276 THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. [A.D. neither be turned nor passed. This tract, for the most part mountainous, is singularly favourable for purposes of defence, more especially for a British army, with its power of extensive maritime co-operation. The Tagus was a mighty artery up which gunboats of considerable size could navigate, and it was a natural obstacle to an attacking force, as it hampered their action and divided their numbers. The portion to the southward, in front of Setubal, was of a milder character of elevation and intersection than that to the northward; but the approaches on that side only led down to the banks of a broad expanse of water, across which no enemy could hope to reach Lisbon, in face of the British navy. Between the north bank of the Tagus and the sea, below the point where that great river, from its increased depth and breadth, becomes, in a military sense, impassable, four great paved roads lead to Lisbon. Three of these roads wind up the hills, through stronglydefined mountain passes at Mafra, Montechique, and Bucellas, and the fourth leads under the high ground along the river shore. The plan proposed by the engineer was to block up the advance in front of all these "passes" with formidable detached redoubts, and to connect the passes themselves with a nearly continuous epaulement, so as to form an effective barrier, that should check an enemy's advance, and enable the defenders to retire within a third line across a small nook of the Peninsula which constituted an innermost enceinte upon the coast itself, where was constructed a sort of citadel, within which an army might be protected in its embarkation, or in case of being successively driven out of all the other defences. Nature had done much to assist the projected design of an entrenched camp in this locality. The little river San Lorenzo, adjoining the pass of Mafra on the extreme left, looking north, presented a deep, rugged, and in many parts impracticable ravine, beyond which the Serra de Chypre commanded prominently the road, as it advanced towards it from Torres Vedras. The next adjoining pass was protected by a mountain called Cabeça de Montechique, the acclivity of which was very abrupt, and capable of good defence. The important operation of blocking up the road here was sufficiently simple of execution, but it was also necessary to place redoubts on the commanding positions, in order to enfilade the two paved roads leading through the pass from Torres Vedras on one side and Sobral on the other. The interval between the two principal passes was to be occupied by a good parallel road of communication for the convenience of the defenders, and this also required to be protected by strong isolated works. The next " 'pass" in order is that of Bucellas, which is of the strongest character and of the easiest imaginable defence, for the road through it runs by the side of a stream, which here forces its way through two high and steep mountains. The paved road leading into the pass, from Sobral, over the Monte Agraça, which is a very strong bulwark or mountain buttress, affords means for the most determined resistance. From Bucellas rightward, towards the Tagus, an extremely serrated or broken ridge, 1809.] THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. 277 with scarcely any interruption, runs in a direct line for two miles, until the heights fall back to the right hand, and subside into the low ground adjoining the river, which they overlook and command. There are here some features in the landscape, both in front and rear, which require to be rendered available in order to render them efficient for defence. A hill between Quintella and Villa-Longa was selected for a strong redoubt in rear, and about five miles in front a position for troops is afforded by an independent ridge beginning at the river bank, close to Allandra, and running thence by Aruda, back to Monte Agraça and Torres Vedras, at which latter place the high ground runs behind the Zizandra to the sea. This was the ground selected for strong isolated forts, which, as far as time would permit them to be completed, were to be such as should demand from an attacking enemy regular siege operations. The most advanced line occupied 25 miles in a direct course, while the interior continuous line displayed about 22 miles of front. Such an extent seemed to require for its defence nearly twice the amount of men which Lord Wellington could expect to assemble, and this, in truth, constituted the only weakness of the Lines of Lisbon. Nearly 50 miles of position with about 150 forts, and probably 600 pieces of artillery, required a large force; but the occasion was peculiar. This could not be regarded as a fortress requiring a garrison commensurate to its walls; it was rather an entrenched camp, placed upon naturally strong positions for defence, and upon so grand a scale as, independent of garrisons, to cover an army of 20,000 men, in every respect equipped for field operations. These "Lines," then, being thus far reconnoitred, appeared to fulfil all the conditions required for the protection of Lisbon, by the aid of a naval and military force combined, and it was at once recommended by Wellington to the British Government for adoption for this end and object. Although the enemy threatened no immediate movement upon the capital, yet it was resolved to commence without delay the innermost line, for protecting an embarkation, lest the French Marshals should combine and march rapidly against the British army before the outward lines could be rendered of sufficient strength in their entire extent to keep them at bay. A place was sought out near St. Juliens, at the mouth of the Tagus, for the innermost enceinte and point for embarkation of the British army, in case of disaster or discomfiture. This corner of the Peninsula is distant about 27 miles behind the pass of Mafra, and there is here a small bay about 200 yards in length, partially sheltered from the ocean, in which boats might be collected; although, under certain winds, such a sea rolls into it for days together, that often not one can be launched upon it. Accordingly, the works required to cover the embarkation of an army had to regard these three objects:-1st, protection to the entire army, with all its artillery and stores, during an uncertain period of inclement weather, with the means of at length embarking in boats; 2nd, an extent which diminished numbers might defend, should 278 THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. [A.D. gales of wind come on, after a portion only of the army had embarked; and lastly, means enabling a rear-guard to maintain itself to the last moment required. With these objects, a line of continuous epaulement was traced near the village of Ocyras, 3,000 yards in extent, which was to be raised so as to enclose an entrenched camp of a limited extent; while an outer line extended from Passo d'Arcos, on the Tagus, to the Tower of Janquera, on the coast. This latter was calculated to fulfil the first condition, and the inner one the second; but again, within this innermost enceinte, Fort St. Juliens, at the mouth of the Tagus (whose ramparts and deep ditches defied an escalade), was armed and strengthened so that, in conjunction with the Tower of Janquera, it might effectually protect the embarkation of a rear guard, should the outer defences fall into the hands of an enemy. On the opposite shore of the Tagus, another embarking place was prepared near the village of Almeda, which, at the same time, was calculated to impede the establishment of batteries to play upon the shipping from the side of Setubal, and could likewise keep open the communication of the river from the sea. Passo d'Arcos was 24 miles distant from the second "Line," and two long days' marches distant from the outer "Line" at Torres Vedras; but measures were suggested to render all the principal routes leading thence only practicable for an enemy's advance, as passing through Lisbon, where means were taken to retard the foe, in order that more time might be spared for the embarkation. The city was 12 miles in rear of Villa-Longa, 15 from Bucellas, and 12 from Montechique; but from the side of the Lorenzo river and Mafra there still remained one road leading direct to Passa d'Arcos. Two out of the four roads of access could be commanded for some distance by the ships in the river; the other approaches are narrow hollow ways open to many defensive expedients. The capital itself is of considerable size, and advantageously situated for defence and subsistence: the buildings which compose it are for the most part substantially built of stone, their doors and windows being secured with strong iron gratings, originally designed with the buildings themselves. Every encouragement was afforded to the inhabitants to avail themselves of the skill of the engineers to defend their houses; and materials to form street barricades and other impediments to the approach of an enemy's troops were provided; but care was at the same time taken that the inhabitants should not be frightened into an idea that they were to be called upon to undergo a frightful siege, or such an endurance of trials as had recently signalised and destroyed Zaragoza. A remarkable peculiarity attaching to the lines of Torres Vedras was the mountainous projection impinging at right angles on their front. This was the Serra called the Monte Junto, a lofty rocky mass stretching forward 15 miles in front of the centre, between Torres Vedras and Sobral, with the former of which it was connected by a ridge or spur, called Serra de Baraguodo. This is of so rugged and precipitous a form as to preclude the march of an army with artillery over its summit. It necessarily, therefore, divided 1809.] PERSPICUOUS MEMORANDUM OF WELLINGTON. 279 any plan of attack into two portions, and impeded the assailants very considerably in moving troops from the right to the left of their line, while the British army could move within the Lines from Torres Vedras to the Monte Agraça, and thence by Arruda to Alhandra to the succour of divisions either of the right or left by a very short flank march. Moreover, the only advance from the north of Monte Junto must cross the lower Serra de Baraguodo, which could not be passed without much delay and an exposure of force that would very much injure the operation. A most complete system of signals, under the guidance of experienced naval officers, was ordered to be established on points uniting extensive views with the greatest security, by means of which orders might be transmitted and intelligence communicated to head-quarters with the utmost celerity from the most distant points of the lines. A memorandum from Wellington to Colonel Fletcher, dated the 20th of October, and detailing the strategical principle on which he desired the co-operation of the skill of the engineers in his projected camp, is a document which for perspicuity and forethought at once places the British Commander-in-Chief in the front rank of military leaders. As in some degree contemporary with the occupation of the Isle of Lob-Awe by Napoleon, it may supply a subject of comparison between the works of these two mighty commanders. The objects of both may be stated as nearly the same, to form a placed'armée and base for future operations; but with the one it was only an expedient adopted on the spur of the moment to obtain a pied-à-terre, from which to strike a blow against his adversary, after the reverse of Elchingen; while with the other it was a wellconsidered resolve, adopted long before the arrival of any necessity, on the sound defensive principle of enabling a weaker body to restrain a stronger, - probably the most important problem of the art of war. The Lines of Lisbon may, perhaps, with greater accuracy, be compared with the ne plus ultra lines of Marshal Villars. erected at Bouchain, in 1711; although Massena did not evince the abilities of Marlborough, by drawing his adversary beyond their protection, and overthrowing him in the open field. The lines of Torres Vedras are also a perpetual monument to the honour of the skill of British engineers. Art and labour were here most judiciously exerted to improve every natural advantage, to strengthen and cover the weaker points, to diminish the length of accessible front, so as to make it more commensurate with the strength of the defending force, to facilitate the communications of troops within, and to cramp, confine, interrupt, and embarrass the movements of assailants without; in short, they were well devised to afford such power of concentration that at no single point should a division engage, but under the favourable circumstances of a strong front, secure flanks, facility of intercourse, and an open and unassailable rear. The redoubts were, generally speaking, but ramparts affording cover sufficient for guns where the fire of artillery was demanded for some specific object, and in which militia and 280 MILITARY GENIUS OF ROBERT FLETCHER. [A.D. ill-organised peasantry, or ordinanza, might fight with confidence. These, though totally unfit to act in the open field, had innate courage and patriotic desire sufficient to resist the enemies of their country, behind earthworks, and to aid in the practice of artillery against a distant enemy. The artificial defences of the lines altogether presented the most favourable example of the first application of the science of the engineer in furtherance of, though invariably subservient to, the field tactics of an army; for there was no continuity of epaulement in the entire extent of the lines requiring a single efficient brigade to be kept out of its ordinary column of march, and the army remained a compact manoeuvring body, totally independent of the fortifications. The name of Robert Fletcher, as connected with the Lines of Lisbon, deserves an immortality in military annals for the ability and diligence with which the British engineers, under his guidance, rendered a naturally strong position absolutely impregnable; so that one of the greatest generals of the day deemed an attack on it utterly hopeless, and never even seriously attempted it. Lord Wellington was too wary in his nature to trust to one obstacle in war. He had an eye not only on the resources of his own army to defend, but on the means of devising impediments and obstacles to restrain the advance of his enemy. He would not, therefore, confide in the simple enthusiasm of the Portuguese people, nor on the free promises of the local authorities, in which he had been so frequently deceived. He therefore insisted with the Regency, that his own authority, as Marshal-General of Portugal, should be independent and absolute, above all local government, in the emergency which the construction of the Lines contemplated. He required, moreover, that they should permit him to enforce the ancient military laws of the realm, by which all men were to be called upon to be enrolled to bear arms in defence of their King and country; and he also demanded that the native inhabitants should be compelled to destroy their corn mills, remove their boats, break down their bridges, lay waste their fields, abandon their dwellings, and remove their property, on whatever line of country the invaders should advance. Under these stipulations upwards of 30,000 regular soldiers, armed, clothed, and paid by Great Britain, joined the allied army under the General's standard. About 26,000 militia had, in addition, muskets and bayonets supplied to them, that they might be enabled to take the field, while a cloud of ordenanzas filled the mountains and villages. The general principle here laid down for resistance against the enemy was, that all the best troops that could be assembled should oppose his advance without risking a general action, while the irregular troops should close round his flanks and rear; and that the country through which he passed should be wasted as though the locusts of the prophet Joel had passed over it, and had left a "desolate wilder ness." |