same day, and it became material to consider the fraction of a day.] It appears, that appeals are not tried on the first day of the Middlesex Sessions. The law, however, takes no notice of adjournments, but contemplates the sessions as one day; the notice, therefore, must be given for the first day; Rex v. The Justices of Surrey (a). [Wightman, J.—— I think the day on which the appeal is entered, must for this purpose be considered as the day on which it is brought.] As to the waiver, the point was not raised at the sessions, and if it had been, the justices would not have been bound by it. They cited Rex v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire (b), Regina v. The Justices of Middlesex (c). [It was also contended that the sessions had no jurisdiction, as the application for relief was not made to the trustees in proper time; but that point was not referred to in the judgment.] Pashley, in support of the rule. The notice was in time. In Legge v. Williams (d), it was held, that under the 14 Geo. 2, c. 17, s. 4, which required notice to be given "at least ten days" before a trial, a notice on the 9th for the 19th was sufficient. That case was not cited in Zouch v. Empsey (e). In Regina v. The Justices of Shropshire (f), the notice was required to be given "fourteen days at least before the first day of the sessions." That case is, therefore, distinguishable; as the terminus ad quem was there distinctly pointed out, and expressly excluded. He cited also Rex v. Goodenough (g), Rex v. The Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire (h), Gould v. Hole (i). But the Court will notice the fraction of a day, and if so it is clear that more than seven days, that is more than seven 1845. REGINA v. Justices of MIDDLESEX. 1845. REGINA v. Justices of times twenty-four hours, intervened between the notice and the beginning of the sessions in this case; Symons v. Low (a), Pugh v. Robinson (b), Ex parte Farquhar (c), Ex parte MIDDLESEX. Davey (d), Ex parte Senior (e), Godson v. Sanctuary (f). In Harper v. Taswell (g), Tindal, C. J., says, The statute requires that he shall wait five whole days, "that is five times twenty-four hours." Cowie v. Harris (h) is to the same effect. The rule is, that where the time is to be computed from the doing of an act, the day on which it is done is included; otherwise, where the time is to be reckoned from a given day; Bellasis v. Hester (i), citing Clayton's case (k), Co. Litt. 46, b., 255, a., Com. Dig., "Temps," (A.), Norris v. The Hundred of Gawtry (1), Glassington v. Rawlins (m), Hardy v. Ryle (n), in which case Bayley, J., distinguishes between those who are privies to an act and strangers. He also contended, that the words "at least," had not the strict meaning attributed to them, but were necessary to be used to preclude the argument that exactly seven days' notice was required. Cur. adv. vult. WIGHTMAN, J.-This was a rule for a mandamus to the justices to enter continuances and hear the appeal of one Henry Thomas against a poor-rate for the parish of St. Leonard, Shoreditch. The proceedings were under a local act, 53 Geo. 3, c. cxii., regulating the parish. The act authorizes a party aggrieved to apply for relief to the trustees, and, if dissatisfied with their determination, to appeal to a Quarter Sessions to be holden within three months next after such determination. In case of such appeal, the (a) Styles, 72. (b) 1 T. R. 116. (c) Mont. & Macarthur, 7. (d) 4 D. & R. 646. (e) 1 Dowl. 517. (f) 4 B. & Ad. 255. (i) 1 Ld. Raym. 280. (k) 5 Rep. 1, a. (1) Hob. 139. (m) 3 East, 407; See S. C. 4 Esp. 224. (n) 9 B. & C. 603; See S. C. 4 M. & R. 295. 1845. REGINA v. Justices of appellant is required to give "seven days' notice at least," in writing, of his intention to bring such appeal. The first day of the sessions at which the appeal was entered was the 7th of January, and the notice was served at half-past nine MIDDLESEX. in the forenoon of the previous 31st of December. The question was, whether the day of the service could be included in the computation of the seven days, or whether the seven days were to be exclusive of the day on which the notice was given, as well as of the day on which the sessions were held. If this question were to be considered now for the first time, I should be disposed to doubt whether by the words, seven days' notice at least," more was meant than that seven days should be the shortest notice, but that more might be given if the party pleased; but it has been so frequently decided that the words " at least" have the effect of excluding the day of the notice, as well as the day of the act of which notice is given, that it seems to me too late now to raise the question, and that we must abide by what has been so frequently decided. The cases of Zouch v. Empsey (a), The Queen v. The Justices of Shropshire (b), and Mitchell v. Foster (c), are direct authorities that the words "at least" have the effect of excluding the day of the notice, and the day of the act to be done; and in the two latter cases the Court, without approving the former decisions, consider they are bound by them, and that the point may be considered settled. It was contended that the fraction of a day might be considered, and that the notice might be calculated from the hour of the day on which it was served; but there is no authority for such a proposition as applicable to cases like the present. In all such cases the general rule excluding fractions of a day from the computation of time has been applied, and great inconvenience might follow if it were not so. Where the question is, which of two acts, or conflicting (c) 12 A. & E. 472; See S. C. 4 P. & D. 150. (a) 4 B. & A. 522. (b) 8 A. & E. 173. VOL. III. 1845. REGINA rights, shall take precedence of the other, the precise time, including fractions of a day, must necessarily be inquired into; but such cases are not applicable to the present, which MIDDLESEX. must be governed by the general rule. V. Justices of Upon habeas corpus to discharge a prisoner out of custody who has been committed by virtue of an order of magistrates, under the 8 Vict. c. 8, s. 25, (the Mutiny Act) for assisting to conceal a deserter; notice of the rule should be served upon the secretary at war. I am, therefore, of opinion that the notice was served one day too late, and consequently that the sessions were warranted in refusing to hear the appeal. There were other points made upon the argument to which it is unnecessary now to advert; for some of them were disposed of at the time, and the consideration of the others is rendered unnecessary by the opinion I have formed as to the sufficiency of the notice. Ex parte GALE. Rule discharged. A HABEAS corpus having been obtained, directed to the gaoler of Durham gaol, to bring up the body of one Matthew Gale, the younger, committed to his custody on a conviction under the Mutiny Act, 8 Vict. c. 8, s. 25, for assisting to conceal a deserter, on the ground that the warrant was bad for defects on the face of it (a); Bramwell now moved that the prisoner be discharged out of custody. WIGHTMAN, J.-Ought not the crown to have notice of this motion? Have you given any notice to the secretary at war? Bramwell. Notice has not been given to the secretary at war; but it has been given to the informer, and to the committing magistrates, who do not appear to oppose his discharge. It is submitted that the crown has no interest in this party's being detained, more than in any other (a) The warrant set out an adjudication of two magistrates, that the party should "forfeit the sum of 20%., or three months' imprisonment," without stating that there were not sufficient goods whereon the penalty could be recovered, pursuant to sec. 77. There were several other defects. criminal case, in which it is never usual to consider the crown for this purpose as an interested party. WIGHTMAN, J.-This concerns the public service, being the case of a person who has assisted a deserter from her Majesty's service. It is always usual in the case of smugglers to give notice to the board of customs. Besides, by the 78th section of the Mutiny Act, one moiety of the penalty is to be paid to "the general agent for the recruiting service in London, to be at the disposal of the secretary at war." I think, in the present instance, you had better give notice to the secretary at war. On a subsequent day, Bramwell produced an affidavit of notice having been given, and on the return being read, and the defects pointed out, and no cause being shewn, the Court ordered the prisoner to be discharged. 1845. Ex parte Prisoner discharged. TAYLOR V. HODGSON. attorney en costs in a does not on THIS was an action of debt for work and labour as Where an an attorney and as the defendant's agent, and for money closes an unpaid, and on an account stated. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and that no signed bill had been delivered in pursuance of the statute 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73 (a). The plaintiff joined issue on the first plea; and replied to the second plea, that he did, above one calendar month before the commencement of the action, to wit, on, &c., send by the post to the defendant, to wit, at his office of business, a bill of the said fees, charges, and disbursements in the said plea mentioned, and which said bill was then accompanied by a letter subscribed with the proper hand of the (a) It would seem that the plaintiff was not bound to deliver a signed bill, this being for agency business; See In re Gedye, signed bill of letter signed by him, and the bill of costs the face of it shew who is the party chargeable letter may be referred to to supply that defect. therewith, the |