Englishman. When this contest com menced," he said, "many of the Indian nations were engaged in actual war with the United States, notwithstanding the greatest endeavors of this government to dissuade them from it. From the moment the war commenced, they took a most active part, and appeared firm on every occasion. They were led yesterday by colonel Elliot, and nothing could exceed their ardor and steadiness. A few prisoners were taken by them, whom they treated with every humanity, and it affords me much pleasure to state, that such was their forbearance and attention to what was required of them, that the enemy sustained no other loss in men than what was occasioned by the fire of our batteries." Such, therefore, were the proposals of the American government for an armistice, and such its misrepresentations as to the mode in which the war had been conducted. Yet, confident as were the rulers of America, they were forced to acknow. ledge that the war was unpopular; that the states of Massachusets and Connecticut had refused to furnish their proportions of militia towards the defence of their maritime frontier, and that the finances were in a state of decay.

The Americans were destined most unexpectedly for awhile to enjoy an apparent triumph at sea, which the confidence of the British in the virtue of their navy, rendered at once surprising and afflicting. The Macedonian frigate was, on the 25th of December, captured after a severe and desperate action, by the American frigate United States. The inequality in the size of the vessels, in the number and weight of guns, and the disproportion in the number of men, were not less striking in this instance than in that of the Guerriere. Yet the action was obstinately contested, and the British frigate surrendered only in conséquence of a number of untoward accidents which could not have been foreseen, but not till she had been reduced to a state which sufficiently evinced the bravery and perseverance of the officers and crew. A violent and unjust clamor was now raised against the admiralty

and the government, which, however, was very easily put down by an in partial inquiry into the circumstances in which these distressing events had occurred. It was asked, why had not the Macedo nian been manned in the same manner with the American frigate. The obvious answer was, that she had not been intended to meet an American vessel called a frigate; that on the extended scale of the British navy, it had not been considered possible, and never had been thought necessary, to arm or man British frigates in that manner. There had been no insufficiency of naval force on the Ame rican station at the commencement of the war; from Halifax to the West Indies, there were stationed ships seven times more powerful than those of the whole American navy collected. But to the groundless apprehensions generated in a moment of disappointment, the best answer was given in the following sensible observations, which may be read with interest, when the puny navy of America shall cease to be remembered.

萨

"There are three of the American frigates, viz. the Constitution, the President, and the United States, which were. originally intended for line of battle-ships, and are of 1600 tons burden and upwards, adineasurement. They carry fourteen 24-pounders, long guns, on a side, on their main deck, and are armed on their quarterdeck and forecastle, which nearly meet, with thirteen 32-pounders, carronades on a side, making in a total of 54 heavy guns. By their capacity, this battery is elevated possibly ten feet above the lead water line, from the lower sill of the main deck-ports.

"It is further to be remarked, that this great capacity enables them to possess considerably larger scuttles for ventilating them betwixt decks, and by such combined power of space and air, they are enabled to carry a compliment of 450 to 500 men. It is also worthy of remark, that this portion of their navy is the elite of the corps, has been long in commission, and commanded by their best officers; add to which, that they are our own degenerated sons that man them, many of whom

are absolutely fighting against us (as it were) with halters about their necks.

"The rest of their frigates are like our own and of a similar size and equip, ment.

"

"The outery made against the govern, ment is, that this small comparative force has been suffered to escape. They, how ever, are like a mouse on Salisbury plain," and, having a roving commission, are of course, not long in one spot. When met at sea by the Guerriere and Macedonian, two of our heaviest frigates now in commission, the fight was between single ships, and the result has been known, to the sorrow certainly of all lovers of their country. But will it be asserted by any one that our whole navy must be remodelled in consequence of this check; possibly a salutary one, for our vanity might require it; would it not be better at once to declare that their three ships, viz. the Constitution, President, and United States, are line of battle-ships, having equipments in men, ordnance, and capacity equal thereto, and exonerate our captains of frigates from going alongside of them, unless assisted by more additional force. It should be remembered by the public that a captain of a British 32-gun frigate mounting only 12pounder carronades, is bound to fight any single deck ship (meaning thereby, gun deck, as contradistinguished from quarter deck and forecastle, though their two platforms nearly meet,) and consequently proceeds into battle, a willing sacrifice to the honor of the flag, whose independence he is most certainly bound to maintain. But surely there should be some bounds to such honorable chivalry. Formerly it was necessary, or at least thought so, for a regiment to remain exposed to a severe galling fire which possibly they could not return to advantage, merely because a British soldier was never to turn his back on an enemy. But such courage is better managed now a days, thanks to lord Wellington and other able men who have learnt in his lordship's school. And why not permit our frigates, (of which I repeat again the Guerriere and Macedonian are as good specimens of force as we can bring; and

being both taken in single action, shews that they are not equal to such frigates of the American navy as before described, to retire from such force, as they are accustomed to do from two-deck ships. It is said by some, who rather delight in exhibiting every loss which this country must in common share with other nations, as the fault of persons whose cause they do not espouse, that we do not man our ships enough. Why, say they, not put the same number of men as the American frigates? The answer is easy, our frigates cannot stow them, or rather, crowd them, they could not take the necessary supplies of provisions, for the usual period of a common service. Our frigates of the first class, with the exception of the Endymion and Cambrian, the former now repairing, and the latter either taken to pieces or about to be, are about 1050 tons, 600 tous less than either of the frigates before described.

"It may be then said, and indeed is already said, build them! This certainly may be done, and possibly will be to a proper extent, if any fit two-decked ships whose upper works are in a state of decay, can be found, to cut down. It is also possible that the department of the government, to which this great responsibility attaches, may be disposed to do so; but it requires considerable care in the selection of the ships, not only as to their state of repair, but also as to their form of body, for an easy two-decked ship may be a most laborious single decked ship, and she may be dismantled in the first gale she encounters. Time must also be given for such a process. It is easy for persons who know little of the subject to clamor, why have we not this, or this? the moment it is wanted. Do our countrymen, at least the sensible part, forget that our navy, with the most rigid economy, costs us twenty millions annually, and would, if such prodigality were used, cost us thirty millions? Do they forget of what perishable materials ships are composed? Do they forget that dreadful disease, the dry rot? But suppose we had three, or four, or six, of this description of frigates, like the Ame:

tican ones, either by building or cutting down larger ships for the purpose, it may happen, and most likely will happen, that they never meet the large Americans. The two finest frigates of ours, the Endymion and Cambrian, have, I will not say not been engaged at all, but certainly never with a frigate of any sort.

"But even admitting that we had them, and that they did meet, might not some of our fast sailing two-decked ships now in the American seas be equally and successfully employed-nay, better; for the certainty of victory, with a comparatively less loss, would be greater. On the whole, therefore, I consider that the nation should at once vote, as it were, these three American soi-disant frigates to be treated as Line of battle-ships; and support a man, and not run his character down, who considered it right to retire from one,-they would then be of no more consequence than any other ship of war; and, by being liable to capture by one of our two-deckers, are the description of ships, if the American war could long continue, would be too expensive as frigates, and not of force for the line."

Such then was the result of the first

operations of this second American war, a war which had been undertaken by the government of the United States from the most unworthy motives; from a system of policy which sought to undermine the energies of the British empire, and to sup port the ambition of France to overwhelm the only state which resisted the arrogance of despotism, and stood manfully forward in defence of the independence of nations, The glory of the British arms was fully sustained by the operations of that little band of heroes to whom the defence of Canada was entrusted. The military prowess of the Americans had appeared contemptible in the eyes of the world; nor had their naval efforts gained them any great credit with those who were capable of reflecting on the prodigious advantages under which their short-lived triumphs had been gained, and on the energy and resolution which had been evinced by British sailors, even at a moment when all the chances of war and every combination of circumstances conspired against them to a degree which must have repressed the ardor of all but those in whom heroism is an innate and indestructible principle.