tion of fiats in bankruptcy in the country, at such place and in and for such district as her Majesty, with the advice of her privy council, shall be pleased to direct." Now the warrant states, that "a fiat in bankruptcy directed to her Majesty's Court of Bankruptcy for the Leeds district was duly awarded and issued against Francis Ward,” “and whereas the said Francis Ward did on," &c., "surrender himself to me, Martin John West, Esq., one of the commissioners of the said Court authorized to act in the prosecution of the said fiat," &c. This, it appears to me, is a sufficient statement that the commissioner so acting, was duly authorized to act under the act. It is urged, however, that as section 70 enables the commissioners to make "general rules and orders for regulating the forms of proceeding," "and the practice to be observed in every Court authorized to act in the prosecution of fiats in bankruptcy;" and as they have made certain orders by which every fiat directed to a district Court is to be allotted by ballot to one of the commissioners, and to be prosecuted before him, except in his absence, when it may be taken before the other commissioner; that therefore it should have been alleged that the fiat in the present case was allotted to this commissioner, or that he was proceeding in the absence of the other. It appears to me, however, that these rules do not interfere with the jurisdiction conferred by the act of Parliament; and that they are merely regulations for the arrangement of business among the commissioners themselves. The other objection was, that it was not sufficient for the warrant merely to state generally, that the "answers of the said Francis Ward are not, nor are any of them, satisfactory to me, the said commissioner;" but that it should have specified which answers were unsatisfactory; and the case of In re Hadland (a) was relied on in support of this objection. That case, however, supposing it to be still an (a) 1 Dowl. 835, N. S. 1846. Ex parte 1846. Ex parte authority after the decision to which I shall presently advert, is distinguishable from the present. There the statement in the warrant was, "several of which answers not being satisfactory, and particularly his answer to the last question;" and I there said, that that was not enough, for it was impossible to see which of the answers the commissioner thought were, and which were not, satisfactory. They might have been utterly irrelevant, and then nothing would have remained but the answer to the last question, which though perhaps sufficient, if it had stood alone, formed only part of the ground of commitment; and for that reason I then discharged the prisoner. That case, however, came under the consideration of the Court in Ex parte Dauncey (a). There the warrant stated generally "which said answers, so given,” &c., "not being satisfactory to us," &c., "these are, therefore," &c. Now, that case strongly resembles the present; and if there be any distinction it is in favour of the latter. If I could see that the commissioner ought to have required further explanation, or that he had come to a wrong conclusion, it might be some ground for requiring that the matter should be reconsidered. But the Court should always be slow in interfering in cases like the present, where the manner and the occasion of giving the answer may go some way to render it satisfactory, or otherwise. And, in the present instance, upon looking at these answers, I think the commissioner had good reason to consider them unsatisfactory. It is said that some of the answers cannot, from the nature of them, be unsatisfactory, particularly the introductory answers; but I do not think the sufficiency of particular and isolated answers can invalidate the warrant. Taking them all together, the result seems to me to be that the bankrupt had not given satisfactory answers to the questions. Rule refused. (a) 4 Q. B. 668; S. C. 3 G. & D. 640. 1846. In re BULL. for a habeas necessary that should make and sign the THIS was a rule calling upon William Burge, Esq., one On motion of her Majesty's commissioners in bankruptcy, acting under corpus: Held, a fiat issued against William Bull; the official and trade that it is not assignee under, and the solicitor to, the fiat; the sheriff of a bankrupt the county of York, and the keeper of the gaol of the castle of York; to shew cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not issue, to bring up the body of the said William Bull; or why the said William Bull should not be discharged out of custody, as to his commitment by virtue of a warrant of the said William Burge, Esq., without issuing the said writ. It appeared upon the affidavit upon which the rule nisi was granted, that William Bull was a prisoner in the gaol of York Castle, under a warrant of commitment under the hand and seal of William Burge, Esq., one of the commissioners of the Court of Bankruptcy for the Leeds district. The warrant recited a fiat against Bull, directed to the Court of Bankruptcy for the Leeds district, under which he had surrendered to William Burge, Esq.; that he had been examined, and upon his examination had made the answers set out in the warrant, after having subscribed the declaration required by the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 48. It then set out several adjournments and examinations, at each of the latter it stated that "the said William Bull having again made and signed the declaration required in the statute," and concluded, "which answers not being satisfactory to me, the said commissioner," &c., "these are therefore to require you," &c.: requiring him to be kept in prison "until such time as he shall submit himself to me, the said commissioner, or to any commissioner of the said Court, and full answers make to my, or his, satisfaction, to the questions so put to him as aforesaid." "Given," &c. The affidavits, in answer, set out a second warrant, attached to the first, dated the 27th of April, 1846, the day declaration required by requ the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 48, previous to each exa mination. It is sufficient if vious to the he do so pre first examina tion. 1846. In re BULL. on which this rule was obtained. This warrant stated a further examination of the bankrupt, on which occasion his former examination, "whereof copies are set forth in the within warrant," was read over to him; but did not state that he had, previous to such last examination, made or subscribed the declaration required by the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 48; and continued thus, (after setting out the answer made to a question, whether he had any explanation or addition to make to such his former examinations), "which answer being still unsatisfactory to me, I do hereby authorize you to continue to keep and detain the body of the said William Bull," &c. "Given," &c. There were several objections made to the first warrant, which became immaterial, as the judgment of the Court proceeded upon the validity of the second. It was objected to the second warrant, that as it was not in existence when the rule was moved for, it could not be used in answer to it; and that even if it could, it was defective, inasmuch as it did not state that the bankrupt had before his last examination subscribed the declaration which is substituted by the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 48, s. 1, for the oath required by the 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 36. Crompton and J. Addison shewed cause. When the Court grant a rule like the present, which is a very modern practice, it is only to save the expense of having the party brought up upon habeas corpus. But the question of the legality of the custody is always to be discussed as if the writ of habeas corpus had been issued, and the motion were for the prisoner's discharge upon the return. The Court therefore will look at the second warrant. If so, it is submitted that the second warrant is valid, and is a sufficient cause of detainer, inasmuch as it refers to the former warrant and the examinations set forth in it, the answers to which are thereby declared to be not satisfactory to the commissioner. It is said, however, that this second warrant is insufficient, because it does not state that the bankrupt had made a fresh declaration upon his last examination; but it was not necessary to do so. The act of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 48, which substitutes the declaration in lieu of the oath required by the 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 36, evidently contemplates only one declaration which shall relate to all the bankrupt's subsequent examinations. This may be gathered from the terms of the declaration itself as contained in the schedule. “I, A. B., the person declared a bankrupt under a fiat in bankruptcy," &c., "do solemnly promise and declare, that I will make true answer to all such questions as may be proposed to me respecting all the property of the said A. B., and all dealings and transactions relating thereto, and will make a full and true disclosure of all that has been done with the said property, to the best of my knowledge," &c. The words of the 2nd section, that "if any such person so to be examined shall in the course of the examination wilfully make any false statement," &c., shew that the whole is but one examination, though it may be adjourned from day to day. The same point is continually occurring before arbitrators, and at Nisi Prius, where it has never been thought necessary, when the inquiry is adjourned from day to day, to reswear a witness at the next meeting, who has been previously examined. [They referred to Ex parte Dauncey (a) and Ex parte Harrison (b).] Allen, Serjt., and Lush, in support of the rule. It is submitted that the second warrant cannot be used as an answer to this rule, since it was obtained after this rule was moved. But, supposing even that it could, it is insufficient, as it should have appeared that the bankrupt had made and signed the declaration required by the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 48. That statute merely substituted the declaration for the oath required by the former statute. It was always the practice to swear the bankrupt on each examination, and (a) 4 Q. B. 668; S. C. 3 G. & D. 640. (b) 1 B. & Ad. 410. 1846. In re BULL. |