice in directing Imperial policy?

Irishmen would again find to their disappointment that the constitution intended to give them independence imposed annoying fetters on their freedom of action. It would restrict them from creating a tariff, from raising volunteers, from endowing religion; and these restrictions would be the more annoying because none of them are imposed on the colonies.

45. IT WOULD PRODUCE CAUSES OF DISPUTE.

Further, it would assuredly produce irritation and friction. This is one of the great dangers of every scheme for uniting partially independent states into a political whole. The authors of the Gladstonian constitution have bestowed but little attention upon the necessity for avoiding occasions of constitutional conflict. The scheme, which is an attempt to combine the advantages of federalism and colonialism, certainly combines many of the evils of both systems. Federalism has its merits and its defects; English colonialism works well enough; the sham federalism and the sham colonialism of the Gladstonian constitution must create between Great Britain and Ireland all the causes of discontent which have from time to time tried the strength of the American Union, and all the causes of disturbance which from time to time reveal the weakness of the tie which binds together our colonial empire.

46. IT COULD NOT WORK.

For all these reasons it is clear that the Gladstonian constitution affords no real prospect of finality. The ingenuity of the plan has indeed hardly been sufficiently recognised, but the essential unreality which this ingenuity has concealed has not even yet met with due condemnation. Since the day when the National Assembly of France presented the brand-new French constitution to the acceptance of Louis the Sixteenth, no form of government has ever been seriously proposed for adoption to an intelligent people so radically unworkable as that Gladstonian constitution which has been instinctively rejected by the good sense of the British Parliament. The constitution of France lasted out two years. To a jurist it may appear conceivable, though hardly probable, that by the vigorous aid of the British Parliament, the new constitution for the United Kingdom might have lasted for as long a period.*

* England's Case,' pp. 157-277.