Abbildungen der Seite

Sect. XIII. Of the Connexion between Senfa

tion and Organization, . - . 150 Sect. XIV. Of the Principles of Human

Nature according to the Scriptures, 153 Sect. XV. Of the Divine Effence, according

to the Scriptures, - - : 173 Sect. XVI. Of the Arguments for the Being

and Perfections of God, on the System of

Materialism, . - - 186 Sect. XVII. Observations on personal Iden

tity with respect to the future. State of Min, - . - - - 194 Sect. XVIII. Of the Origin of the popular

Opinions concerning the Soul, .- 206 Sect. XIX. A View of the different Opinions that have been held concerning the Divine Essence, especially with a view to the Doctrine of Immateriality, - 215 Sect. XX. An Account of the different Opi

nions that have been maintained concerning the Soul,

. 232 Part I. The Opinions of the Heathens and Jews, 233 PART II. The Opinions of the Christian Fathers to the sixth Century,

- 245 PART III. The State of Opinions from the sixth

Century to the Time of Descartes, .- 251 Part IV. The State of Opinions from the Time of Descartes to the present,

257 Sect. XXI. A brief History of Opinions, con

cerning the State of the Dead, 271 Sect. XXII. An Account of Opinions concerning the sentient Principle in Brutes, 281


The History of the Philosophical Do&trine con

cerning the Origin of the Soul, and the Na

ture of Matter, - - 289 The INTRODUCTION, containing the Outlines

of the Philosophical Doctrine concerning the

Origin of the Souls of Men, @c. 291 Sect. I. Of the Indian, or the proper Ori

ental Philosophy, - -, 302 Sect. II. Of the Religion of the ancient Per

fians and Chaldeans, - - 315 Sect. III. Of the Introduktion of the Oriental

Philosophy into Greece, - 317 Sect. IV. of the Mixture of the Oriental and

Greek Philosophy with Christianity, 326 Sect. V. Of the Influence of the Philosophical

System on the Christian Doctrine concerning

the Person of Christ, - 347 Sect. VI. General Arguments against the

Pre-existence of Christ, - : 356 Sect. VII. Of the Opinions that have been

held concerning Matter, and their Influence with respect to Christianity, - 388




ADVERTISEMENT. -. The less metaphysical reader may, without any inconvenience, intirely omit the three first sections of this work, and begin with section IV. For whatever be the essential properties of matter, man, according to the doctrine contended for in this work, is wholly composed of it, and his hope of a future life is only derived from revelation.






Í EST any person should hastily misap

prehend the nature, or importance, of the questions discussed in this treatise, or the manner in which I have decided for myself with respect to them, I shall here state the several subjects of inquiry as concisely, and with as much distinctness; as I can, and also inform the reader what my opinions concerning them really are.

It has generally been supposed that there are two distinet kinds of substance in human nature, and they have been distinguished by the terms matter and spirit. The former of these has been said to be possessed of the property of extension, vizi of length, breadth, and thickness, and also of solidity or impenetrability, but it is said to be naturally destitute of all powers whatever. The latter has of late been defined to be a substance intirely. deftitu t'e of all extension, or relation to Space, so as to have no property in common with matter; and therefore to be properly immaterial, but to be possessed of the powers of perception, intelligence, and self-motion,


Matter is that kind of substance of which our bodies are composed, whereas the principleof perception and thought belonging to us is said to reside in a spirit, or immaterial principle, intimately united to the body; while the higher orders of intelligent beings, and especially the Divine Being, are said to be purely immaterial. .

It is maintained in this treatise, that neither matter nor Spirit (meaning by the latter the fubject of sense and thought) correspond to the definitions above-mentioned. For that matter is not that inert substance that it has been supposed to be; that poieers of attraction or repulsion are necessary to its very being, and that no part of it appears to be impenetrable to: other parts. I therefore, define it to be a substance poffeffed of the property of extension, and of powers of attraction or repulsion. And fince it has never yet been asserted, that the powers of sensation and thought are incompatible with these (solidity, or impenetrability only, having been thought to be repugnant to them) I therefore maintain, that we have no reason to suppose that there are in man two substances so distinct from each other, as have been represented

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