1809.] EVACUATION OF ZUID-BEVELAND. 261 left to maintain possession of Walcheren, the remaining force of 28,000 men was to be rendered applicable to the redaction of the forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoeck, each of considerable strength, mounting 40 pieces of heavy cannon, and now strongly garrisoned Since the 19th, symptoms of an alarming fever had already become apparent in the British camp, occasioned probably by the miasma arising out of the inundation of the country round, which had been caused by the cutting of the dykes by order of General Rousseau, and it had caused already some anxiety. At length, on the 26th, the head-quarters of the army were moved to Fort Bahtz, where the "St. Domingo," with the flag of the Admiral, and the frigates, still remained. On the evening of that day a council of war was there held, which determined, as such councils commonly do, that the enterprise had better be abandoned, for not only was the sickness increasing daily but that the enemy were now fully on the alert, and had collected a force of 30,000 men, who had surrounded themselves with all the preparations for a resolute defence; that Admiral Mi-siessy's fleet was already in perfect security at Rupelmonde, five miles above Antwerp; and that, therefore, the further object of the expedition were no longer attainable. Orders were accordingly given for the evacuation of Zuid-Beveland, and by the 4th of September no troops were left within any of the mouths of the Scheldt, except a garrison sufficient to defend Walcheren. On the 14th, Lord Chatham, preceding the army, arrived in England, where he was received with very great dissatisfaction. The French threw every bitter sarcasm on this very costly expedition, nor were the British backward in their denunciation of it. Every sort of ridicule and odium was thrown upon the Government who had sent it out; and, what was worse, it was kept in the recollection of every family in the land for an entire generation, by the effects of the well-remembered Walcheren fever. The troops were not entirely withdrawn from Walcheren until towards the end of the year, when the healthy season was commencing. Then the basin, arsenal, and sea defences of Flushing having been destroyed, this ill-fated expedition came to an end on the 23rd of December, having scarcely encountered an enemy, having lost one-half of its original numbers from sickness, having effected nothing, and having cost the nation twenty millions sterling! Napoleon was not satisfied either with the commission given to Bernadotte by the Minister of War, or by his administration of the trust reposed in him, and sent Marshal Bessières to supersede him, who re-established the batteries and made many ineffectual attempts to employ them against the ships and land detachments of the British, during the continuance of their occupation of the island, but without serious results. The wits of Paris, among other charges against Lord Chatham, declared of him "de s'ètre occupé presque exclusivement de sa santé, et du soin d'avoir de bon bouillée de tortue au lieu de se livrer aux détails de l'expédition qui lui était confiée." The English wits gave vent to their displeasure in the following epigram : : 262 IMPROVED PROSPECTS OF SPAIN. [A.D. "The Earl of Chatham, with his sword drawn, The Walcheren Expedition and the Coruña Retreat did more to injure the military reputation of England upon the Continent than the well-fought triumphs of Alexandria, Maida, Coruña, Vimiero, and Talavera could counterbalance. This has been, in truth, a great injustice to the British. The Germans and Russians, who think more of military prowess from the numbers of an army than from its intrinsic worth, have evinced little freedom of thought and independence in their military opinions, in which they have absolutely succumbed to those of French writers. Cowed by the crushing exploits of Napoleon, and dazzled by the brilliant success of his arms, they have adopted, in almost every case, the French estimate of the prowess of other nations, and sought consolation for their own disasters in gloating on the shortcomings of England; not regarding her wonderful exertions, naval and military, against the common enemy. 37. PENINSULAR WAR. Since the commencement of the year a material improvement had taken place in the prospects of the Spanish nation. Marshals Soult and Ney had been compelled to abandon completely both Portugal and Galicia, and a supply of money had been transmitted to the patriots by their South American brethren. Napoleon, after his reverse at Essling, had neither time to attend to Spanish affairs nor men to spare to reinforce his armies in the Peninsula; and a British army was silently gathering strength for a new swoop, which even threatened to endanger the French possession of Madrid. At this period the several French armies were distributed as follows: Marshal Victor, with about 23,000 men, had, after the seizure of the bridge at Alcantara, advanced into Beira, and had even pushed forward his outposts as far as Castello Branco, but hearing that a British force, under General Mackenzie, was at Sobreira-formosa, and that Soult had been driven from Oporto, he determined to cross the Tagus and return to Merida, where the castle had been already threatened by a division of Cuesta's army and which he only just reached in time to relieve. A corps of 18,000 men, under Sebastiani, still held La Mancha; 10,000 were in the neighbourhood of Madrid, under direction of the intrusive King and Marshal Jourdain; 40,000 were in Arragon and Catalonia under Generals Suchet and St. Cyr, fully occupied by the persevering energy of the patriot generals; Kellerman, with a division of cavalry in Old Castile, kept the communications open between the north, where Soult, Ney, and Mortier had amongst them 60.000 men, and the centre and east of the kingdom, which altogether contained an equal number. The Spanish army of Cuesta comprising 33,000 men, occupied the left bank of the Tagus, and held the bridge 1809.] BOLD STRATEGIC PLAN OF WELLINGTON. 263 of Almarez; 18,000 men, under Vanegas, opposed Sebastiani in La Mancha; De la Romagna was in Galicia with 15,000, and Blake in Valencia with 20,000. The British army, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, had now accumulated to 22,000 men, who were concentrated in the vicinity of Abrantes, but were not in the very best order. Much sickness and a great deal of insubordination and lack of discipline required them to be held stationary for a while to recover their organisation; nearly 5,000, indeed, were in hospital, but the behaviour of the soldiers had been so bad, that many were in confinement, and many had even abandoned their regiments and given themselves up to an independent course of rapine and licentiousness. The opinion of the Commander-inChief is a very humiliating one as recorded in his despatches to the Government :-"I have long been of opinion that a British army can bear neither success nor failure." In honest truth, however, all armies are alike in this respect. The license of a period of war, when everyone with arms in his hands can do what is right in his own eyes; when a man is spoiled by the adulation of success, and embittered by the privations of defeat, offers the same experience in every nation; and this is the moment when the efficiency of good officers and non-commissioned officers is most tested, when, indeed, a national characteristic is most displayed. If those in authority are sordid, corrupt, profligate, immoral, unprincipled, an armed force goes hopelessly to the bad; but when officers are highminded, well-principled, honourable men, military disorders are soon repaired, and, as in Wellesley's army, they are of very short duration. There was, however, an evil of very great magnitude pressing on the General at this moment. There was no money in the military chest. His operations were, therefore, by these concurrent causes impeded for a considerable period; for he could not get on without money, and instead of listening to his urgent demands for it, the British Government was employing all its pecuniary resources in the expedition to the Scheldt, which ought not to have been thought of, if the credit at its disposal was not at the same time equal to the demands of the war in the Peninsula, which had the first and most imperative claim upon the national resources. Between the Douro and the Tagus there are but two lines by which an army can advance upon Madrid: the one by Salamanca, the other by Castello Branco. The whole country intervening between these two main communications is one impracticable Sierra; and even these roads, the latter by Coria and Placentia, on Talavera, the former by the Puerto de Baños, on the Guadarama, offer many strong and difficult positions, if defended by a resolute enemy. Public feeling in England being decidedly opposed to the opinion entertained by Sir John Moore, that no confidence was to be placed in any co-operation of the Spanish armies, Sir Arthur Wellesley was induced to open the campaign by a bold and comprehensive strategic plan, which was to offer the right hand of fellowship in thorough good faith to the Spaniards, whether politicians or generals, and to advance, in concert with the army of Don 264 UNDECIDED MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH ARMY. [A.D. Gregorio de Cuesta, against Marshal Victor's intervening army and upon Madrid. The Spanish authorities having undertaken to supply ample provisions for the British troops on the line of march, he implicitly relied upon their promises, and broke up his cantonments near Abrantes, without any itinerant commissariat of his own. On the 27th of June, directing his march on Placentia, by Castello Branca, Zaza Mayor, and Coria, he calculated that the beating he had given Soult had disqualified that army from assuming the offensive, but he was ignorant of the orders which Napoleon had sent out of Germany, directing the Marshal to assume the supreme command of the two corps of Ney and Mortier, and to advance with the whole force united on the flank of the British army. To effect this object, however, it was first necessary for the French Marshal to lay siege to Ciudad Rodrigo, the possession of which would open a direct means of cutting off, through a descent by Placentia on Almaraz, all retreat of the allied army out of Spain. Soult at once proposed to the intrusive King to lay siege to this fortress with a view of forcing Wellesley to withdraw out of Spain; but Joseph thought it of more importance to protect Madrid. Napoleon, however, judged as Soult had done, and wrote from Schönbrunn, "Wellesley will probably advance by the Tagus upon Madrid; in this case, pass the mountains, fall upon his flank and rear, and destroy him." The possibility of such a step was present to the mind of the British Commander, who had directed Beresford to move on Almeida and to co-operate with the Duque del Pasque, who was in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo; and Wilson, who was in the Gredos mountains with the Lusitanian Legion, was appointed to guard the defile of Baños and to watch the Col de Perales. He had, however, at this time the incontestable evidence of a General Franceschi, who had been taken prisoner by the Guerillas, that Soult had not quitted Zamora on the 30th of June. While, therefore, the army remained at Placentia from the 8th to the 13th of July, Sir Arthur Wellesley thought it prudent to concert measures with the army with which he was to co-operate, and therefore repaired to the Spanish head-quarters at Puerto Mirabete, to have an interview with Cuesta. He found the General sullen, obstinate, haughty, and impracticable, in no degree concealing his natural arrogance and the supreme contempt in which he held the English General. Wellesley however, after much trouble, induced him to promise that his army should be amply provisioned on the line of advance agreed upon, and immediately on returning to his head-quarters he issued orders for a forward movement on Madrid. While the British army rested at Placentia no decided indication had been given of the future intentions of its leader. He there covered Almaraz as well as Ciudad Rodrigo, and thus watched every point of junction of the French armies, but as soon as he moved forward to Oropesa, where he joined Cuesta on the 20th, he exposed his left flank. On the 24th, 25th, and 26th, the French forces began to concentrate. Marshal Victor now warned the 1809.] DISCORD CREATED BY CUESTA'S OBSTINACY. 265 intrusive King at Madrid that not only might the capital be threatened by Wellesley and Cuesta, but that Vanegas was marching against Sebastiani on the site of La Mancha. Marshal Jourdain forthwith advised Joseph to collect all the forces he could assemble, and advance to meet the allied army in his front, which was supposed to number 60,000 men, exclusive of the corps of Vanegas, namely, 26,000 British and 36,000 Spanish. The army of Victor was estimated at 22,000 bayonets, and the garrison of Madrid could spare about 5,000 men, including the King's guard. A request was despatched to Soult for the aid of the corps of Marshal Mortier, consisting of 18,000 or 20,000 good old soldiers, stationed at Villa Castin, two or three marches from Toledo; but Soult had already ordered Mortier to march to Salamanca; and King Joseph, having refused him the co-operation of the armies of Arragon and Catalonia, was afraid of insisting on a countermand of Mortier's march, lest he should incur the displeasure of the Emperor, who had, as stated, appointed Soult to the supreme command of the French troops in the north of Spain. Joseph, however, ordered Sebastiani to move quickly through the province of Toledo, to the support of Marshal Victor, which made the French army amount to 45,000 excellent troops. Very shortly after Wellesley had effected the junction of his army with that of Cuesta, the ill-will and wrong-headedness of the latter produced open discord. The English General complained that the needful supplies for his army had not been forthcoming, and he informed Cuesta that, unless furnished with the articles which he had vainly and repeatedly demanded, he would not march another league in advance of his own resources. The old Spaniard replied tha: the British army was unreasonable in requiring more than was deemed amply sufficient for the Spanish; and Sir Arthur, unwilling to retire from the prospect of a successful inroad, acceded, but with an ill grace, to this unsatisfactory retort. Marshal Victor now withdrew behind the Alberche, and the allied army advanced to Talavera de le Reyna, where it took up a joint encampment on the 22nd. Wellesley, with his accustomed vigour, now proposed to attack Victor next morning, but Cuesta, from constitutional indolence and the effect of age, declared that he was not ready. The French Marshal, accordingly, was enabled to withdraw unopposed towards Toledo a strategic point of considerable importance, as it brought him into immediate communication with the corps of Sebastiani. Wellesley now addressed a further communication in writing to urge Cuesta to unite in an attack, but without effect; and the next day he saw incontestably that the time for action was passing away, for he received information that Soult was concentrating his army in the rear, while King Joseph, in the front, was uniting all his strength to reinforce Victor. At length, however, being assured by the Spanish officer commanding the outposts that the French were withdrawing their artillery, and induced by the paltry ambition of being the first to enter Madrid, Cuesta changed his mind, and proposed an attack on the 25th, assuring Sir Arthur |