THE CONSTRUCTION, SALE, AND EXPORTATION BY NEUTRALS OF WAR- RUSSIAN SEIZURES OF NEUTRAL MERCHANTMEN-THE RIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR INTRODUCTORY THE CAUSES OF THE WAR In his history of the Hannibalic War, Polybius carefully distinguishes between the real or fundamental causes of the struggle and the overt acts or events leading up to that great conflict. He justly remarks that we should look for real causes in the "motives which suggested such action and the policy which dictated it." But in order to explain fully the fundamental causes of the Russo-Japanese War, it would be necessary to analyze carefully the foreign policies of Russia and Japan and to investigate the motives which suggested these policies. This would involve an exposition of Russian and Japanese political and economic aims and ambitions as illustrated by a complete history of Russian and Japanese expansion, more particularly of the Russian advance to the Pacific and the repeated efforts of Japan to obtain a preponderance of influence in, if not a positive control over, the (affairs of Korea. For such an exhaustive discussion the writer has neither the requisite knowledge nor sufficient space at his disposal. The reader of this volume must, therefore, be content with a brief sketch or outline of the underlying issues at stake between Japan and Russia. 'Polybius (Shuckburgh's trans.) III, 6. For Japan, except possibly in Korea, these issues appear to be economic rather than political in their nature. They are to be found in the "enormous increase of her population"; the "immense growth of her trade and industries"; the slow progress of her agriculture, which is "no longer able either to support her increased population or to produce enough raw articles for her manufactures"; the consequent need of new sources of supply, as well as an outlet or field of colonization and economic enterprise for her surplus population; and finally, the need of "an increased importation of raw material and foodstuffs and an increased exportation of manufactures."2 Japan's interests in China-probably the most important stake in this war—also seem to be primarily economic rather than political. They are apparently based on a desire for trade advantages, the gaining of which involves, under present conditions, the maintenance of the principle of the open door in China, or the policy of equal economic opportunity for all nations. This in turn involves, as a means to that end, the preservation of the territorial sovereignty or integrity of China; for if that country be dismembered or partitioned into "spheres of interest" or "influence," it might eventually fall a prey to the systematic commercial exploitation and exclusive protective systems of the several Powers exercising political influence or control in the regions acquired by them. The interests of Russia in the Far East, on the other hand, appear to be primarily political rather than economic, and are, therefore, less vital than those of Japan. Russia is still The above citations are from the Introduction to Dr. Asakawa's excellent work entitled The Russo-Japanese Conflict, pp. 1-8, passim. They are probably political only in a negative sense, i. e., as opposed to aggressive political designs on the part of any other Power. essentially in the agricultural stage of her development, and, in an economic sense, she is largely sufficient unto herself. Speaking broadly, it may be said that she produces what she consumes and consumes what she produces. Her "economic interests are, even in Manchuria, rather for her glory as a great expanding empire than for any imperative need of trade and emigration in that particular part of her Asiatic dominion; while similar interests of Japan, primarily in Korea and secondarily in Manchuria, are vital, as they are essential for her own life and development as a nation." A mere glance at the globe will suffice to show how greatly the history of Russian expansion has been influenced by her geographical situation. Ever since the days of Peter the Great, who first discerned the possibilities of the future, the foreign policy of Russia has been largely controlled by a desire to obtain access to the sea in four directions, viz.-the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Pacific Ocean. Her desire for the control of the Baltic Sea has been but partially realized, owing to the maritime rivalry of England, Germany, and Sweden; after several failures she finally secured a foothold on the Black Sea, but her successive attempts to obtain control of Constantinople and the passageway of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean have been frustrated by the interference of the Powers, more particularly of England, who has also restrained her from ob 'Asakawa, op. cit., p. 48. The truth of the former part of the above statement is shown by the fact that, while Russia's vested interests in Manchuria are enormous, her commercial success there has been remarkably small. Such apparent success as she obtained in Manchuria was due to the protective and exclusive policy of the Russian Government and to the artificial stimulus which was furnished by the building of railways and the activity of the Russo-Chinese Bank. See recent works on Manchuria, especially Weale, Manchu and Muscovite, passim. CULTIVAS I IMPRUTIA WHIMS |