In a subsequent Executive Order,23 President Roosevelt warned all officials of the Government, whether civil, naval, or military, not only to observe all obligations of neutrality during the present war between Japan and Russia, but "also to abstain from either action or speech which can legitimately cause irritation to either of the combatants." This proclamation is said to have produced a good effect in Russia and to have somewhat allayed the feelings of irritation of the Russian Government and people against the United States. Although doubtless an act of wisdom and discretion on the part of our President, this additional proclamation was not necessary from the point of view of our international obligations, and it can hardly be said to have been binding upon the majority of those to whom it was addressed.

If the United States and Great Britain can show a remarkably clear and consistent record in the performance of their neutral duties during the Russo-Japanese War, the

and The Netherlands. Denmark and Norway-Sweden also strictly limit the supply of coal in neutral waters. In Norway-Sweden a number of ports and fjords were entirely closed to the entry of belligerent warships. For the various Neutrality Proclamations issued after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, see House Doc. of the 58th Congress, 3rd session (For. Rel.), pp. 14-36, and Revue Générale de Droit Int. Pub., t. XI (1904), Documents, pp. 1-18.

It seems always to be assumed in current discussions that these rules are part and parcel of International Law. Where modern governments as well as the general public are willing to take such advanced ground, it would seem to be unbecoming for publicists to lag too far behind. This is especially true of the rule limiting the supply of coal in neutral ports. In view of the supreme importance of coal under conditions of modern naval warfare, there can scarcely be any question but that a very limited supply only should be furnished to belligerent vessels at neutral ports. But this subject will be discussed more fully in a subsequent chapter. See infra, ch. 7.

23 Printed in House Doc., 58th Congress, 3d Session (For. Rel.), 1904, p. 185.

same can scarcely be affirmed of Germany and France.

The

complaints which were directed especially against Germany will be discussed in the next chapter.24

CHAPTER III

THE CONSTRUCTION, SALE, AND EXPORTATION BY NEUTRALS OF WARSHIPS, SUBMARINES, AND OTHER

VESSELS Intended for Belligerent SERVICE

The charges against Germany raise some very difficult and delicate questions which are inseparably connected with a great historical controversy. The most important of these charges are that the German Government failed to prevent (if, indeed, it did not, directly or indirectly, encourage) the sale to Russia of a number of transatlantic steamers belonging to its Auxiliary Navy, and that it permitted the exportation overland of torpedo boats to Russian territory.

Soon after the beginning of the war the charge was freely circulated in the newspapers, and was even made on the floor of the German Reichstag,' that the Russian Government had purchased several vessels (notably the Fürst Bismarck, of the Hamburg-American Line) belonging to a great German transatlantic line, whose vessels are auxiliary cruisers of the German Navy. In reply to the strictures of Herr

'By Herr Bebel, the famous leader of the Socialists. See N. Y. Times for April 15, 1904. For other reported sales, see, e. g., London Times (weekly ed.) for April 15 and May 13, and N. Y. Times for May 11. It was also reported that Japan had bought eight steamers belonging to the North German Lloyd Co., but this report was officially denied by the Japanese Government. It seems certain, however, that a considerable number of auxiliary cruisers of the German Government belonging to the North German Lloyd and the Hamburg-American Companies were purchased by Russia, equipped in Russian ports, and sent out to prey upon neutral commerce in the summer of 1904.

Bebel, who maintained that "such sales accomplish indirectly the reinforcement of the Russian Navy," Chancellor von Bülow is reported to have claimed that, "according to the principles of International Law hitherto prevailing, the sale of the vessels of a private firm to a foreign state was admissible." "At any rate," he declared, "the question is a doubtful one." He admitted that "the principle of neutrality forbids a neutral state from giving direct or indirect support to either belligerent through furnishing ships for war transportation purposes." However, "in the case of the Russian transports, it was not to a state, but to private firms that the vessels were sold. There could not be any question of taking sides against Japan, since she also had full liberty to buy vessels from Germany."

3

It was also charged on the floor of the German Reichstag, as well as in the newspapers, that the German Government permitted the exportation overland of a number of torpedo boats and destroyers for the use of the Russian Navy. It was charged that, for the purpose of disguising these transactions, "the several parts of the vessels are being exported as half-finished manufactures and put together in Libau, Russia," whither a large number of German workmen had been sent. It was also asserted that these submarine boats were originally built for the German Government, which refused to take them because the terms of the contract (i. e., the stipulations as to time limit) under which they were built had not been strictly observed.

It appears, however, that Germany was not the only coun

*For reports of these somewhat puzzling utterances, see N. Y. Times and Chicago Tribune for April 15, 1904.

'By Herr Bernstein, the anti-Bebel Socialistic leader. See, e. g.. N. Y. Times for May 5, and editorials in N. Y. Tribune for May 14 and Hartford Courant for May 5.

try in which Russian agents were busy in making and soliciting contracts for the purchase or construction of vessels for the use of Russia in the war, but that Japanese agents were similarly active in other countries as well. Germany seems, however, to have been the most flagrant offender in these respects.

It was reported early in June, 1904, that Russia had ordered five armored cruisers to be built at Trieste, but this report was afterwards contradicted by the Vienna correspondent of the London Times. Russia was also said to have purchased a number of fast cargo vessels in England, with a view to their alteration for use as transports, and Premier Balfour publicly justified such sales. At a meeting of a section of the London Chamber of Commerce held on August 25, 1904, he said: "There can be no doubt that merchant ships may be sold by neutrals to any government, and that that government may turn these ships into cruisers if they please.'

It was also stated that several new battleships had been ordered by Japan in England prior to the beginning of the war, and that these were in process of construction' in April, 1904. Several new ones are said to have been ordered later in the year. In May, 1904, the Russian and Japanese Governments were reported to be in sharp competition for the purchase of transports in Holland and Belgium, and repeated and persistent rumors were current to the effect that

'Chicago Tribune, June 1, 1904.

'N. Y. Times, May 28, 1904.

'London Times (weekly ed.) for Sept. 2, 1904. Premier Balfour admitted that one of the vessels bought by Russia was a British ship. 'Chicago Record-Herald, April 10, 1904.

N. Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1904.

'N. Y. Times, May 25, 1904.