1845. REGINA v. Justices of erroneously conceiving that, as the appeal had been entered and respited at a previous sessions, they were bound to come to a final determination at these sessions, under the 9 Geo. 1, c. 7, s. 8. In the case of Rex v. The Justices of Norfolk (a), where the Court decided against the GOMERYSHIRE. validity of a rule of sessions requiring one calendar month's notice of the entry and respite of the appeal, the decision proceeded upon such a rule controlling in effect the terms of the 9 Geo. 1, c. 7, s. 8, which only required that a reasonable notice should be given. But it has since been generally acknowledged, that that statute only applies to the first sessions after the order of removal has been sent, and to which the appeal is made; and that the Court will not interfere with the discretion of the magistrates at the second as to adjournment, if it is in furtherance of a reasonable practice; Rex v. The Justices of Monmouthshire (b). Then the question is, whether, in the present case, the practice requiring twenty-eight days' notice of prosecuting the appeal, is so unreasonable as to call for the interference of this Court, and it is submitted that it is not. When parties suffer their rights to lie dormant for so long a period of time, as in the present case, where six months have intervened between the execution of the order of removal, and the notice and grounds of appeal being given; a longer notice than is requisite in ordinary cases ought to be given by them to the other side, who may fairly suppose that they mean to acquiesce in the order. Townsend and Pashley in support of the rule. The sessions had no right to require twenty-eight days' notice of trial to be given, and to refuse to hear the appeal because such notice had not been given. A notice of such length is unreasonable, and is contrary to the practice of other sessions, where the notice varies from six to fourteen days. The recent act for the amendment of the poor laws, the (a) 5 B. & Ad. 990; See S. C. 3 N. & M. 55. 1845. REGINA v. Justices of GOMERYSHIRE. 4 & 5 Wm. 4, c. 76, s. 81, only requires the grounds of (a) 5 B. & Ad. 990. (b) 5 B. & Ad. 667; S. C. 2 N. & M. 390. (c) 1 Car, Ham. & Allen's New Sess. Cases, p. 277; See S. C. 1 D. & M. 121. (d) 7 B. & C. 691. (e) 10 East, 404. (f) 2 Q. B. 705; S. C. 1 G. & D. 630, (g) 2 Ventr. 22. in Regina v. Dunn (a), Lord Denman, C. J., says, "It may be enough on this occasion to observe that the Court of King's Bench has, in fact, controlled the decision of the justices, whether in or out of sessions, to a much greater degree than was supposed at the bar." In Rex v. Justices of Staffordshire (b), Lord Denman, C. J., says, "The sessions have no right to introduce a new condition of appeal which is not in the statute." Cur, adv. vult. WIGHTMAN, J.-This was a rule for a mandamus to the justices to enter continuances and hear an appeal against an order of removal. The order was made in December, 1843, and the pauper was removed in November, 1844. The appeal was entered and respited at the April sessions, and notice and grounds of appeal were given fourteen clear days before the first day of the July sessions. The practice of the sessions required twenty-eight days' notice of trial, and because that notice had not been given, the sessions refused to hear the appeal. The question was, whether the rule of practice of the sessions, requiring twenty-eight days' notice instead of fourteen, was so unreasonable that this Court would interfere, and compel them to alter their practice, and shorten the time of notice? Several cases were cited, but none were applicable, but those in which the question was, how far this Court would interfere, on the ground that the sessions had adopted an unreasonable practice. Rex v. The Justices of Wiltshire (c), Rex v. The Justices of Monmouthshire (d), Rex v. The Justices of Lancashire (e), Rex v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire (f), were all cited, and the result of those cases, and indeed of all the later authorities, seems to be this; that the Quarter Sessions are the judges of (a) 12 A. & E. 616. (b) 4 A. & E. 844; See S. C. 6 N. & M. 477. (c) 10 East, 404. (d) 3 Dowl. 306. 1845. REGINA v. Justices of MONTGOMERYSHIRE. 1845. REGINA v. Justices of GOMERYSHire. their own rules of practice, and that this Court will not interfere with their determinations respecting them, unless the rules upon which they have acted, are so unreasonable as to be illegal. In the present case, the rule requiring twenty-eight days' notice of trial of an adjourned or respited appeal, where no previous notice has been given, though it seems unnecessary, can hardly be said to be so unreasonable that the Court would interfere on that ground. The interval between one sessions and another leaves ample time for the giving such a notice; and it appears therefore to me, that in this case the Court ought not to interfere with the determination of the sessions. Rule discharged. In an action on a guarantee, mise by the in the event a sum of HIGGINS v. DIXON. ASSUMPSIT on a guarantee. The declaration stated, the declaration that one A. Mangeon was indebted to the plaintiff stated a proin 157. 3s.; that the plaintiff had commenced an action defendant that in the Common Pleas against the said A. M. for the recovery of that sum, which action was pending at the time of the after-mentioned promise of the defendant ; that in consideration of the premises, and that the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, would forbear and give time to the said A. M. for the payment of the said sum, and interest at four per cent., on the 26th of October to the plaintiff. then next, the defendant undertook and promised, and guaranteed the plaintiff, that in the event of the said A. M. making default in payment of the said sum, &c., the defendant would, immediately on such default being made, defendant would im mediately on such default, pay the same In the guarantee itself, the terms were "in the event of A. M. making default, I will, immediately upon such default being made, and a letter being sent to me addressed, &c., giving me notice of such default, pay, &c:" Held, that there was a material variance between the declaration and the guarantee; the former alleging an absolute promise to pay on default, while the promise in the latter was coupled with the condition of sending a letter, &c., which was a material qualification. pay to the plaintiff the said sum of 151. 3s., or so much. thereof as should then remain unpaid, together with interest, &c. It then proceeded to aver, that the plaintiff, confiding, &c., did forbear, &c.; that A. M. made default, &c., of which the defendant had notice. Breach; that the defendant, though requested, had not paid the said sum of 15. 3s., and interest, &c. The defendant pleaded non-assumpsit, on which issue was joined; and other pleas not material to the present case. The cause was tried before the sheriff of Middlesex, and the guarantee, which was given in evidence, was in the following terms: 1845. HIGGINS v. DIXON. Mangeon. "In consideration of the above named plaintiff having granted the defendant time for payment of the debt herein, being 157. 3s., together with interest thereon after the rate of four per cent. per annum, from the 12th day of July, 1843, I, the undersigned, do hereby undertake, guarantee, and agree, by way of collateral security, that in the event of the defendant making default in payment of the said judgment debt on the 26th day of October next, I will, immediately upon such default being made, and a letter being sent to me, addressed to No. 62, Gower Street, Bedford Square, giving me notice of such default, pay the amount due, or so much thereof as shall then remain unpaid to the plaintiff, together with interest thereon as aforesaid. And it is hereby expressly understood, that nothing herein contained shall be deemed or construed to be taken as a release of the judgment already signed herein, but as a suspension only for the space of six months. "R. DIXON." It appeared from the undersheriff's notes, that a letter was posted by the plaintiff, addressed to "- Dixon, Esq., |