27. PERMANENT AND GENERAL COERCION ACTS WOULD IMPROVE OUR CRIMINAL Law.

To

An Act which should be permanent, which should apply to the whole United Kingdom, and which should deal in the main with criminal procedure, could hardly contain injudicious, harsh, or tyrannical provisions. The passing of one such good Criminal Law Amendment Act, even though its discussion might occupy a whole session, would save an infinite waste of time, and would render unnecessary half a dozen Coercion Acts for Ireland. enlarge the power of examining persons suspected of connection with a crime, even when no man is put upon his trial, to give the Courts the right under certain circumstances of trying criminals without a jury, to enable the Government to forbid public meetings when dangerous to the public peace, for instance, would be measures tending greatly to increase the efficiency of our Criminal Law. Some of these powers already exist in Scotland, without exciting any disapproval, and might advantageously be extended to the whole kingdom. Civilisation raises our standard of the protection which good citizens ought to receive from the State; it also places new means of attack in the hands of cheats and ruffians. The improvement of our Criminal Law must therefore keep pace with our general advance in civilisation.

Nevertheless, the necessity which has so often been encountered for laws fairly to be described as "Coercion Acts" in Ireland points to a discord between the law of the land and the law of the people. They are the outward and visible sign of internal discontent and disloyalty, and they do give good ground for supposing that the law or some part of it requires amendment. But the necessity for amending bad laws is no reason why just laws, or indeed any law which cannot rightly be repealed, should not be enforced. There seems to the thoughtless crowd--whether rich or poor; and all men are thoughtless about most things, and many men about all things-to be a certain inconsistency between reform and coercion; there is something absurd in the policy of cuffs and kisses. But this is only seeming; the necessity of carrying through by legal means an agrarian revolution-and the passing of the Irish Land Act was in effect an admission by the English Parliament that this necessity exists-is really a solid reason for the strict enforcement of justice. A wise driver holds his reins

all the tighter when he is compelled to drive along the brink of a precipice. The real question is, whether we can by just administration, and by just legislation, remove the source of Irish opposition to the law. If we can do so, the outcry about coercion becomes unmeaning; if we cannot, it becomes an argument of crushing power in favour, not of Home Rule, but of Separation.

VI. FROM THE INCONVENIENCE TO ENGLAND. The presence of eighty-six Members in the Parliament at Westminster who do not respect its dignity or care for its efficiency, is absolutely fatal, we are sometimes told, to the success of parliamentary government, and to the character of parliamentary statesmanship. This is a real but surely a very measurable inconvenience, and one which it cannot be beyond the power of Parliament itself to deal with by stringent restrictions upon the overflow of parliamentary eloquence.

28. LESSON FROM OBSTRUCTION.

The real fact is, that Parnellite obstruction has revealed rather than caused the weakness of parliamentary government. The experience, not only of our own, but of other countries, shows the great difficulty of working our present system of government in a representative assembly which is divided into more than two parties. The essence of the difficulty lies in the fact that a modern ministry depends for its existence upon every vote of the House of Commons. This difficulty is met in more than one country, and especially in Switzerland and the United States, by constitutional arrangements which render the executive, though in the long run amenable to the will of the people, comparatively independent of the legislative assembly. It might in our case be met, for the moment at least, by a change in our parliamentary practice. Were it once understood that a Ministry would not retire from office except in consequence of a direct vote of want of confidence in the House of Commons, the political power of the Parnellite, or of any other minority, would be greatly diminished. Meanwhile the English people have the remedy in their own hands. By giving to either of the great parties an absolute majority, they can put an end to all the inconveniences of Parnellite

obstruction.

The remedy is in their own hands, and recent

experience shows that they will not be slow to use it.

29. THESE ARGUMENTS REALLY TELL IN FAVOUR OF SEPARATION RATHER THAN OF HOME RULE.

The arguments which we have been considering do undoubtedly show, what no one who has given a thought to the matter has ever doubted, that the present relation between England and Ireland is unsatisfactory and full of inconveniences. Although they are, as far as they go, objections to the maintenance of the Union, they do not in reality tell in favour of the policy of Home Rule; they are, in short, arguments in favour of Irish independence, and would be seen in their true character should the Irish demands take the form of a claim to independence.

Meanwhile we have before us only three possible courses:-the concession to Ireland of Home Rule,-Separation, and the Maintenance of the Union. We must now consider the advantages and disadvantages of each of these three courses in turn.*

CHAPTER III.

HOME RULE-ITS FORMS.

THERE are three principal types of government which it is supposed that we might more or less copy in the attempt to give Home Rule to Ireland. These are (A) Federalism, (B) our already existing Colonial system, and (C) the Constitution proposed by Mr. Gladstone in the Bill for the "Government of Ireland."

30. CONDITIONS BY WHICH WE MUST TEST EACH PLAN. The three following conditions are admitted to be essential to any plan of Home Rule which can be accepted by England, and by them, as by a touchstone, we must test each of the plans before

us:

1. It must be consistent with the ultimate supremacy of the British Parliament.

2. It must be just; that is it must provide that each part of the * England's Case,' pp. 47-127.

tionary proposal which has ever been submitted to a British Parliament. The abolition of the House of Lords, the disestablishment of the Church, or the abolition of the monarchy, might leave the constitution less essentially changed than would the adoption of federalism even in an apparently moderate form.

32. THREE DEFINITE EVILS TO GREAT BRITAIN.

The definite evils of the proposed revolution fall under three heads. First, the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament would be destroyed, and all English constitutional arrangements would be dislocated. Secondly, the power of Great Britain would be diminished. Thirdly, the chance of further disagreement with Ireland would certainly not be diminished, and would probably be increased.

(a) Would dislocate Constitution.

First, the secret source of the life and growth of the British constitution is the absolute supremacy of Parliament. Between the King, Lords, and Commons, there have at times been disputes as to the division of power amongst themselves, which have led to civil war; but that Parliament-that is, the Crown, the Peers, and the Commons acting together-is absolutely supreme, has never been doubted. It has been well said that the merit of the English constitution is, that it is no constitution at all. The distinction between articles of the constitution which can be touched only, if at all, by a constituent assembly, and ordinary laws, which can be repealed by an ordinary Parliament-the whole apparatus, in short, of artificial constitutionalism-is utterly unknown to Englishmen. Hence Parliament, like the Czar, is a despotic sovereign: it possesses unlimited power, and power which can at once be put in force by the means of ordinary law. England has, therefore, without the sacrifice of freedom, been able, at times of danger, to act with all the energy of despotism.* This is our great advantage over the United States. The pliability, power of development, and freedom of action of the British constitution are in America rendered impossible by the constitutional restrictions which hamper every ordinary authority. It is obvious that these qualities are essential to the maintenance of the British Empire. Home Rulers, in fact, whether they know it or not, seek to lay hands on the main-spring of the British constitution. When once the Imperial Parliament * See 'England's Case,' pp. 238-252.

had become a federal congress, its omnipotence would be gone. Even were it made up of the same persons, elected by the same electors, its nature would be changed, and its power would be limited on all sides. It might, indeed, deal with Imperial and foreign affairs, and any matters placed within its competence; but on all other matters it would be powerless. Some arbiter-say the federal court-would have power to determine whether any law was constitutional; in other words, whether it was valid. Let no one suppose that this would be a mere matter of form; American experience decisively shows the contrary. The existence of an arbiter, who may decide upon the validity of any laws passed by either the central or the local legislatures, is essential to federalism; and the existence of such an arbiter absolutely destroys the sovereignty of Parliament.

Nor do the lessons of American experience end here. Not only has question after question, that is to say, conflict after conflict, arisen between the Federation and the original States, but we can see by American history to what an extent the federal pact checks change, in other words reform. Every institution based upon the articles of the constitution, becomes more or less sacred. Under a federal system the Crown, the House of Peers, the Imperial Parliament, or Federal Assembly itself, would be almost beyond the reach of change, reform, or abolition. Not only would the British legislature be thus affected, but the relations between the government and the country would be greatly altered. It is possible that the weakening of Parliament might add to the strength of the monarch, who, under such a system, would be in a very special sense the representative of national unity; however this might be, federalism would assuredly dislocate the British constitution.

(b) Would weaken Central Government.

Secondly, a system of federalism would also weaken the government. One of the questions which would have to be faced, would be that of the disposal of the army. Is the army to be entirely under the command of the federal, that is, in effect, of the British, government; or is Ireland to have an independent force of her own? If not, the language used by the federalists as to Irish independence is singularly misleading. If, on the other hand, Ireland is to have an independent force, then it passes the wit of man to see how the rights of the central government are to be