sequently appeared that, about two hours before her departure, (which occurred at 2 o'clock in the morning,) a number of persons, some of whom appeared to be seamen and some mechanics, had arrived by railway, and gone on board of her. On the day following that on which she sailed, the agent for the steamer told the collector of customs that she had munitions of war on board. At the time of her departure, there was nothing whatever to connect her with the Georgia, which had sailed three days before, under her original name of the Japan, from Greenock, for Point de Galle and Hong-Kong, and of which nothing was known to the customs officers at Newhaven or to the Government; nor does there appear to have been anything which would have warranted the customs officers in detaining or interfering with the Alar. No information had been received, nor was there any fact within the knowledge of the Government or their officers, until she had already sailed, indicative of any thing hostile to the United States in her employment or destination.

80. The Shenandoah, which likewise sailed from England without armament, took it on board in Portuguese waters, near to the Madeira Islands. The steamer Laurel, by which it was conveyed thither, had sailed from Liverpool with a regular clearance for Nassau and Matamoras.3 There was nothing whatever to connect her with the Shenandoah, which had sailed on the previous day from the port of London for Bombay, under her original naine of the Sea King, and of which nothing was or could be known to the customs officers at Liverpool, nor to the Government. It appears that some suspicion had been excited in the mind of the United States consul at Liverpool as to the Laurel; but the suspicion was that she was intended to become a Confederate cruiser or privateer. He had, as he said himself, no evidence, and he made no representation to any officer of the Government. Nor does there appear to have been any ground of belief or suspicion which would have war ranted the customs officers in detaining or interfering with her. Of her real errand nothing whatever was known, until the receipt of intelligence from the British consul at Teneriffe. Her Majesty's Government is not aware that any claim has ever been made by the United States against Portugal, on the ground that the Shenandoah was converted into a ship of war within Portuguese territory.

81. The Florida is the only vessel of which it is alleged that she was armed in British waters. The circumstances stated on this head in certain affidavits, which, more than two years afterward, were for the first time produced by the United States, and which the British Government has no means of verifying or disproving, were as follows: That before the Florida (then known as the Oreto) sailed from Nassau-which she did after having cleared as a merchant-steamer, and with a very small crew, hired in the port-a schooner called the Prince Alfred had put to sea, apparently with the design of running the blockade, and freighted with some guns and ammunition as cargo. There was nothing whatever to connect her with the Oreto, which was then lying in the har bor, after having been released by the judge of the proper court from seizure under the charge previously made against her, but not substantiated, of violating the Foreign-Enlistment Act. There does not ap pear to have been any circumstance within the knowledge of the local authorities to direct special attention to the cargo of the Prince Alfred, to disclose her errand, or to furnish a reason for detaining her. No com

British Case, p. 123; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, p. 405.

2 British Case, pp. 136-141; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, pp. 477-490.

3 Appendix to British Case, vol. i, pp. 492, 493.

Appendix to Case of United States, vol. vi, p. 556.

British Case, p. 67; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, p. 85.

plaint or representation respecting her seems to have been made by the consul of the United States at the time, nor until about a month afterward.' It is stated that while at sea she was overhauled by the Oreto, (or Florida,) and that the two vessels then proceeded to Green Cay, where the cargo of the Prince Alfred was transferred to the Florida. If this was so, it was certainly a violation of British territory by both vessels. But it was a violation which furnished no proof of negligence on the part of the local authorities, still less of the British Government, which was the party wronged and not the wrong-doer. Green Cay is a small island at a considerable distance from Nassau, uninhabited, and visited only by fishermen.2 Violations of neutral territory committed by a belligerent in remote and unfrequented places, where no effective control can be exercised, were never before imputed to a neutral Government, as permitted or allowed by it in breach of its obligations toward the other belligerent. Over such a dominion as the Bahamas-which consist of several hundred islands, scattered over a wide surface, most of them desolate and uninhabited, and some merely small rocks or islets -no Government in the world could reasonably be expected to exercise such a control as to prevent the possibility that acts of this kind might be furtively done in some part of its shores or waters.

82. It is suggested, on the part of the United States, that the arms finally put on board of the Florida had previously been transported to Nassau from Hartlepool in the steamer Bahama. No evidence of this is produced by the United States. But, if it were true, the facts placed before the arbitrators by the United States themselves clearly prove, that the purpose, to which the Bahama's cargo was intended to be applied, was unknown alike to the British government and to the officials of the United States in England. By the latter it was believed to be destined for a confederate port, and intended to run the blockade.3 The Florida herself did, in fact, go into and re-issue from a confederate port before she began to cruise against the shipping of the United States.* 83. It has thus been made clear that all the arms and munitions of war which were sent from ports within the Queen's dominions, in order to be used in arming confederate vessels, were shipped as in the ordinary course of commerce; that the purpose to which it was intended that they should be applied was not known to the British Government or its officers; that they had no means of knowing, and no reason even to suspect it. Hence, if it were possible to suppose that any obligation to prevent the shipment of cargoes destined for such a purpose was incumbent on a neutral Government, there would be no just ground for imputing negligence on that score to the Government of Great Britain. But no such obligation in fact existed; and the facts above stated appear to show that the effectual discharge of any such obligation would ordinarily be impossible to a neutral Government, unless by the total and indiscriminate prohibition of the export of arms and munitions of war. The second rule of the treaty of Washington is directed, not against proceedings of this kind, but against the use of neutral territory as a base of operations for naval warfare, or for the renewal or augmentation. of military supplies or arms to ships employed, or intended to be employed, in the war-service of a belligerent, with the consent, or by the sufferance, of the neutral Government.

Appendix to British Case, vol. i, p. 87.

2 Ibid., vol. i, p. 90; vol. v, p. 20.

3 British Counter Case, p. 74; Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. vi, pp. 222,.

223.

4

British Case, p. 67; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, p. 73; Case of the United States, p350; Appendix to ditto, vol. iv, p. 458.

84. The tribunal may be here reminded that even the fact that any particular vessel was freighted with arms and munitions of war would not of necessity be known to the officers of the customs before her departure, and would probably be unknown to them if the parties concerned in the shipment had any motive whatever for not disclosing it. Unless where an exemption was claimed from customs duties otherwise payable, or a remission of import duties already paid, the law did not require that any statement or specification of the particulars of any cargo should be furnished to the officers of the revenue before the sailing of a ship. The specifications, being required only for the compilation of the statistical returns from the various ports, might be furnished at any time within six days after clearance. Nor were there any means of ascertaining, otherwise than by the statement of the master or owner, to what port a vessel was destined, or of guarding against the contingency that, having cleared for a specified destination, she might change her course when at sea.1

Charge that the crews of certain vesels were partly com

posed of British sub

jects.

85. It is suggested, on the part of the United States, that the crews of all or some of these four vessels were in part composed of British subjects. If that fact could be proved, it would not impose any liability on Great Britain. If, indeed, the British government had given permission to one of the belligerents to enlist men in Great Britain, for either its military or naval service, this might have given just ground for remonstrance and complaint to the other belligerent, especially if the latter were refused a like privilege. But it is not pretended that anything of this kind occurred. If, again, a vessel of war of either belligerent had been suffered, by connivance or acquiescence on the part of the authorities of a British port, to increase her strength in the port by adding to her complement of men, this would undoubtedly have been a proper subject of complaint under the general principles of international law, as well as under the second of the three rules. But nothing of this kind has been proved. It may be assumed to be true that, in the cases of the Alabama and Georgia, a considerable number of seamen were induced to leave England with an intention, on the part of the persons who induced them to go, that they should afterward be solicited to enlist in the naval service of the Confederate States, and that many of these did afterward enlist in that servive; and it may probably be true that some of them knew or suspected that they would be invited to do so. But the facts show that (unless, perhaps, in one or two individual cases) no proposal to take service under the Confederate Government was made to them until they were at a distance from England; that persuasion was then used to induce them to join, by promises of high pay and prize-money; that some consented and others refused; that the latter were sent home, and the former signed fresh articles and entered into a new engagement and a new service. In every case the same course appears to have been pur sued. Sailors were hired in England for an ordinary mercantile voyage, in the hope that they might afterward be won over, when at sea, by large promises, and by appeals, which it might well be thought would not be addressed in vain to men of careless, roving, adventurous habits. In fact, however, this expectation was in no small measure disappointed. The crew who went out on board the Oreto (afterward the Florida) lodged complaints before a magistrate at Nassau, on the ground that there had been a deviation from the voyage for which they were hired; they thus obtained their discharge from the ship, and a fresh crew were afterward hired at Nassau, who refused to sail because they had doubts

1 See British Case, p. 57.

about her real character and intended employment. The crew by which she was manned during her cruise was hired at Mobile. With respect to the crew of the Alabama, it appears from Clarence Yonge's affidavits, produced on the part of the United States, that, after the vessel had put to sea, he was directed to "circulate freely" among them and "induce them to go on the vessel" after she should get to Terceira.3 Many men when, after arriving at Terceira the new proposal to join was actually made to them refused, and were sent back to England. Of the seamen who went on board of the Japan (afterward the Georgia) and the Alar, a considerable proportion-twenty-four at the least-refused in like manner to join the confederate service, when invited to do so, the vessels being then in French waters. Of the crew of the Sea King (afterwards the Shenandoah) only three or four yielded; and these, it was stated, were under the influence of liquor. Forty-two refused, although tempted by the most profuse offers and far from home.

86. It is clear that acts and contrivances of this kind on the part of a belligerent, although the netral power may regard them as injurious to itself, and as tending to endanger its friendly relations with the other belligerent, do not, even when partially successful, give to the latter any claim against the neutral.

87. It came to the knowledge of the British Government during the civil war that endeavors were being made to induce British subjects to go in considerable numbers to the United States, nominally to be employed in making railways or other works of a like kind, but really with the intention that, when there, they should enlist in the United States Army. Her Majesty's Government does not attribute these endeavors to the Government of the United States, nor hold that Government responsible for them. They were made, however, and they partially succeeded, as was known to and admitted by the Government of the United States.7

88. Efforts have been made, on the part of the United States, to prove that the Shenandoah was enabled to ship a considerable addition to her crew at Melbourne by the connivance or culpable negligence of the colonial authorities. This charge is one which, from its nature, would require to be supported by the clearest evidence. But it has not been so substantiated; on the contrary, it is disproved by the facts.

The accusations on this head, contained in the Case of the United States, have already been answered in detail in the British Counter Case, (pages 94–100,) to which Her Majesty's government would refer the Tribunal as affording also a sufficient reply to the further observations contained in the Counter Case of the United States. The physical obstacles which delayed the repairs of the Shenandoah have been fully

British Case, p. 65; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, pp. 46, 49; Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. vi, p. 264.

2 British Case, pp. 67, 78; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, pp. 116-125; British Counter Case, p. 79.

3

Appendix to British Case, vol. i, p. 220; vol. ii, p. 221; Appendix to Case of United States, vol. vi, pp. 432, 438.

See Redden's affidavit; Appendix to British Case, vol. i, p. 210; Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. vi, p. 423.

See Affidavits of Thompson and Mahon; Appendix to British Case, vol. i, pp. 412– 415; Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. vi, pp. 511–515.

British Case, pp. 136-141; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, pp. 477–481, 485–490; Appendix

to Case of the United States, vol. vi, pp. 566-571.

7

Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. i, pp. 270, 281, 533, 590; vol. ii, pp. 406, 460; vol. iv, p. 248.

explained', and the peculiar difficulties under which the Colonial authorities labored, from the absence of any British vessel of war, and the impossibility of exercising an efficient control over the shipment of men from different parts of the Bay. On the other hand, the active vigilance enjoined upon and exercised by the authorities, the examination of the vessel by Government officers before permission to repair was given, the daily reports furnished to the Governor of the progress of the repairs, the stringent course adopted toward the commander of the vessel in order to obtain the arrest of the men who were discovered to have gone on board of her, and the prosecution and punishment of those of them who were amenable to the law, all show the determination of the Governor and his advisers to prevent any violation of neutrality so far as it was in their power to do so. Such was, in fact, the impression originally made by the report of their proceedings upon the mind of Mr. Adams, as shown by his letter to Mr. Seward of the 12th April, 1865.2

The United States have, in their Counter Case, (Sec. VIII, par. 4.) questioned the accuracy of the observations made at page 160 of the British Case as to the composition of the crew of the Shenandoah, and as to the statements made by a man named Temple on the subject. The correspondence which took place at the time on this point will be found at pages 691-724 of the first volume of the Appendix to the British Case, and will, Her Majesty's Government believes, amply bear out all that has been said in the British Case. It will be seen from the list annexed to Temple's affidavit (page 701) that the composition of the crew was as stated, and from the police report (page 714) that Temple himself admitted that a considerable portion of his own affidavit was false. 89. Stress has been laid, in the Case of the United States, on the alleged facts that the vessels in question were built and prefederate agencies in pared for sea under the superintendence of Bullock, who was an agent of the Confederate Government, or some other agent of that Government; that the armament sent out for them was also procured and sent out under Bullock's orders, and that the officers and men drew their pay through a firm of merchants in Liverpool.

Charge as to ConGreat Britain for war purposes.

Although most of the evidence adduced in support of these allegations is of little value, and they rest even now, to a considerable extent, on conjecture and suspicion, there is little doubt that, as to some of the vessels, they are substantially true. But it cannot be admitted that, if true, they impose a liability on Great Britain.

90. It is to be observed, in the first place, that the information on which the United States now rely was not, at the times with reference to which the question of due diligence has to be determined, in the pos session of the British Government; much of it had not even been ac quired by the Government of the United States. Of Bullock's employ ment, and of the facts that he was an agent of the Confederate Government, and that he had anything to do with the contract for building the Alabama, the British Government, up to the time of the departure of the Alabama, and until long afterward, had no proof beyond such statements-unsupported by anything which could properly be called evidence-as were contained in the depositions furnished by Mr. Dudley and Mr. Adams, in relation to that vessel, a few days before she sailed."

The paper referred to in the Counter Case of the United States, as showing that the repairs to the machinery of the vessel were not commenced until she had bee fourteen days in port, gives also the reason of the delay, viz, that they could not be effected until the vessel was placed upon the slip. This latter operation had been delayed by the state of the weather and tides. Appendix to British Case, vol. i, PP.

529,530.

2

Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. i, pp. 641, 642.

3 British Case, pp. 87-89, 92, 95; Appendix to ditto, vol. i, pp. 189-192, 195.