1809.] THE ENGLISH HARD PRESSED. 271 further pursuit, and the French, therefore, rallied on their supports and re-formed. Sir Arthur now turned his view to Victor's attack, and, seeing the whole disposition of Ruffin's and Villatte's advance, sent Anson's brigade of cavalry against the former, as he was skirting the mountains. The 23rd Light Dragoons instantly charged, and Ruffin formed square to receive them, but the chasm of a dry watercourse, which was not seen from a distance, stopped the dragoons at the very moment of impingement. Many of the British chargers jumped the ditch, and the officers were followed by some of the men; but the greater part rolled over each other in horrible confusion. Colonel Seymour, in command, was wounded, but Ponsonby dashing on, after clearing the obstacle, passed through Villatte's column, when he found himself in presence of some Polish lancers and Westphalian light horse, under General Strolz. The British cavalry were unable to make any head against this well-formed body, and, being entirely broken, retreated in hot haste, leaving behind them 200 men and officers. During the progress of this attack, Victor, with Lapisse, and Latour-Maubourg, under cover of the guns, and at the head of the 16th Légère, crossed the watercourse, and pressed hard upon the English to the right of the hill, when Sherbrooke received them with a most galling and destructive fire, and here Lapisse fell dead from a musket-ball; the enemy's ranks were broken in the scuffle, and they gave way. The English Guards quitted their lines and followed the retreating French with such inconsiderate ardour that they came up with the French supporting division, and received an awful pounding from the batteries, so that they were obliged to draw back, exposing the flank of the German Legion, who were now severely pressed in their turn. and got into confusion; but at the same time the brigade Rey, of Sebastiani's corps, was also severely shaken, and obliged to fall back. Sir Arthur saw the Guards make their rash attack, and speedily ordered down the 48th under Colonel Donellan, from the hill, while he at the same time directed the light cavalry, under General Cotton, to move up to their support. This was the critical and decisive point of the battle. A close and well-directed volley arrested the progress of the victorious Sebastiani, and under cover of it the Guards rallied. The French then turned upon the 48th, but that regiment firmly stood its ground, and the Guards, re-formed, advanced with cheers to its support. The cavalry were launched forward just as the French column staggered, and this gave the British the preponderance at the decisive moment. French attack relaxed, as the British fire grew hotter, and the shouts of the latter's charge were heard along the whole line in triumph. Had the battle at this juncture been in the hands of a consummate general, Joseph's reserve might have restored the combat, and given the advantage to the French side. As it was, the enemy, foiled at all points, gathered together their columns and withdrew. It was only 6 o'clock, and Victor urged Joseph to give the order for the advance of the reserve, for Ruffin was at this time well up the valley The 272 MELANCHOLY EVENT OF THE BATTLE. [A.D. on the flank, and Villatte had but an exhausted British division before him; but Jourdain, who had from the first opposed giving battle at all, countermanded all further attacks, and gave orders to the army to retire beyond the Alberche, so that by nightfall all had withdrawn, although the fire of artillery did not cease till after dark. The loss of the British in these engagements were, Generals Mackenzie and Langewith killed, and 767 rank and file, 3 Generals, and 3,718 were wounded. On the French side 2 Generals and 944 men were killed, 6,294 wounded. The British took 10 guns, and the French left behind them 7 more in the wood. The Spaniards reported their loss to be 1,200 killed and wounded. But the saddest event of the battle was occasioned by an incident which occurred near the end of the engagement. The long dry grass with which the place was covered was ignited by the expended cartridge papers, and the whole surface of the ground became a sheet of fire. Some hundreds of wounded men, unable to crawl out of reach of the flames, were thus burned to death. Those who served in the Peninsula will remember how common an occurrence was the ignition of a vast plain, and how frequently, from the heat of the weather, the leaves and grass, parched like tinder, caught fire and blazed for weeks. General Jomini remarks on this battle of Talavera, "Cette bataille réleva au reste la gloire des successeurs de Marlborough, qui depuis un siècle avait décliné: il fut reconnu que l'infanterie Anglaise pouvait le disputer à la meilleure de l'Europe:" a most gratuitous, impertinent, and unjust assumption, as the annals of the century which has elapsed since the days of Queen Anne's triumphs would indisputably prove to any impartial reader, if it were worth the trouble. Monsieur Thiers, confusing the moral and strategic effects of the movements of other armies with the physical conflict of the two antagonists, puts in a claim for a drawn battle. Savary calls it a battle "où on perdit beaucoup de monde sans aucun résultat." Kausler freely admits the British victory, and Wedekind gives it to the French. Napoleon thought otherwise: "Cette bataille de Talavera donna à l'Empereur un chagrin qui dura plusieurs jours." It will be rather amusing to the Eng ish reader to see any doubts of a victory expressed by historians (so called). when the enemy had been foiled in their attempt to force the position, and when the allies kept the field. The campaign was, however, rather a political than a strategical operation on the part of Wellesley, and was most successful in result. It proved to demonstration that the Spanish army was not to be relied upon, and that the British must for the future depend solely on their own prowess; it also proved that they might do this very well. During the 29th-30th the two armies remained in presence; but on the former of these days General Craufurd arrived in the British camp with the light brigade from England. They had halted near Malpartida de Placentia, when the alarm caused by the Spanish runaways spread to their bivouac. The General was not of the stuff to succumb to a panic, but instantly called his men to arms, and leaving the weakest to follow as they could, he marched to the front, 1809.] RAPID MARCH OF LIGHT DIVISION. 273 with a resolution not to halt until he reached the front or ascertained where Sir Arthur might be. The troops pressed on with such goodwill, that, leaving only 17 stragglers behind, they accomplished 62 English miles in one of the hottest days of the year, in 26 hours: indeed, this body of men had marched previously to their arrival at the halting-place where they had encountered the Spaniards as many as 20 miles, so that they had made a march in reality of 80 miles in about 30 hours. The French claim, and with great justice, the faculty of making extraordinary marches, and no soldiers in the world will obey the desire of a favourite general to tax their powers to the utmost with more invincible good humour and energy than our rivals; but they have never exceeded this march of the British Light Division, notwithstanding. Reports came in from scouts that rations for about 17,000 or 18,000 men had been ordered for Soult's army, by the way of the Puerto de Baños; but Wellesley, thinking that this Marshal was not coming up in such strength, as it was afterwards discovered he was, resolved to carry his single army against him, while Cuesta undertook to watch King Joseph's army, and, should he be forced to retire, had promised to bring away the allied wounded left in hospital at Talavera. Relying on this, Sir Arthur marched the British army away on the 3rd of August, and on the 4th reached Oropesa. On the latter day Soult arrived at NavelMoral, Joseph with Jourdain and Sebastiani came up to Valdemoro, and Victor to Maquedo, so that the narrow valley of the Tagus now swarmed with troops; and thus the strategy of Wellesley's movement against Madrid afforded this additional advantage to the common cause, that all the provinces to the north and westward were free and open to the patriots to carry out their designs. Wilson had quitted the passes of the mountains on Soult's approach, and now threatened Madrid from the side of the Guadarama, while Vanegas, after occupying Toledo and Aranjuez, had even sent patroles as far as Madrid. The intrusive King accordingly sent General Sebastiani to Toledo, and ordered Marshal Victor to fall back on Sta Olalla, to drive away Wilson and his Lusitanian Legion, who, however, after the battle of Talavera, had hastily retired through the Puerta de Baños and out of Spain. 39. COMBATS AT ARZOBISPO AND ALMONACID. On reaching Oropesa, Wellesley learned that Soult, instead of only having his own division of 25,000 men, with whom he might have contended, was advancing with Mortier and Ney in company, and would soon be upon him with 50,000 men. At the same moment, Cuesta learned the same facts, having intercepted some despatches to Marshal Jourdain, and, without communicating with his colleague, he at once abandoned all his promises. Instead of holding the ground at Talavera and protecting the wounded, he fell back upon the British at Oropesa with his whole army. Wellesley once more endeavoured to concert operations with the Spanish General. It was for the last 274 JOSEPH RETURNS IN TRIUMPH TO MADRID. [A.D. time, for, finding him still impracticable and wrong-headed, he resolved to act entirely for himself, and on his own resources. He instantly collected such carts as he could, and by these means brought away as many of his wounded as he was able from Talavera, but was, nevertheless, obliged to leave 1,500 to the compassion of the enemy; and, to the credit of his adversary be it said, Marshal Victor showed them every attention and kindness, though, of course, they became prisoners of war. The next step of Sir Arthur was to send off Craufurd to Almaraz to secure the bridge from any attempts of Marshal Soult to interpose between him and the river; and he then moved his army with all expedition across the Tagus by the bridge there. As soon as the British left Oropesa, Cuesta followed them to the same place, and, having barricaded the bridge, prepared to hold it, while Wellesley traversed the mountain passes which intervene between it and Almaraz. On the 6th of August, Mortier came down to the banks of the Tagus, opposite to where the Spanish army was posted, and evinced a determination to force a passage. Having made his reconnoissances, he despatched Caulaincourt with some dragoons across a ford upon the flank of the Spaniards, who stood firm, and immediately threw themselves into square, while the cavalry of Albuquerque in line fell upon that of the French; but, in the meanwhile, a battalion contrived to break through the barricades, and the Spaniards fled in all directions, abandoning 30 pieces of cannon. Cuesta now, at the command of the Junta, relinquished the command of the army, and the task of collecting the fugitives was intrusted to General Equia, who established a trysting-place at Deleytosa on the 13th, where he was enabled to collect a force, and occupy and defend the important pass of Meza del Ebor. Vanegas, as soon as he found that Sebastiani was marching against him, retired on Almonacid, where he took up a position, flanked by an old Moorish castle, and hoped, with 30,000 men, to check any force which the intrusive King could collect against him. Sebastiani, however, marched forward almost unopposed, crossed the bridge of Toledo on the 10th in the evening, and the next morning sent forward Leval's division to attack Vanegas. Some Germans and Poles, who occupied the left of the French position, soon carried their point, while four French regiments, under Generals Dessoles and Godinot, dispersed the enemy's centre and right. The Spaniards attempted to make a stand at the castle, which was naturally strong, but they were defeated, with a loss of 6,000 or 8,000 killed or prisoners, and 16 guns. After this, Joseph returned in no small triumph to Madrid. There was no Spanish army left to harass him, and, though he was required to exchange Jourdain for Soult as Major-General, by Napoleon's order, yet he had the corps of Soult, Ney, Mortier, and Victor under his hand to bring the kingdom into subjection. The British Commander-in-Chief at this time removed to the frontier of Spain and Portugal, being resolved to have no further cooperation with the Spanish armies; and on the 3rd of September he cantoned his troops in and about Merida, an excellent position, 1809.] THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS. 275 whence he could cover at the same time Portugal and the south of Spain. The Cortes now proposed to confer upon him the supreme command of these armies, but he was unwilling to undertake the task, for, he said, "I have fished in many troubled waters, but Spanish troubled waters I will never try again." 40. WELLINGTON ORDERS THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LINES OF LISBON ON TORRES VEDRAS. The battle of Talavera having put to a practical test the value to be henceforth attached to Spanish co-operation, it became apparent to Sir Arthur Wellesley (who had just been raised to the peerage by his Sovereign for that victory, and was for the future to be spoken of by the title of Lord Wellington), that it was no longer prudent to trust to armies which were wanting in proper organisation, discipline, and skilful leaders, and fully demonstrated to be utterly inefficient against an enemy. At the same time, the state of affairs in the north of Europe, and the recent success of Napoleon at Wagram, afforded the clearest evidence that French troops would now be poured into the Peninsula with the most lavish hand, in order to insure its effectual subjugation. The contest, therefore, henceforth, manifestly depended on the British troops alone, and on the efficiency which could be thrown into the means of defensive warfare. Wellington, accordingly, sat himself down to the task of solving the mighty problem; how best to resist aggression from an overwhelming power, having regard to the facilities afforded him by the seaboard of Portugal for unlimited supplies, and for the invaluable co-operation of the naval service, whose energy and prowess might be turned to account, either to assist in offensive operations, or to cover and secure the escape of the army, if it should, in the last resort, be obliged to be carried back again to the shores of Great Britain. Lisbon was in every respect admirably adapted for the base of British military operations, situated as it is upon a magnificent estuary, capable of holding any amount of shipping. The Commander-in-Chief, therefore, concluded that his first object was to insure the defence of all the approaches upon that capital, from both Portuguese Estremadura and the Alemtejo, and to prepare the means of disputing the ground by artificial obstructions against an enemy's advance, if he should be obliged to withdraw from the open country before a too powerful force; and he deemed with great judgment, that Great Britain could here best decide the issue of the contest, which was now imminent, between his army and the hitherto irresistible legions of the French Empire. With these views, Lord Wellington, while his army rested in their cantonments on the Guadiana, repaired with his Chief Engineer, Colonel Fletcher, and his Quartermaster-General, Colonel George Murray, to make a close reconnoissance of the country on both sides of the Tagus, which covered all the approaches to the capital, and which, as extending from sea to sea, afforded the peculiar characteristic that it could |