1808] EMBARRASSING POSITION OF GENERAL JUNOT.

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peasants, concentrated in the valley of the Mondego. The Lieutenant-General then proceeded by sea to the mouth of the Tagus, where he consulted Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, in command of the British fleet off that port. The information he here obtained was that the enemy's position in the neighbourhood of Lisbon was so strong that it was not practicable to effect a landing in that quarter, and he, therefore, resolved to return in the "Crocodile," to meet the fleet of transports, and disembark then, midway between Oporto and Lisbon, at Mondego Bay. There was no place to the northward of Lisbon better suited for disembarkation except Peniche, where was a strong fort, occupied by the enemy, which could not be taken with. out heavy ordnance; but the fort of Figueras, at the mouth of the Mondego, had been already taken possession of by the partisan Zagalo, and was now occupied by a detachment of British marines. On the 1st of August, the troops commenced landing there, and as the last brigade disembarked, on the 3rd, the division of General Spencer arrived from Cadiz most opportunely, and came to anchor the same day. This reinforcement raised the effective strength of Wellesley's army to 12,300 men.

The moment he set his foot on shore, Sir Arthur proceeded to hold a conference with General Bernardin Freire, in command of the Portuguese force at Montemor Velho, in order to discuss a plan of future operations. The British General's sagacity soon discovered, notwithstanding the pompous accounts given him by the Junta, that no reliance whatever was to be placed on the Portuguese Government, for, instead of finding the supplies which had been promised, the magazines, prepared for the British army at Leyria, had been seized by the Portuguese General, who further demanded of the English General that he should undertake to subsist his troops, most obstinately refusing to move from Leyria, if he would not do so. Sir Arthur, therefore, proposed to Freire to send him the Portuguese cavalry and about 1,000 Cacadores, who, he engaged, should fare equally with the British, and the Portuguese General was then to be left to carry on such independent operations as he might think proper. Accordingly, a small division of 1,400 infantry and 260 dragoons joined the British army. The General-in-Chief was obliged, under these circumstances, to arrange his movements with much circumspection, and, before commencing his march, saw the necessity of collecting for himself means of transport sufficient for the march of his soldiers into the field.

General Junot had, from the very first moment of his arrival in Portugal, found himself in a situation of danger and embarrassment. He had made himself personally obnoxious to the people of Lisbon by contumely and exaction, and had exasperated the clergy in a manner that acted with telling force on the bigoted community under their influence; but the French General had not been insensible to the dangers arising from the proceedings on the Spanish side of the Peninsula, and adopted every precaution against his army being surprised or surrounded like that of Dupont. He divided the French force under his command, amounting to an

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[A.D.

effective strength of 45,000 men, into three corps of infantry and one of cavalry: the first was commanded by Laborde, the second by Loison, the third by Travot, and the cavalry by Margaron. All the fortresses of the kingdom were at this time in his possession, and were everywhere in perfect repair, garrisoned and provisioned. Kellerman had the military superintendence of the Alemtejo, Maurice of the Algarves, and Quesnel of the North, while the Marshal maintained his head-quarters in the capital. He received, in June, the orders of the Emperor to send one corps into Galicia, to the support of Marshal Bessières, and another to assist Dupont in Andalusia. The Spanish contingents, however, which were sent to both corps revolted, and joined the patriot armies. Junot, by his personal activity and vigour, prevented Caraffa's division in Lisbon from following their example, for he sent the 4,500 men composing it to be confined in hulks upon the Tagus. The news, that a British army had effected a landing in Mondego Bay, reached Lisbon on the 2nd of August. Junot, in anticipation of such an arrival, had warned the commanders of the different corps under him, and the division under General Laborde, consisting of 5,000 bayonets and 500 sabres, with five pieces of artillery, marched to the encounter at once of the British; but the French Marshal now ordered General Loison, with 7,500 men and six guns, to come up quickly from the Alemtejo and strengthen Laborde's division; then collecting all the detachments he had with him in Lisbon, he proceeded with them to take the field in person.

19. COMBAT AT ROLIÇA-BATTLE OF VIMIERO.

On the 8th Wellesley marched, and on the 9th his advance entered Leyria, to prevent, if possible, the junction of Loison and Laborde. On the 11th, he reached that city with his whole force, and succeeded in this object; for the former finding the British before him at Leyria fell back on Santarem, through Torres Novas, while Laborde, not knowing where his colleague might be, advanced to Batalha, but afterwards fell back to Obidos, and thence on the 16th to Roliça. The heat was very oppressive, and the French were so exhausted with it that Loison was compelled to remain at Santarem two days to recover them. The rival troops first came to blows on the previous day, when some men fell in a skirmish, and Obidos was occupied after a trifling resistance; but the position taken up by Laborde at Roliça was a good one, though he had a very inferior force to contest it against his antagonist, unless Loison should come up. The French General was therefore placed in a situation that required no small exercise of personal intrepidity ; but animated by the danger, encouraged by the advantages the position offered, and justly confident in his troops, he resolved to abide his adversary's assault. About 7 in the morning of the 17th the British general marched against him from the town of Obidos with 14,000 men and 18 guns, in three columns of attack; the riflemen being detached right and left to keep up the communication between them. Hill, with his brigade, and 1,200 Portuguese, under Colonel Trant,

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moved on the right of the valley to make a long détour to turn the enemy's left. The left, under Ferguson, consisting of his own brigade and that of Bowes, with 6 guns, advanced up the hills under the expectation of meeting Loison, whose arrival at Rio Major had been ascertained, and at the same time to render the heights at Roliça untenable. The centre, under Wellesley himself, consisting of the brigades of Beresford, Nightingale, and Fane, with two batteries of guns, moved along the high road against the enemy's front. The French general seeing this disposition, retired by the passes into the mountains with the utmost regularity and the greatest celerity, and fell back under a cannonade to the rocky heights between Columbeira and Zambugeiro. This retrograde movement so lengthened the march to Ferguson and Trant's columns that they were too distant to be of service, so that the centre was forced to a direct unsupported attack against the new position, where Laborde received them with great gallantry. The advantage of superior numbers was thus lost to the British, for only 4,000 men could be thrust into the fight, and the assailing columns were so crowded in the ascent by narrow pathways that the attack lost all its ensemble. The defence of the formidable position was desperate. The French general was himself wounded at the commencement of the affair, but never quitted the field. He was, however, unable to maintain his ground alone against the great force to which he was opposed. But, nevertheless, he made his retreat in good order and with resolution, for Ferguson's column now coming on his right flank, he gradually drew away his troops from the left, although in so doing the 9th and 29th fell upon him, against whom he made three most gallant attacks, in one of which Colonel Lake, of the latter regiment, fell. The action lasted from 9 in the morning till 5 in the afternoon, and cost the French 3 guns and 600 men. The British loss did not exceed 500. The manœuvre of General Loison at Roliça was, to employ a modern slang word, extremely dodgy. His object was to afford time for a junction with Laborde, and he was also wishful to learn the amount of his adversary's force. He therefore retired slowly before the British from Olidos to the heights behind the village of Roliça, whence he could see Wellesley's army; but, as soon as he perceived Ferguson marching to outflank him, he fell back to Zambugeiro, where he could withstand any disparity of force. He also by this little retreat obliged Ferguson, who had made the circle to outflank him at Roliça, to make another to outflank him at Zambugeiro, and having thus obtained time, he then, protected by his cavalry, made a timely retreat. It was not his fault that he did not reap all the advantage of this delay. The want of cavalry and the nature of the ground, intersected with deep ravines and covered with low brushwood and gum cistus, prevented this first success of the English from being as complete as it might have been.

Junot, having made all his arrangements at Lisbon, left General Travot in charge of the capital, which he quitted on the 16th of August, carrying with him three battalions and a regiment of

VOL. II.

I

114

THE POSITION AT VIMIERO.

[A.D. cavalry, with 10 guns and plenty of ammunition, together with the military chest. He came up at Torres Vedras with Laborde, and was soon after joined there by Loison. The former general was not followed after to Roliça, as well for the causes named already as that Wellesley had intelligence that a large fleet of transports was in sight off the coast. Instead, therefore, of following the high road in pursuit of the French, he marched close to the shore to cover the landing of these reinforcements, and moving forward towards Lourinka for this purpose, he, on the evening of the 19th, took up a position beside the village of Vimiero. The same night the brigades of Anstruther and Ackland safely came to shore, and were marched up to join Sir Arthur on the 20th, which increased his force most opportunely to 16,000 men and 18 pieces of artillery. Thus reinforced, Wellesley resolved on an advance upon Lisbon. He was, however, expecting every hour to be superseded in his command, for, such was at this period the deplorable ignorance of the British Cabinet of military organisation, that no less than three senior generals-Moore, Burrard, and Dalrymple-were nominated to the actual command, and each or all of these might be expected to arrive every moment. In the night of the 20th, one of them, Sir Harry Burrard, did arrive, and Sir Arthur went on board the frigate in Maceira road to report to, his superior officer. He explained to him that Marshal Junot was in his front with 14,000 good soldiers, 23 guns, and a powerful cavalry, but that he had projected a march for that very night to turn the French left and gain Mafra, without assailing the strong ground of Torres Vedras. Sir Harry, however, forbade the projected march, because he had reason to expect the reinforcement under Sir John Moore; and any reason for delay has always a sufficient influence upon incompetence. What sort of commander would this have proved, who could sleep on shipboard when the enemy was in pursuit of his army? Wellesley showed him the utter impossibility of remaining quiet where both armies now stood, and explained that any delay would give Junot the advantage of the initiative; but Sir Harry was not to be convinced, although he would not land and assume the command. At the very moment of this colloquy the French were in motion, and, after a tedious night's march, they appeared at 7 in the morning within four miles of the British outposts.

The position at Vimiero was a steep mountain ridge, resting its right upon the sea, and trending on the left hand towards a plateau on which the village of Vimiero was situated. A ridge of less elevation continued on the other side of a ravine or dry bed of a rivulet. Junot, whose impetuous character was too impatient to make any reconnoissance, saw that the British left was lower and less occupied than their right, and at once ordered his cavalry, under General Margaron, to march by the road to Lourinka to turn the position on that side, while he directed Brennier and Laborde, supported by Loison and a reserve of grenadiers under Kellerman, to assail the lower elevation of the position, paying no attention whatever to the higher ground. Wellesley detected this error, and

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denuding the lofty ridge of all that occupied it, except one brigade under General Hill, he sent away the four other brigades which had been posted there across the plain to the left-hand ridge, while the Portuguese, under Trant, were despatched to the extreme left to watch the Lourinka road. These movements, made along the chord of the arc by which the French moved, were concealed by the form of the ground from the French Marshal's observation, and this accession of force had, in fact, already reached its ground before the attack commenced. The whole of the position about Vimiero is so broken and wooded, that the approach of the French, led by Laborde, could not be clearly discerned before they burst upon the British centre. The advance, under Brigadier Thomière, forced its way with great vehemence and power, but could not get through the British line, where they were well received by the brigade of Fane, who, observing that the guns could act well from the place he occupied, ordered up Colonel Robe with the reserve artillery to strengthen the brigade of six guns already on this platform. Such a shower of shell and grape now fell upon the advance as might have been sufficient to stop any troops; nevertheless, Thomière pushed up the hill, but on the summit he found the 50th regiment, who checked his advance and drove him down again. Anstruther's troops on Fane's left had equal success, so that Laborde called up Kellerman's reserve. These were met by the 43rd, who encountered them in the churchyard of the village with ringing shouts, rushing in a solid mass upon the enemy, whom Robe's artillery had already terribly disconcerted, and driving them by the bayonet in irrecoverable disorder. A French chef-de-bataillon here fell covered with wounds, and Colonels Foy and Prost of their artillery were severely wounded. A flank attack was opportunely made upon the retiring French column by the brigade of Ackland, who drove the enemy, under Brigadier Charlot, before them, close to the very foot of the plateau. Towards noon Junot, seeing that he could not pierce the centre, sent forward the brigades of Brennier and Solignac of the division Loison, to turn a ravine which led to the English left: this ground, full of rocks and hollows, was difficult to traverse, so that when they emerged from it in some disorder, they were encountered by Brigadier Ferguson with the 36th, 40th, and 71st, who came down upon them with a counter attack, so fierce, so rapid, so well sustained, that Solignac fell badly wounded, and his men, deprived of his command, were forced into low ground on their right and lost six guns. The troops who retained the ground were soon afterwards attacked by the brigade Brennier, who beat them back and retook the guns, but in the struggle that ensued the French general himself was made prisoner, and his brigade obliged to retreat again with great loss.

The French, to whom, at this period of the war, anything like defeat was an amazement, were retiring from these attacks when Colonel Taylor, at the head of 400 men of the 20th dragoons and Portuguese cavalry, came sweeping down the plain, and actually had taken prisoner the chef-de-bataillon, Palamède de Forbin, when he was encountered by Margaron's horse, who drove the allied cavalry back