66

aide-de-camp, who arrived precisely at the moment that Soult had put his troops in motion, which he had only delayed, to allow the Russians time to extend their army towards the left, by which they were weakening their centre. All who opposed his march were either killed or taken. Buonaparte, who was stationed on a height from which he could plainly discover the movements of the army, was charmed with the precision and the brilliant results of his lieutenant's manœuvres; he went to him at full gallop, and in presence of all his staff, who had but a few moments before beheld him most vehemently exclaim ing against Soult, he embraced him, saying, My lord marshal Soult, I esteem you as the most able tactician of my empire." "Sire, I believe it," replied Soult, 66 since your majesty has the goodness to tell me so," a well-timed compliment, which caused as much pleasure to Buonaparte, as it astonished the officers who were present and nothing was wanting to complete the effect of the extraordinary scene of this day, but the colonel of the regiment du roi infantry, under whom Soult served as a common soldier in 1786, who would no doubt have exclaimed, "A miracle indeed!" on beholding his raw recruit become a wily courtier, and a general sufficiently skilful to defeat the Russian and Austrian generals, who had previously acquired so much reputation by their brilliant exploits against the Turks.

At the battle of Jena, Soult decided the victory by his movement against the centre of the Prussian army, after having taken possession of the wood which was on his right. On the 16th of October, 1806, at Greussen, he refused to give confidence to the armistice, said to have been agreed on by general Kalkreuth, with a view of favoring the retreat of the column which covered the flight of the king of Prussia. Buonaparte, in his tenth bulletin, dated Naumburg, the 18th of October, 1806, has manufactured a conference between the Prussian general and marshal Soult, for the purpose of affording a lesson to the generals of the grand army, who,

having allowed themselves to be insnared by the pretended armistice, had suffered many of the enemy's columns to escape. Soult rendered great services in Prussia and in Poland. At the battle of Eylau, though inferior in number, he held Beningzen's arany in check. Augereau had been routed, and had left the right of Soult unprotected; Davoust had been retarded in his march by bad roads; Ney was fighting against the Prussians; and Bernadotte was too far distant to take a part in the engagement. Soult, however, ar ranged his troops with so much skill, that he made them appear much more numerous than they were. If, after having defeated Augereau's corps, the Russian army had rushed headlong (a favorite manœuvre of theirs) upon Soult's line, Buo naparte would have been completely beaten, and Davoust's corps, separated from the rest of the army, would have been either killed, taken, or dispersed. On the approach of night, Buonaparte, alarmed at the enormous loss which he had sustained, wished to retreat. us remain where we are, sire," said Soult to him, " for although we have been dreadfully mauled, we shall pass for conquerors, if we remain the last on the field of battle; and I have observed some movements in the Russian army, which induce me to think that the enemy will effect his retreat during the night." Although Buonaparte was apprehensive of the contrary, he resolved to follow the advice of Soult, of whose extraordinary perspicacity he was well aware. The next day he was so rejoiced at the retreat of the Russians, that he was observed the whole day with a smiling countenance, although in the midst of 20,000 dead, dying, and wounded, lying strewed on the field of battle near the town of Eylau.

"Let

At the present important crisis, Soult was actively employed against the forces of count Belvedar, while Buonaparte established his head-quarters at Burgos, from whence he issued an edict, granting, in the name of the intruder, a pardon to all Spaniards who, within one month, should lay down their arms and renounce

all connection with England. From Burgos, Ney and Victor were despatched with their divisions to take post behind the army of Castanos, while Lasnes attacked it with 30,000 men in front. Too much reliance had been placed on the celerity of the French troops. Ney's division, which should have reached Agreda on the 23rd, was so exhausted when it arrived at Coria, on the 22nd, that it was compelled to remain there during the two following days. Had it not been for this circumstance, the defeat of the Spaniards would have been more complete than it was, and not a man could have escaped. But Castanos, learning that the enemy on the 21st, were advancing by Coria with 12,000 foot and 4000 horse, fell back to a position extending from Tarragona to Tudela. This movement was executed without loss. On the 23rd, at day-break, Lasnes came up with the Spaniards, whom he found posted with their right to Tudela, and their left occupying a line of a league and a half. The position was bad, the line injudiciously extended, and Castanos, contrary to the advice of Palafox, had neglected to secure some advantageous heights, of which the French obtained possession. Yet the action was well contested. On the right, the Spaniards had the advantage; but their centre was broken, and the French cavalry, passing through, came in the rear of the pursuing wing, and decided the fate of the day. No resource was left but to retreat to Borga. So imprudently had Castanos concerted his plans, that the fourth division of his army, under general Lapena, which had received orders to attack the right flank of the enemy, was two hours' march from the field of battle, and found itself unexpectedly opposed by 3000 foot and 1000 horse. According to the French account, 4000 Spaniards fell in the field or perished in the Ebro. Castanos retired upon Calatayud, and afterwards upon Siguenza, while Palafox was compelled, by the disasters of that general, to fall back in the direction of Saragossa.

Buonaparte in the mean time was rapidly advancing to Madrid. On the 30th of

November, he crossed, after a slight resist ance, the mountain pass of the Samosierra, and arrived before Madrid. The inhabitants, in imitation of the citizens of Saragossa, had made the most vigorous preparations for defence; but the metropolis was already sold by Morla and the prince of Castel Franco. The conduct of these individuals had been so uniformly plausible, that the jealousy of the people was diverted to other objects. It was reported and asserted that sand had been put into their cartridges: They strangled the marquis de Periales, to whom this act of treachery was imputed, and the monks were immediately employed in making new cartridges. On the 2nd of December, the anniversary of Buonaparte's coronation, Bessieres and the enperor arrived within sight of Madrid, and took possession of the adjacent heights. There were only 6000 troops in the city, but there were 60,000 men ready to lay down their lives in its defence. Their first efforts of resistance were vigorous and successful; and Buonaparte remained three days before Madrid, till the treachery of Morla, and the reluctant suspicions excited by his conduct, rendered the city one melancholy scene of insubordination and distrust. During the night, the most enthusiastic of the patriots left a place where they were not permitted to exert themselves,, and general Belliard, on the morning of the 5th of December, took possession of the city. Three days after the admission of the French, the mockery of a capitulation was concluded with

Morla.

Unpropitious as was the influence of these events to the enterprise of sir John Moore, the progress of that general was still more powerfully impeded, by the imbecility or indifference of the English ministry. Sir John was unprovided with cavalry for the artillery or commissariat stores, or for the light baggage of the regi ments. No magazines were formed on the line of march, and it was not till the 27th of October, that he had been able to quit Lisbon. The northern boundary of Portugal, with his limited means of

conveyance, appeared to be impassable to artillery; and the Spanish commissary general had declared his inability to furnish provisions on the road by Elvas. On the arrival of the British army, however, at the mountains, 'it was discovered that they were easily practicable for cannon. In consequence of this error, it was thought necessary to divide the army. . The artillery and cavalry were entrusted to majorgeneral Hope, with four regiments of infantry: they were to march by Elvas on the Madrid road, and two brigades under general Paget, proceeded by Elvas and Alcantara. The rear of the army moved through Almeida; two brigades under general Beresford by the rout of Goimbra; three under general Fraser, by the way of Abrantes. These were to unite at Salamanca; and general Hope and sir David Baird were to join them there or at Valladolid. The total amount of the forces that left Portugal was 18,628, of which only 912 were cavalry.

On the 13th of November, sir John Moore arrived with his van-guard at Sala manca, where he received information of the late disastrous events, and of the arrival of the French at Valladolid, twenty leagues from Salamanca. He had with him only three brigades of infantry, and not a single gun; but he soon learned that the French had retired towards Palencia, and that none of their infantry had advanced beyond Burgos. Placed nearly in the centre, between two divisions of his army, he was compelled to remain inactive; and, observing the supineness of the juntas, despaired of the cause of the Spaniards, and erroneously supposed that the people would do nothing for themselves.

Sir David Baird had formed the same opinion. The expedition under his command reached Corunna on the 13th of October; and such, were the idle forms and the neglect of the Spanish governinent, that the troops were detained on ship-board till an order for their landing could be received from the central junta. This general had been accustomed to an Indian army with its train of elephants and suttlers, slaves and palanquins, and

for

he had now to march the army through a country where it is difficult even private travellers to obtain food, and which had already been exhausted by its own troops. Dividing his army into small detachments, which followed each other at considerable distance, he arrived at Astorga, (November 19th,) and there learning the defeat of Blake's army, determined to remain in his position till the arrival of his whole force. "I see my situation," (says his journal,) "as clearly as any one, that nothing can be worse, yet I am determined to form the junction of the army, and to try our fortune. We have no business here as things are; but, being here; it would never do to abandon the Spaniards without a struggle.".

Sir John Moore now determined to retreat on Portugal. Murmurs against this determination from all ranks of the army, and even the officers of the staff, were heard in every quarter. Mr. Frere expostulated with vehemence on the intention of retreating upon Lisbon, as peculiarly calculated to disgust the junta and discourage the Spanish people. If a retreat was indispensible, he thought the army should fall back on Gallicia; but in his own opinion, the greatest advantages would be derived from advancing on Madrid. Before the letter containing this remonstrance arrived, the general received intelligence of the defeat of Castanos; but the effect of that intelligence on his movements was counteracted by a treacherous invitation from Castel Franco and Morla, and the further statements of Mr. Frere, supported by the evidence of a colonel Charmilly,, an emigrant in the British service. This gentleman communicated to the English minister the sentiments of the people of Madrid, and Mr. Frere entrusted him with a letter to sir John Moore, urging him to suspend his retreat. But, conceiving that, after having begun the retreat, sir John, might suppose his responsibility to be pledged to its continuance, he confided to colonel Charmilly a second letter, to be delivered in case the general persisted in. his determination to retire. It was the purport of this letter, to request that the

advanced to Sahagun. The weather was The weather was at this time severe, the roads bad and covered with snow; and, as the soldiers had suffered considerably from forced marches, the general halted that they might

recover.

The forces of Soult, to the number of 18,000 men, were placed behind the river Carrion, and orders were issued for attacking him. The British soldiers, always impatient to meet the enemy, prepared for battle with the most cheerful alacrity, and confidently anticipated a glorious victory. Their general was less sanguine. "The movement I am making," he said to Mr. Frere, "is of the most dangerous kind. I wish it to be apparent to the whole world as it is to every individual of the army, that we have done every thing in our power in support of the Spanish cause, and that we do not abandon it till long after the Spaniards had abandoned Had he attended to the advice of Mr. Frere, he would not have precipitately rejected the judicious suggestion of that gentleman to make a stand at Astorga, nor have advanced against the enemy "bridle in hand, and expecting to have a run for it."

us.

At the hour.appointed, the whole force was under arms; the right column had begun its march, and the rest were in high spirits, expecting the word of command:just at this time came a letter from Romana, with intelligence that the French were advancing from Madrid, either to Valladolid or Salamanca; and information to the same purport was received by other messengers, and also that considerable reinforcements had arrived at Carrion from Palencia. Orders were immediately issued that the troops should go back to their quarters, and by day-break next morning, be again under arms. life," says one who heard the order, "I never witnessed such an instantaneously withering effect upon any body of living creatures. A few murmurs only were heard, but every countenance was changed, and they, who the moment before were full of that coufidence which ensures victory, were at once deprived of all heart

VOL. II.

"In my

and hope." and hope." The next morning, generat Hope fell back to Majorga, on the road to Benevente, with his own division and with general Fraser's. Sir David Baird was ordered to pass the river at Valencia; and, on Christmas-day, the commanderin-chief followed general Hope with the reserve and the light brigades; and the cavalry under lord Paget followed the reserve on the 26th. Sir John Moore had made up his mind to lose some of his baggage, and not to fight if he could avoid it. Astorga was to be his rallying point; there he informed Romana he should stand, as his return from thence, if necessary, would be secure, and he should be in the way to receive the supplies and the reinforcements which he expected from England. At the worst he could defend himself, and, with Romana's aid, defend Gallicia "You may rest assured," he added, "that I shall not retreat a foot beyond what is necessary to secure my supplies from being intercepted." But his despatches from Benevente on the 28th, show that this intention, if it had ever been seriously enter-tained, was abandoned. His force, he said, when he reached Astorga, would be about 27,000: Romana could not have above 8000. The troops moving against him he estimated at not less than 50,000; and it was said that Buonaparte himself was coming with 10,000 of his guards. His intention was not to stop longer at Astorga than to secure the stores, and then retreat to Villa Franca, where he had been told there was a position. Romana had intimated to him some time ago, his intention of retiring into Gallicia by this rout; but sir John begged it might be left open to the English, as being the only communication they had for their retreat or supplies:

From the 22nd till the 24th, Soult received such reinforcements as made his army superior to the British. Junot had advanced to Palencia, and threatened their right flank. Buonaparte was hastening in person from Madrid, with his imperial cavalry, and all the disposable force in that quarter. The force under Le Febvre, (duke of Dantzic,) was counter

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