It is likewife maintained in this treatife, that the notion of two fubftances that have no common property, and yet are capable of intimate connection and mutual action, is both abfurd and modern; a fubftance without extenfion or relation to place being unknown both in the fcriptures, and to all antiquity; the human mind for example, having till lately been thought to have a proper prefence in the body, and a proper motion together with it; and the Divine Mind having always been represented as being, truly and properly omniprefent. It is maintained, however, in the SEQUEL of this treatise, that fuch a diftinction as the ancient philofophers did make between matter and fpirit, though it was by no means fuch a diftinction as was defined above (which does not admit of their having any common property) but a diftinction which made the Supreme Mind the author of all good, and matter the fource of all evil, that all inferior intelligences are emanations from the Supreme Mind, or made out of its fubftance, and that matter was reduced to its present form not by the Supreme Mind itself, but by another intelligence, a peculiar emanation from it, has been the real fource of the greatest corruptions of true religion in all ages, many of which remain to this very day. It is here maintained, that this fyftem of philofophy, and the true fyftem of revelation, have always been diametrically oppofite, and hoftile to each other; and that the latter B 2 can can never be firmly established but upon the ruins of the former. To promote this firm establishment of the fyftem of pure Revelation, in opposition to that of a vain and abfurd phil:fophy, here shewn to be fo, is the true object of this work; in the perufal of which I beg the candour and patient attention of the judicious and philofophical reader. It may not be unufeful to obferve, that a distinction ought to be made with respect to the relative importance and mutual fubordination of the different pofitions contended for in this treatise. The principal object is, to prove the uniform compofition of man, or that what we call mind, or the principle of perception and thought, is not a fubftance diftinct from the body, but the refult of corporeal organization; and what I have advanced preliminary to this, concerning the nature of matter, though fubfervient to this argument, is by no means effential to it: for whatever matter be, I think I have fufficiently proved, that the human mind is nothing more than a modification of it. Again, that man is wholly material is eminently fubfervient to the doctrine of the proper, or mere humanity of Chrift. For, if no man has a foul diftinct from his body, Chrift, who, in all other refpects, appeared as a man, could not have had a foul which had exifted before his body; and the whole doc trine trine of the pre-existence of fouls (of which the opinion of the pre-existence of Christ was a branch) will be effectually overturned. But I apprehend that, fhould I have failed in the proof of the materiality of man, arguments enow remain, independent of this, to prove the non pre-existence of Chrift, and of this doctrine having been introduced into chriftianity from the fyftem of Oriental philosophy. Laftly, the doctrine of neceffity, maintained in the Appendix, is the immediate refult of the doctrine of the materiality of man; for mechanism is the undoubted confequence of materialism. But whether man be wholly material or not, I apprehend that proof enough is advanced that every human volition is fubject to certain fixed laws, and that the pretended felf-determining power is altogether imaginary and impoffible. In fhort, it is my firm perfuafion, that the three doctrines of materialifm, of that which is commonly called Socinianifm, and of philofophical neceffity, are equally parts of one fyftem, being equally founded on just observations of nature, and fair deductions from the scriptures; and that whoever fhall duly confider their connection, and dependence on one another, will find no fufficient confiftency in any general scheme of principles, that does not comprehend them all. At the fame time, each of thefe doctrines ftands on its own independent foundation, and is capable of fuch feparate B 3 demon demonftration, as fubjects of a moral nature require, or admit. I have advanced what has occurred to me in support of all the three parts of this system; confident that, in due time, the truth will bear down before it every oppofing prejudice, how inveterate foever, and gain a firm eftablishment in the minds of all men, SECTION SECTION I. Of the Nature and effential Properties of MATTER. IAM forry to have occafion to begin thefe difquifitions on the nature of matter and Spirit, with defiring my reader to recur to the univerfally received rules of philofophizing, such as are laid down by Sir Ifaac Newton at the beginning of his third book of Principia. But though we have followed these rules pretty closely in other philofophical researches, it appears to me that we have, without any reason in the world, intirely deserted them in this. We have fuffered ourfelves to be guided them in our inquiries into the causes of particular appearances in nature, but have formed our notions, with refpect to the most general and comprehenfive principles of human knowledge, without the leaft regard, nay, in direct contradiction, to them. And I am willing to hope, that when this is plainly pointed out, the inconfiftency of our conduct in thefe cafes cannot fail to ftrike us, and be the means of inducing the philofophical part of the world to tread back their steps, and fet out again on the fame maxims which they B 4 have |
