The Federalist, on the New Constitution, Band 1George F. Hopkins, at Washington's Head, 1802 |
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Seite 13
... will be necessa- ry to recommend men to offices under the national govern- ment , especially as it will have the widest field for choice , and and never experience that want of proper persons , which THE FEDERALIST . 13.
... will be necessa- ry to recommend men to offices under the national govern- ment , especially as it will have the widest field for choice , and and never experience that want of proper persons , which THE FEDERALIST . 13.
Seite 14
and never experience that want of proper persons , which is not uncommon in some of the states . Hence it will result , that the administration , the political councils , and the judicial decisions , of the national government , will be ...
and never experience that want of proper persons , which is not uncommon in some of the states . Hence it will result , that the administration , the political councils , and the judicial decisions , of the national government , will be ...
Seite 24
... that they would place us exactly in the si- tuation in which some nations doubtless wish to see usin which we should be formidable only to each other . From From these considerations , it appears that those persons are 24 THE FEDERALIST .
... that they would place us exactly in the si- tuation in which some nations doubtless wish to see usin which we should be formidable only to each other . From From these considerations , it appears that those persons are 24 THE FEDERALIST .
Seite 25
From these considerations , it appears that those persons are greatly mistaken , who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be formed between these confedera- cies , which would produce that combination and union of wills ...
From these considerations , it appears that those persons are greatly mistaken , who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive might be formed between these confedera- cies , which would produce that combination and union of wills ...
Seite 51
... PERSON , had they not contrived a kind " of constitution , that has all the internal advantages of a 66 republican , together with the external force of a mo " narchical government . I mean a CONFEDERATE repub- 26 LIC . " This form of ...
... PERSON , had they not contrived a kind " of constitution , that has all the internal advantages of a 66 republican , together with the external force of a mo " narchical government . I mean a CONFEDERATE repub- 26 LIC . " This form of ...
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The Federalist Or the New Constitution Alexander Hamilton,James Madison,John Jay Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2015 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
Achæans admit advantage America appear appointment articles of confederation aulic council authority bill of rights body Britain causes circumstances citizens civil list commerce common confede confederacy congress considerations considered convention councils danger defence degree duties effect equal execution exercise existing experience extent faction favour federacies federal government force foreign former Greece happen happiness important individuals influence instances interests jealousy jurisdiction latter laws legislative legislature less liberty Lycurgus Macedon means ment military establishments militia Montesquieu national government nature necessary necessity neighbours New-York NUMBER NUMBER objects occasion operation particular parties passions peace political possess power of taxation principle probable proper proportion proposed constitution propriety provision PUBLIUS reason regu regulation render republic republican require requisite respect revenue rience safety situation society sovereign sovereignty Sparta spirit stadtholder standing armies SUBJECT CONTINUED suppose taxes tion treaties union United usurpation vernment
Beliebte Passagen
Seite 60 - Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests ; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.
Seite 260 - Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of revising the articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall, when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union.
Seite 295 - No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
Seite 294 - Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.
Seite 167 - That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament, is against law; 7.
Seite 278 - The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens...
Seite 1 - It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.
Seite 86 - They formed the design of a great confederacy which it is incumbent on their successors to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them.
Seite 252 - If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their off1ces during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior.
Seite 251 - It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the People of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution ; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government.