were continually arising and increasing, and could not then be defined, and the time for formulating them would not arise until a willingness to enter upon their consideration arose." Lord Russell's objections were mentioned, it is true, in addition to the reason above quoted, but although additional," they are not therefore exclusive.

The communications which the British High Commissioners may have made to their Government, either pending the negotiation or since, can scarcely be urged with seriousness upon this Government for acceptance in the construction of the Treaty. One of those gentlemen is reported as saying recently "that we, the (British) Commissioners, were distinctly responsible for having represented to the Government that we (they) understood a promise to be given that these claims were not to be put forward, and were not to be submitted to arbitration." He does not say by whom, on what occasion, or in what manner, such promise was made. He involves all his colleagues in the representation made to their Government, that such promise had been made. But this seeking aliunde, outside of the Treaty and of the Protocol, to establish a meaning or to explain its terms, has had the effect, which the honorable baronet who made the declaration anticipated, to raise “a personal question," and I cannot allow this reference made by Lord Granville to the information furnished to Her Majesty's Government by Her High Commissioners to pass without alluding to the representation which Sir Stafford Northcote (one of those Commissioners) says that the commissioners are responsible for having made to their Government. In justice to myself and my colleagues on the American side of the Commission, I must take this occasion (the first that has presented itself since I have seen the speech of Sir Stafford Northcote) to say that no such promise as he states that the British Commissioners represented to their Government, as having been understood by them to be made by the American Commissioners, was in fact ever made. The official communications between the American and the British Commissioners (as you are aware) were all made by or to me as the first-named of the American Commissioners.

I never made and never heard of any such promise, or of anything resembling a promise on the subject referred to. None was ever made by me, formally or informally, officially or unofficially; and I feel entire confidence in making the assertion that none of my colleagues ever made any promise or any declaration or statement approaching to a promise on the subject. What may have been the understanding of Sir Stafford Northcote, or of his colleagues, I cannot undertake to say, but that the American Commissioners gave him or them any grounds to understand that such a promise was given, as he says they represented to their Government as having been made, I am bound most respectfully but most emphatically to deny. I cannot conceive from what he has imagined it, as the only direct allusion to the three classes of claims (called the "indirect claims") was that made on the part of the American Commissioners on the 8th day of March, and is set forth in the 36th Protocol in the words in which it was made.

The British Government has, in the correspondence which has recently taken place, endeavored to construe the withholding of an estimate of those "indirect claims" in connection with a proposition on behalf of this Government, which was declined by the British Commissioners, into their waiver. I have already discussed that question, and shall not here again enter upon its refutation. The Protocols and the statement approved by the Joint Commission furnish the substantial part of what passed on that occasion. I am at a loss to conceive what rep

resentation, outside of the statement made in the 36th Protocol, Sir Stafford Northcote can have made to his Government. He refers to some "personal question," something which, until the time of his address, he and his colleagues had been under official restraint from discussing, but the Protocols and the statement to which I have referred had been before the public both in Great Britain and in the United States for nearly a year before his declaration. It is only within a day or two that the journals containing his address have reached me. I have this day addressed a letter to yourself and to each of our colleagues. on the Commission, calling attention to Sir Stafford's statement, and in due time may make public the correspondence.

Returning to Lord Granville's dispatch in the supplement to the London Gazette, I find little else that has not already been discussed or that requires further reply.

It may, however, be noticed that the remote or consequential nature of claims does not appear to have been a serious objection to the presentation of such claims on the part of the British Government against the United States. Lord Granville, in the dispatch in the supplement, recalls the fact that the British Commissioners repeatedly put forward the Fenian raid claims, but not until the 3d of May, (after the American Commissioners had declined to treat on them,) did the British Commissioners admit that a portion of the claims were of a constructive and inferential character, having thus persistently, for nearly two months, kept before the Commissioners those constructive claims. It is not necessary now to consider the relative admissibility of "constructive " and of indirect" claims, as the ground for pecuniary compensation against a Government, under the principles of International Law.

His Lordship again refers to the case presented by the British Government to the Claims Commission, sitting in this city, for the Confederate cotton loan. While questioning the accuracy of my statement, that "the United States calmly submitted to the Commission the decision of its jurisdiction," he proceeds to establish its accuracy by stating the motion made by the Counsel of this Government to dismiss the claim.

If the British Government will follow this example, and move the Tribunal at Geneva to dismiss the claims which it thinks are not included in the submission of the Treaty, a similar result may be obtained, and the benefits of the Treaty and of the principles of peaceful arbitration of grave differences between nations may be established. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

HAMILTON FISH.

[Inclosure in No. 86.]

Earl Russell to Lord Lyons.

FOREIGN OFFICE, March 27, 1863. MY LORD: Mr. Adams having asked for an interview, I had a long conversation with him yesterday at the Foreign Office. He read me a dispatch of Mr. Seward on the subject of the Alabama and Oreto. In this dispatch, which was not unfriendly in its tone, Mr. Seward complains of the depredations on American commerce committed by vessels fitted out in British ports, and manned, for the most part, by British sailors. He alludes to the strong feeling excited in the United States by the destruction of her trading vessels and their cargoes. He repeats the complaint common in America, that England is at war with the United States, while the United States were not at war with England. He expresses his hope that Great Britain, in execution of her own laws, will put an end to the fitting out of such vessels to prey on the commerce of a friendly nation. I said that the phrase that England was at war

with America, but America was not at war with England, was rather a figure of rhetoric than a true description of facts. That the facts were that two vessels, the Oreto and the Alabama, had eluded the operation of the Foreign-Enlistment Act, and had, against the will and purpose of the British Government, made war upon American commerce in the American seas. That the fitting out of the Alabama, the operation against which the Foreign-Enlistment Act was especially directed, was carried on in Portuguese waters at a great distance from any British port. That the most stringent orders had been given long ago to watch the proceedings of those who might be suspected of fitting out vessels of war for Confederate purposes. That if there were six vessels, as it was alleged, fitting out in British ports for such purposes, let evidence be forthcoming, and the Government would not hesitate to stop the vessels, and to bring the offenders before a court of justice. That Mr. Adams was no doubt aware that the Government must proceed according to the regular process of law and upon sworn testimony.

Mr. Adams, on the other hand, dwelt on the novelty and enormity of this species of warfare. He said that if a belligerent could fit out in the ports of a neutral swift armed vessels to prey upon the commerce of its adversary, the commerce of that belligerent must be destroyed, and a new and terrible element of warfare would be introduced. He was sure that England would not suffer such conduct on the part of France, nor France on the part of England. He should be sorry to see letters of marque issued by the President; but there might be no better resource than such a measure.

I said I would at once suggest a better measure. Mr. Seward had said to Lord Lyons that the crews of privateers had this advantage-that they reaped the whole benefit of the prizes they took, whereas the crews of men-of-war were entitled to only half the value of the prizes they took. Let the President, I said, offer a higher reward for the capture of the Alabama and Oreto to the crews of men-of-war than even the entire value of those vessels. Let him offer double their value as a gratuity, and thus confine his action to officers and men of the United States Navy, over whom he could keep a control, and who were amenable to the laws which govern an honorable profession. But what could Mr. Adams ask of the British Government? What was his proposal?

Mr. Adams said there was one thing which might be easily done. It was supposed the British Government were indifferent to these notorious violations of their own laws. Let them declare their condemnation of all such infractions of law.

With respect to the law itself, Mr. Adams said either it was sufficient for the purposes of neutrality, and then let the British Government enforce it, or it was insufficient, and then let the British Government apply to Parliament to amend it.

I said that the Cabinet were of opinion that the law was sufficient, but that legal evidence could not always be procured; that the British Government had done everything in its power to execute the law; but I admitted that the cases of the Alabama and Oreto were a scandal, and in some degree a reproach to our laws. Still, I said it was my belief that if all the assistance given to the Federals by British subjects and British munitions of war were weighed against similar aid given to the Confederates, the balance would be greatly in favor of the Federals.

Mr. Adams totally denied this proposition. But above all, he said, there is a manifest conspiracy in this country, of which the Confederate loan is an additional proof, to produce a state of exasperation in America, and thus bring on a war with Great Britain, with a view to aid the Confederate cause, and secure a monopoly of the trade of the Southern States, whose independence these conspirators hoped to establish by these illegal and unjust measures. He had worked to the best of his power for peace,

but it had become a most difficult task.

Mr. Adams fully deserves the character of having always labored for peace between our two nations, nor, I trust, will his efforts and those of the two Governments fail of I am, &c.,

success.

No. 87.

Mr. Fish to General Schenck.

[Telegram.]

RUSSELL.

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1872.

The Government of the United States differs entirely from the opinion expressed in Lord Granville's note to you, that it is not necessary for

the Agents to present the arguments of the respective Governments on the 15th.

The fifth Article of the Treaty requires that the arguments be presented within a specified time, which time will expire on the 15th.

Being a treaty requirement, the Executive Department of the Government cannot depart from its obligations, and has not the power to consent to a change of its terms.

If an adjournment is contemplated by Great Britain, with the idea of future negotiation, it is right that, with reference to the Senate Article, it should be understood that this Government cannot negotiate on a proposition which involves the idea that it may be guilty of intentional ill faith, or of willful violation of its international duties, or that it regards such acts on the part of another Power the subject of compensation by the payment of damages in money.

FISH.

[From British Blue Book "North America," No. 9, (1872,) p. 37.]

No. 88.

Memorandum read by Lord Granville in the House of Lords.

I have spoken to General Schenck as to the annoyance which has been felt in and out of Parliament at the publication in the United States of the papers submitted to the Senate in their secret session.

I told him that, for obvious reasons, I much regretted it, but that I believed that it was no act of the Government of the United States. Sir E. Thornton had informed me that these papers had been surreptitiously obtained.

General Schenck told me that he believed that the Government of the United States had not, through any of its Departments-the President, the Senate, or the Secretary of State-been a party to the publication of that correspondence. It appeared to have got out surreptitiously through the enterprise (if it may be called by so innocent a name) of the newspapers.

I have also spoken to General Schenck, and alluded to the unfavorable impression which has been created by certain passages in that correspondence wherein Mr. Fish declares the determination of the President to maintain the indirect claims before the Tribunal of Geneva. I told General Schenck that, from the various conversations which I have held with him, and from his written communications, I have been led to believe that the position of the United States was this:

The President held that the indirect claims were admissible under the Treaty; that the Treaty was made and ratified in that sense; and that, therefore, although he might by interchange of notes or otherwise, agree not to press for compensation for those claims, yet as being within the scope of the Treaty, it was not in his power to withdraw them-that could only be done by the exercise of the full Treaty-making power, including the concurrence of the Senate; that it was for this purpose that the President preferred, instead of an interchange of notes, that Her Majesty's Government should adopt a supplementary Article, which for some sufficient consideration might enable the Government of the United States to declare that they would make no claim for such losses, and that the Arbitrators would thereby be prevented from entertaining these indirect claims.

General Schenck informed me that he agreed with me in my construction of what had passed, and I have submitted to him this report of our conversation.

I read this in the House of Lords last night.
FOREIGN OFFICE, June 4, 1872.

No. 89.

General Schenck to Mr. Fish.

[Telegram.]

LONDON, June 5, 1872. (Received at 10.45 a. m.)

Opposition members in Parliament have strange and unworthy suspicions and fears that the last clause of the Article, although in the language of their own Government, is not explicit enough to prevent the indirect claims from being again brought forward. Might we not offer that if this Government will accept the Senate language for the expression of the rule, we will agree to the last clause of their form, as communicated to you in my telegram of the 31st May, adding thereto the words "but will thereupon abandon those several enumerated claims as a cause of difference between the two countries to be considered by the Arbitrators in making their award.”

SCHENCK.

No. 90.

Mr. Fish to General Schenck.

[Telegram.]

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1872.

We cannot agree to the suggestion in your telegram of this date. This Government deals with the British Government, and not with opposition members of Parliament. If that Government adopts the unworthy suspicions and fears referred to in your telegram, and advances them as reasons for modifying the proposed Article, or suggests that this Government will not in good faith act upon the agreement contained therein, all further negotiations must cease at once.

If it does not adopt or entertain those suspicions, there is no reason for proposing to alter the language which was proposed by itself, has been accepted by us, and which is sufficiently explicit.

You may say that this Government regards the new rule contained in the proposed Article as the consideration, and will accept it as a final settlement of the three classes of the indirect claims put forth in our Case, to which they objected.

It is useless to expect that any change can be made in the Article as agreed to by the Senate. A treaty in the words which the Senate had agreed upon could be ratified by that body without debate and in a few minutes. Any change, however immaterial, would involve discussion. and debate, and in the crowded state of their business would inevitably lead to the defeat of the Treaty.