266 CRITICAL SITUATION OF WELLINGTON. [A.D. that the enemy was in full retreat; but the British General knew better, and was now firm in refusing to quit the Alberche to move forward. The Spaniards were, nevertheless, put in motion on Sta Olalla and Torrejos, and their columns passed the river in rapid succession; but Wellesley, though he would not advance, looked most anxiously upon Cuesta's rash movement. Jomini sees in this cautious and judicious proceeding of the British General "une foible idée de son talent et de son caractère-de l'aplomb mais peu de hardiesse." Nevertheless, he finds fault with Joseph for not tempting the allied generals forward, which was the precise reason which made Wellesley pull up, and which had inspired him with alarm for Cuesta's rashness. The French were assembled behind the Guadarama stream with an army of nearly 50,000 men and 90 guns, and Wellesley, seeing the inevitable consequences of the Spaniard's presumption, sent forward across the Alberche the whole of the British cavalry, with two infantry divisions, under General Sherbrooke in support. The van of Cuesta's army was attacked, as Wellesley expected, on the morning of the 26th, and after considerable resistance was driven back in confusion, followed closely by the dragoons of LatourMaubourg. Fortunately the Duke del Albuquerque, with 3,000 Spanish cavalry, stood firm, and by a gallant charge checked the enemy in the very nick of time; for a panic had already begun to diffuse itself in the Spanish ranks. Sir Arthur, who witnessed the disorderly march of chattering assemblages of half clad, halfarmed men, now came up, and besought Cuesta to withdraw his army to Talavera, undertaking that Sherbrooke should remain to cover the movement; but Cuesta's uncouth nature again broke forth. He saw his troops beaten, dispirited, fatigued, and bewildered, yet said that his army would be disheartened by a retreat; and it was not until after much persuasion that the sullen old man yielded, turning round to his staff with the absurd remark, that "he had first made the Englishman go down on his knees." Having vented this ridiculous speech, he retired into the lumbering coach and six, which always attended his head quarters in his campaigns," leaving to the Englishman,' by virtue of his superior genius, to assume the command of both armies." Sir Arthur posted the Spanish army in two lines upon the right of the position he had assumed at Talavera, resting their flank on the town, which touched upon the river, and their entire front being covered by an extensive grove of olive and cork trees. 38. BATTLE OF TALAVERA. The British commander had not been unmindful of the very critical situation into which he had got himself by trusting too confidently to Spanish presumption, and by marching almost to the capital itself without the ordinary security for the provisioning of his army; but he saw that it would be necessary to satisfy public opinion by trying the fortunes of a battle, and examined the ground about Talavera, where he discovered a limited but very favourable 1809.] DISPOSITION OF THE BELLIGERENTS. 267 position suited to his object. It has been thought that Joseph could have done better had he awaited the movement of Soult (who was at last certainly in motion), but having advanced to, and already obtained some success at, Sta Olalla, the French army, in the early morning of the 27th, went forward and again crossed the Alberche in front of Sir Arthur's position. The allied army was situated on commanding ground of about two miles in extent, strengthened with some field works. Between it and the river lay a plain thickly covered with cork and olive, which were also scattered over the lower face of the mountain range here bordering the valley of the Tagus. The right flank rested on the town of Talavera, through which passed the high road, but this was rendered almost unapproachable by the mud enclosures of the suburb, which were occupied by the Spanish r.flemen. The left flank was closed by a mound, on which was a large field redoubt. Some unconnected hills, of moderate height, bounded the plain on the left; and on these were situated the British troops, covered in their front by a ravine formed by the winter torrents from the mountains, but at this time dry. In order to secure the point of junction where the British right touched the Spanish left, ten guns were placed in battery on the summit of a bold knoll, and behind this the British and Spanish cavalry were posted. In front of Cuesta's infantry, ditches and felled trees added something to the difficulties of an attack, and a large house, with a wood, also stood there, well placed for defence. A battery likewise covered the retreat, which could be made by the main road from Madrid to Oropesa. From the mound the British line consisted of Campbell's division, in two lines; Sherbrooke's next, but only in one line; then Mackenzie; and then Hill, who had two brigades of artillery posted in his front for the defence of an isolated hill, at which the position terminated. The French army marched in the cool of the morning of the 27th, and fording the Alberche, surprised and attacked General Mackenzie's division, which was posted at the Casa de Salinas, and had not yet got into line. Here they were without cavalry outposts, and the woods by which the enemy approached were badly guarded by the sentinels. Indeed, Sir Arthur was like to have been taken prisoner himself, for, at the moment of attack by the divisions Lapisse and Ruffin, he was in the house writing out his directions. The French charged hotly, and an English brigade, now under fire for the first time, was separated and driven back in some disorder; but Wellesley placed himself at the head of the 45th regiment, and, with some companies of the 60th rifles, kept Marshal Victor at bay, and brought the 87th and 88th regiments safely back, having called up some cavalry to cover the movement; but he lost 400 men in this encounter. Mackenzie's division then took up its allotted place in the line, and Marshal Victor rapidly advanced across the plain in fine martial order: Ruffin on the right, then Villatte, then Lapisse; while Sebastiani approached the Spanish line, and pushed forward his light cavalry to make Cuesta show his order of battle. Milhaud's light cavalry actually commenced a pistol skirmish, to which the Spaniards replied with one 268 CONFUSION IN THE BRITISH CAMP. [A.D. general discharge of musketry, when, in one instant of time, 10,000 infantry, with all the artillery, as if deprived of their senses, broke their ranks and fled; the gunners leading away their horses from the guns, and the infantry throwing away their arms, and even Don Gregorio de Cuesta himself going with them. Sir Arthur instantly brought up some British cavalry to flank them, and opened some batteries against the enemy, which were aided by the difficulties of the ground; when Cuesta, having fortunately recovered his presence of mind, sent his horsemen to head the fugitives and bring them back, but about 5,000 men never returned at all, and the great redoubt in the centre was for a long time silent for want of gunners. Marshal Victor had observed the confusion which appeared to exist in the enemy's army, and thought that a smart attack upon the left before nightfall would bring matters to an issue, and permit him and his corps-d'armée, of which he was justly proud, to gain the exclusive glory of the day. Without communicating with the King, or even with Sebastiani, he ordered Ruffin's division to make a circuitous march to their right, but to send up one regiment to attack the hill on that side, and another to press down the valley and get to the rear of the British position, while the third was to attack General Hill's right, where Villatte was to join in support; and Lapisse was to assail the British divisions rather as a diversion than seriously It was already nearly dark, but the assault was vigorous; at intervals, voices were heard through the dusk calling out not to fire, for that they were of the German Legion. Thinking that at this late hour it was but some English stragglers, Hill with his Brigade- Major Fordyce rode forward, and in a moment found himself in the midst of the French. Fordyce was killed by the first fire, and Hill's horse wounded; indeed, a grenadier had seized the General's bridle, but he disengaged himself from the man's hold and galloped off to the 29th regiment. Considerable sections of the enemy had even got into the English lines; some crying out that they were Spaniards, others Germans This night contest was carried on with acrimony, and often hand to hand with the butt ends of the muskets. General Donkin had at first gallantly repulsed the attack with his brigade, and the 48th had poured in some telling volleys, but he was at length obliged to give way, and one French regiment actually reached the top of the hill. General Hill, however, arrived in the nick of time with the 29th, which he led up the height, and poured in a volley, followed by such a charge that the enemy could not sustain the shock, but fled in all directions. When the summit was thus happily recovered, the 48th again went forward, and Donkin presented so formidable a front that the 9th French regiment, which made another attempt to ascend, was attacked front and flank and repulsed with little difficulty. The regiment sent up the valley had found obstacles there that they did not expect, so that the whole having failed in their several attacks, the French retired with one of their regiments perfectly cut to pieces. Their loss was estimated at 1,000, and the British loss was nearly 800 men. Both sides now lay down in their bivouac; but about mid 1809.] RENEWAL OF THE BATTLE. 269 night the silence was interrupted on the side of Talavera, not by a straggling desultory fire, but by several rolls of musketry. Sir Arthur started up, but when he recognised that it proceeded from the Spaniards, expressed a hope that they would do as well whenever they should be really attacked. As he heard no return fire he soon concluded, what turned out to be the truth, that some false alarm had disturbed the valorosos, and he turned in to rest again. Nothing daunted, however, Victor recurred to his attack at 5 in the morning, by inverting the previous order of attack. He, however, informed the King of his intention, and requested that Sebastiani might be ordered to move at the same time against the enemy's centre. He sent forward two regiments, which had taken no part in the first attack, and which advanced at a rapid and steady pace. Ruffin prepared to assail the hill. while Lapisse opened fire against the German bigade of Sherbrooke's division. They were well received on the acclivity by the brigades of Tilson and Richard Stewart. Wellesley saw, however, that Lapisse was this time up in force to assist Ruffin's attack, and therefore sent forward some troops of Sherbrooke's division to bear upon their flank. A tremendous fire of 50 guns covered the advance of the French column, to which fire no adequate answer could be made, for the English guns were few and of small calibre. The Commander-in-Chief, therefore, sent to Cuesta for some assistance, and he sent up two Spanish guns. These were immediately so placed as to bear effectively upon the enemy, and did excellent service, the Spanish gunners fighting them gallantly. Soon the charging shout of the British soldiers was heard above the din and roar of musketry and cannon, and the enemy's troops were seen to go down the hill once more into the ravine below. The energy of the fire and charge which were directed against the French attack soon obliged them to return to their lines. In this conflict Hill was wounded in the shoulder. It was now about 10 o'clock when the King and Marshal Jourdain, with Victor, met and discussed what step had better next be taken. Jourdain urged the propriety of waiting the arrival of Soult, before they again assailed the British position, and Victor was opposing this council, when a message arrived to say that it was impossible for Marshal Soult to come up in the rear of the British army before the 3rd of August. Reports also came in that the van of Vanegas's army had passed Toledo and was in march on Aranjuez. It was therefore resolved that a vigorous and simultaneous attack, forth with, from right to left, should be made on the entire allied position. Orders were therefore issued, and steps immediately prepared to carry out the resolve. A small stream flowed through part of the battle field, and, during this cessation of hostilities, the heat of the weather and the weariness resulting from the night attack, induced many soldiers from both armies to meet at the rivulet for a refreshing draught. The men approached each other fearlessly, and, like good comrades, interchanged their canteens and wine flasks. Suddenly the bugles and drums sounded, and the soldiers jumped up to return to their respective regiments, but not before they had grasped each 270 DISPOSITIONS OF THE FRENCH ATTACK. [A.D. other's hands, and spoken a somewhat unintelligible adieu. Wellesley made efficient use of the interval allowed him between these attacks for, perceiving, that the enemy was evidently determined to bear with his principal force on the hill and valley on his left, he now determined to prolong his left flank across the valley, and thereby bring the high ground beyond the valley into his line of defence. He accordingly posted a Spanish division of infantry on the lower ascent of the Sierra de Montelban beyond the rivulet. At this period of the day, the Duque del Albuquerque had induced General Donkin to carry a letter to Wellesley, warning him that his colleague, Cuesta, was no better than a traitor. Sir Arthur received the letter with the utmost coolness, and drily replied, "Very well, General, you may go back to your brigade." The dispositions of the French attack were soon completed. Ruffin was this time to take his division across the valley, and to move by the foot of the mountains, so as to turn the British left — Villatte following him was to menace the little hill with one brigade, and to guard the valley beyond with the other. Lapisse's division was to follow in support, having Latour Maubourg with Mortier's brigade of cavalry, and the whole under Victor, were to make a vigorous effort on the hil, and to assail Sherbrooke's division to their right of it. The remainder of the cavalry, under General Beaumont, was directed to support this attack. The King's reserve was to place itself in the centre, in order to act as might be required, and Sebastiani with the whole of his corps-d'armée was to fall upon the Spanish army in the centre. It was about 2 o'clock in the day before the French went forward to the attack according to these dispositions. Heavy clouds of dust on every side of the horizon made it evident that their columns were again advancing in force. Covered by a swarm of sharp-shooters, they came successively into view, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, from the summit of the hill, had a clear sight of the whole field of battle, and readily comprehended the plan of attack. Sebas tiani came first into action, advancing against the mound in the centre, on which was the redoubt already spoken of, with the usual impetuosity of French soldiers. Here they had to encounter the British division of General Campbell, assisted by Mackenzie's brigade and two Spanish battalions. A German brigade of General Leval came suddenly and unexpectedly upon some Spanish cavalry, and rapidly formed square to receive them, but their leader, De Porbeck, being killed, the cavalry regiment was hastily withdrawn. The brigade Belair advanced to the left of the mound, came in collision with a mixed force of English and Spanish; and the brigade Rey, on the other side, fell upon one of Campbell's regiments with infinite fury. Regardless of the French skirmishers, the British charged past them with loud shouts, drove the enemy before them, and, affording them no respite, broke their opposing front and lapped their flank with fire. The French were driven back under a battery of a dozen guns, which Campbell at once assailed and carried, but would not break his line by any |