The Citations in the foregoing annotations include all from the following Reports and all preceding them in each State or series:
FOUR VOLUMES OF WHEATON CONTAINED IN THIS BOOK.
FORMED BY CONSOLIDATION.
N. B.-Figures at right of title show volume to whose index it belongs.
Figures in parentheses refer to marginal paging of the volumes contained in this book respectively, while
the figures following indicate the page of this book on which the marginal paging referred to is found.
1. The courts of the United States have exclusive
jurisdiction of all seizures for a breach of the laws
of the United States; and if the seizure be ad-
judged wrongful, and without probable cause, the
party may proceed, at his election, by a suit at
common law, or in the court of admiralty, for dam-
ages for the illegal act.
Slocum v. Mayberry et al. (1, 10) 169, 171
2. Under the Judiciary Act of the 20th Septem-
ber, 1789, ch. 20, and the act of the 3d March,
1803, ch. 93, causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction cannot be removed by writ of error,
from the Circuit Court for re-examination in the
Supreme Court. The appropriate mode of remov-
ing such causes is by appeal.
The San Pedro,
See Prize.
See Jurisdiction, 1.
4. Libel for a forfeiture of goods imported, and
alleged to have been invoiced at a less sum than
the actual cost, at the place of exportation, with
design to evade the duties, contrary to the 66th sec-
tion of the collection law, ch. 123. Restitution de-
creed upon the evidence as to the cost of the goods
at the place where they were last shipped; the
form of the libel excluding all inquiry as to their
cost at the place where they were originally
shipped, and as to continuity of voyage.
The United States v. 150 Crates of Earth-
enware,
(232) 377
5. The courts of the United States have exclusive
cognizance of questions of forfeiture, upon all
seizures made under the laws of the United States,
and it is not competent for a state court to enter-
tain or decide such question of forfeiture.
If a
sentence of condemnation be definitively pro-
nounced by the proper court of the United States,
it is conclusive that a forfeiture is incurred; if a
sentence of acquittal, it is equally conclusive
against the forfeiture; and in either case, the ques-
tion cannot be again litigated in any common law
forum.
(246, 311) 381, 397
6. Where a seizure is made for a supposed for-
feiture, under a law of the United States, no action
of trespass lies in any common law tribunal, until
a final decree is pronounced upon the proceeding
in rem to enforce such forfeiture; for it depends
upon the final decree of the court proceeding in
rem, whether such seizure is to be deemed rightful
or tortious, and the action, if brought before such
decree is made, is brought too soon.
(313) 398
7. If a suit be brought against the seizing officer
for the supposed trespass, while the suit for the
forfeiture is depending, the fact of such pending
may be pleaded in abatement, or as a temporary
bar of the action. If after a decree of condemna-
tion, then that fact may be pleaded as a bar; if
after an acquittal, with a certificate of reasonable
cause of seizure, then that may be pleaded as a bar.
If after an acquittal without such certincate, then
the officer is without any justification for the
seizure, and it is definitively settled to be a tor-
tious act. If, to an action of trespass in a state
court for a seizure, the seizing oflicer plead the
fact of forfeiture in his defense, without averring a
lis pendens, or a condemnation, or an acquittal
with a certificate of reasonable cause of seizure, the
plea is bad; for it attempts to put in issue the
Id.
(314) 398
8. At common law, any person may, at his peril,
seize for a forfeiture to the government, and if the
government adopt his seizure, and the property is
(310) 397
condemned, he is justified.
(310) 397
1. Libel under the non-importation acts. Alleged question of forfeiture in a state court.
excuse of distress repelled.
nounced.
Condemnation pro-
(59) 333
2. Necessity, which will excuse a violation of the
laws of trade, must be urgent, and proceed from
such a state of things as may be supposed to pro-
duce on the mind of a skilful mariner. a well-
grounded fear of the loss of vessel and cargo, or of
(68) 336
3. Decree of restitution affirmed, with a certifi-
cate of probable cause of seizure, in an instance
cause, on further proof.
(78) 338
The San Pedro,
9. By the act of the 18th of February, 1793, ch.
8, s. 27, officers of the revenue are authorized to
make seizures of any ship or goods, for any breach
(311) 397
of the laws of the United States.
24. Case of The King v. Bruce.
Note 1,
11. The statute of 1794, ch. 50, s. 3, prohibiting
the fitting out any ship, etc., for the service of any
foreign prince or states, to cruise against the sub-
jects of any other foreign prince, etc., does not ap-
ply to any new government, unless it has been ac-pelled.
knowledged by the United States, or by the govern-
ment of the country to which such new state pre-
viously belonged. A plea setting up a forfeiture
under that statute, in fitting out a ship to cruise
against such new state, must aver such recognition,
or it is bad.
Id.
(328) 402
12. A plea justifying a seizure under this stat-
ute, need not state the particular prince or state
by name, against whom the ship was intended to
cruise.
Id.
(329) 402
13. The 7th section of the statute of 1794, was
not intended to apply, except to cases where a sei-
zure or detention could not be enforced in the or-
dinary civil power, and there was a necessity, in
the opinion of the President, to employ naval or
military power for this purpose,
Id.
(331, 334) 402, 403
14. The definitive sentence of a court of admiral-
ty, or any other court of peculiar and exclusive
jurisdiction, whether of condemnation or acquittal,
is conclusive, wherever the same subject-matter
comes incidentally in controversy in any other
tribunal.
(315) 398
15. Application of this principle to a recent case
in England.
Note 1,
(322) 400
16. Supposing that the third article of the Con-
stitution of the United States, which declares that
"the judicial power shall extend to all cases of ad-
miralty and maritime jurisdiction," vests in the
United States exclusive jurisdiction of all such
cases, and that a murder committed in the waters
of a state, where the tide ebbs and flows, is a case
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; yet Con-
gress have not, in the 8th section of the act of
1790, ch. 9, "for the punishment of certain crimes
against the United States," so exercised this power
as to confer on the courts of the United States
jurisdiction over such murder.
The United States v. Bevans,
(336, 387) 404, 416
17. Quære, Whether courts of common law have
concurrent jurisdiction with the admiralty over
murder committed in bays, etc., which are inclosed
parts of the sea.
(387) 416
18. Congress having, in the 8th section of the
act of 1790, ch. 9, provided for the punishment of
murder, etc., committed upon the high seas, or in
any river, haven, basin, or bay, out of the juris-
diction of any particular state,' it is not the of-
fense committed, but the day, etc., in which it is
committed, that must be out of the jurisdiction of
the state.
(387) 416
19. The grant to the United States, in the consti-
tution, of all cases of admiralty and maritime ju-
risdiction, does not extend to a cession of the wa-
ters in which those cases may arise, or of general
jurisdiction over the same. Congress may pass all
law which are necessary for giving the most com-
plete effect to the exercise of the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction granted to the government of
the Union; but the general jurisdiction over the
place, subject to this grant, adheres to the terri-
tory as a portion of territory not yet given away;
and the residuary powers of legislation still remain
in the state.
(389) 417
20. Congress have power to provide for the pun-
ishment of offenses, committed by persons on board
a ship of war of the United States, wherever that
ship may lie. But Congress have not exercised
that power in the case of a ship lying in the waters
of the United States; the words "within any fort,
arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place
or district of country under the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States," in the third sec-
tion of the act of 1790, ch. 9, not extending to a
ship of war, but only to objects in their nature
fixed and territorial.
(390) 417
21. Texts on the admiralty jurisdiction.
Note 3, 4,
(357, 361) 409. 410
22. Resolution of 1632, upon the cases of ad-
miralty jurisdiction.
(365) 411
23. Agreement of the judges of the King's Bench
and the admiralty of 1575.
(367) 411
(371) 412
A question of fact under the non-importation
Defense set up on the plea of distress, re-
Condemnation.
(392) 418
26. Libel under the 25th sec. of the registry act
of 1792, ch. 146 (1), for a fraudulent use by a
vessel of a certificate of registry to the benefit of
which she was not entitled. Vessel forfeited. The
provisions of the 27th sec. apply as well to vessels
which have not been previously registered as to
those to which registers have been previously
granted.
The Neptune,
(601) 469
See Piracy.
See Practice, 5, 6, 7.
See Prize.
1. Where the pleadings in an admiralty cause are
too informal and defective to pronounce a final
sentence upon the merits, the cause will be re-
manded by this court to the Circuit Court, with
directions to permit the pleadings to be amend-
ed, and for further proceedings.
The Divina Pastora, (52, 64) 512, 515
2. A collector of the customs, who makes a seiz-
ure of goods for an asserted forfeiture, and before
the proceedings in rem are consummated by a sen-
tence of condemnation, is removed from office,
acquires an inchoate right by the seizure, which
by the subsequent decree of condemnation gives
him an absolute vested right to his share of the
forfeiture under the collection act of the 2d March,
1799, c. 128.
3. In a case of civil salvage, where under its
peculiar circumstances, the amount of salvage is
discretionary, appeals should not be encouraged
upon the ground of minute distinctions of merit,
nor will the court reverse the decision of an in-
ferior court, unless it manifestly appears that some
important error has been committed.
4. The demand of the ship-owners for freight
and general average in such a case, is to be pur-
sued against that portion of the cargo which is ad-
judged to the owners of the goods, by a direct libel,
or petition, and not by a claim interposed in the
salvage cause.
(99) 522
5. Any citizen may seize any property forfeited
to the use of the government, either by the munic-
ipal law, or as prize, in order to enforce the for-
feiture; and it depends upon the government
whether it will act upon the seizure; if it proceeds
to enforce the forfeiture by legal process, this is a
sufficient confirmation of the seizure.
(100) 523
6. The admiralty possesses a general jurisdiction
in cases of suits by inaterial men, in personam and
in rem.
8. Where repairs have been made or necessaries
furnished to a foreign ship, or to a ship in the
port of the state to which she does not belong, the
general maritime law gives the party a lien on the
ship itself for his security, and he may maintain
a suit in rem, in the Admiralty, to enforce his
right.
Id.
(443) 611
9. But as to repairs or necessaries in the port or
state to which the ship belongs, the case is gov-
erned altogether by the local law; and no lien is
implied unless by that law.
11. A shipwright who has taken a ship into his
possession to repair it, is not bound to part with
the possession until he is paid for the repairs. But
if he parts with the possession (of a domestic
ship), or has worked upon it without taking pos-
session, he has no claim upon the ship itself.
Id.
(443) 611
12. The common law being the law of Maryland
on this subject, material men cannot maintain a
suit in rem in the District Court of Maryland for
supplies furnished to a domestic ship, although
4. The treaty of 1794 relates only to lands then
held by British subjects, and not to any after ac-
quired lands.
(13, 14)
5. A person born in the colony of New Jersey,
before the declaration of independence, and resid-
ing there until 1777, but who then joined the Brit-
ish army, and ever since adhered to the British
government, has a right to take lands by descent
in the state of New Jersey.
Id.
(12) 322
6. A person born in England, before the declara-
tion of independence, and who always resided
there, and never was in the United States, cannot
take lands in Maryland by descent.
7. By the acts of Maryland of 1780, ch. 45 and
49, the equitable interest of British subjects in
lands were confiscated, and vested in the state,
without office found, prior to the treaty of 1783, so
that the British cestui que trust was not protected
by the stipulations in that treaty against future
confiscations, nor by the stipulation in the treaty of
1794, securing to British subjects, who then held
lands in this country, the right to continue to hold
them.
Id.
(13) 322
8. An alien may take, by purchase, a freehold or
other interest in land, and may hold it against all
the world except the King, and even against him
until office found; and is not accountable for the
rents and profits previously received.
466
9. Where W. R. claimed title to lands in Ken-
tucky, derived from a warrant issued in 1774, by
the Governor of Virginia, on which a grant issued
in 1788, to W. S., who was a native subject of the
King of Great Britain, and who left Virginia prior
to the year 1776, and has never since returned to
the United States; held, that W. S. took a legal
title to the lands under the warrant and grant,
which not having been devested by any act of Vir-
ginia prior to the treaty of 1794, was rendered ab-
solute and indefeasible by the 9th article of that
treaty.
(594, 599) 467, 468
Craig v. Radford,
See Chancery, 6.
See Treaty, 1.
1. An alien may take an estate in lands by the
act of the parties, as by purchase; but he cannot
take by the act of the law, as by descent.
Orr v. Hodgson,
(453) 613
2. Where a person dies, leaving issue, who are
aliens, the latter are not deemed his heirs in law;
but the estate descends to the next of kin who
have an inheritable blood, in the same manner as
if no such alien issue were in existence.
Id.
(Ib.) 613
3. The 6th article of the treaty of peace of 1783,
between the United States and Great Britain, com-
pletely protected the titles of British subjects to
lands in the United States, which would have been
liable to forfeiture, by escheat, for the defeat of
alienage. That article was not meant to be con-
fined to confiscations jure belli.
(Ib.) 613
4. The 9th article of the treaty of 1794, between
the United States and Great Britain, applies to the
title of the parties, whatever it is, and gives it the
same legal validity as if the parties were citizens.
1. The fact that the commander of a privateer
was an alien enemy at the time of capture, does
not invalidate it.
The Mary and Susan (Richardson,
claimant),
(46) 32
2. Property of an alien enemy, found within
the territory, at the declaration of war, is not con-
fiscable as prize, but may be claimed by him, upon
the termination of war, unless previously confis-
cated by the sovereign power.
The Astrea, note 6 (The Adven-
ture),
AMENDMENTS-1.
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1. A letter, written within a reasonable time be-
fore or after the date of a bill of exchange, de-
scribing it in terms not to be mistaken, and prom-
ising to accept it, is, if shown to the person who
afterwards takes the bill on the credit of the let-
ter, a virtual acceptance, binding the person who
makes the promise.
Coolidge et al. v. Payson et al. (66) 185
2. Review of the English cases on this subject.
Id.
(Ib.) 185
3. Law of France as to previous acceptance.
Id. note 1,
(75) 188
(76) 188, 189
4. American decisions on the same subject.
Id. note 1,
5. A demand of payment of a promissory note
must be made of the maker on the last day of
grace; and where the indorser resides in a different
place, notice of the default of the maker should be
put into the post-office early enough to be sent by
the mail of the succeeding day.
(377) 265
6. An action of debt will lie by the payee or in-
dorsee of a bill of exchange, against the acceptor,
where it is expressed to be for value received.
Raborg et al. v. Peyton,
(385) 268
2. Where a bill of exchange was indorsed to T.
T. T., Treasurer of the United States, who re-
ceived it in that capacity, and for account of the
United States, and the bill had been purchased by
the Secretary of the Treasury (as one of the com-
missioners of the Sinking Fund, and as agent of
that board) with the money of the United States,
and was afterwards indorsed by T. T. T., Treas-
urer of the United States, to W. and S., and by
them presented to the drawees for acceptance, and
protested for non-acceptance and non-payment, and
sent back by W. and S. to the Secretary of the
Treasury; held, that the indorsement to T. T. T.,
passed such an interest to the United States as
enabled them to maintain an action on the bill
against the first indorser; and that the United
States might recover in an action against the first
indorser, without producing from W. and S. a re-
ceipt or re-indorsement of the bill, W. and S. be-
ing presumed to have acted as the agents
bankers of the United States; and all the interest
which W. and S. ever had in the bill, was de-
vested by the act of returning it to the party from
whom it was received.
Dugan v. The United States, (172) 362
3. Quære, Whether, when a bill is indorsed to
an agent, for the use of his principal, an action on
the bill can be maintained by the principal in his
own name. However this may be between private
parties, the United States are permitted to sue in
their own name, wherever it appears, not only on
the face of the instrument, but from all the evi-
dence, that they alone are interested in the sub-
ject-matter of the controversy.
Id.
(180) 364
4. If a person who indorses a bill to another,
whether for value, or for the purpose of collection,
comes again to the possession thereof, he is to be
regarded, unless the contrary appears in evidence,
as the bona fide holder and proprietor of such bill,
and is entitled to recover thereon, notwithstanding
there may be on it one or more indorsements in
full, subsequent to the indorsement to him, with-
out producing any receipt or indorsement back to
him from either of such indorsees, whose names he
may strike from the bill, or not as he thinks proper.
Id.
(182) 364
5. The indorser of a promissory note, who has
been charged by due notice of the default of the
maker, is not entitled to the protection of a court
of equity as a surety; the holder may proceed
against either party at his pleasure, and does not
discharge the indorser, by not issuing, or by coun-
termanding an execution against the maker.
6. By the statute of Maryland of 1763, ch. 23,
s. 8, which is perhaps only declaratory of the com-
mon law, an indorser has a right to pay the
amount of the note or bill to the holder, and to
be subrogated to all his rights by obtaining an as-
signment of the holder's judgment against the
maker.
(526) 451
1. A court of equity will decree a specific per-
formance of a contract for the sale of land, if the
vendor is able to make a good title at any time be-
fore the decree is pronounced; but the dismission
of a bill to enforce a specific performance in such
a case, is a bar to a new bill for the same object.
Hepburn & Dundas v. Dunlop &
Co..
(179) 65
2. The inability of the vendor to make a good
title at the time the decree is pronounced, though
it form a sufficient ground for refusing a specific
performance, will not authorize a court of equity
to rescind the agreement in a case where the par-
ties have an adequate remedy at law for its breach.
Id.
(Ib.) 65
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1.-H., in contemplation of marriage with B.,
gave a bond for $5,000, and interest to trustees, to
after the death of H., in case she should survive
secure to B. a support during the marriage, and
him, and to their child or children, in case he
should survive her; with condition that if H.
should, within the time of his life, or within one
year after the marriage (whichsoever of the said
terms should first expire), convey to the trustees
some good estate, real or personal, sufficient to
secure the annual payment of $300, for the separ-
ate use of his wife during the marriage, and also
sufficient to secure the payment of the said $5,000
to her use in case she should survive her husband.
to be paid within six months after his death
and in case of her death before her husband, to
be paid to their child or children; or if H. should
die before B., and by his will should, within
year from its date, make such devises and be-
quests as should be adequate to these provisions.
then the bond to be void. H. died, leaving his
widow B. and a son, having, by his last will, de-
vised a tract of 1,000 acres of land in the Missis-
sippi Territory, to his son in fee; a tract of 10,-
000 acres in Kentucky, equally between his wife
and son, with a devise over to her, in fee, of the
son's moiety, if he died before he attained "the
lawful age to will it away.” And the residue of
his estate, real and personal, to be divided equally
between his wife and son with the same contingent
devise over to her as with regard to the tract of
10,000 acres. The value of the property thus de-
vised to her, beside the contingent interest, might
have been estimated, at the time of H's death, at
$10,000. B. subsequently died, having made a
nuncupative will, by which she devised all her
estate, "whether vested in her by the will of her
deceased husband or otherwise," to be divided be
tween her son and the plaintiff in the cause, with
a contingent devise of the whole to the survivor.
The son afterwards died, and the plaintiff brought
his bill to charge the lands of H. with the pay-
ment of the bond for $5,000, and interest,
which the plaintiff derived his right under the
nuncupative will of B. By the laws of Kentucky
this will did not pass the real estate of the tes-
tator, but was sufficient to pass her personal es
tate. including the bond. Held, that the provision
of the will of H. for his wife, must be taken in
satisfaction of the bond, but subject to her liberty
to elect under the will and the bond, and that this
privilege was extended to her devisee, the plaintiff.
Hunter et al. v. Bryant,
(32) 177
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